Amitai Etzioni Notes

Terrorists are a unique breed

McCain maintains that the Supreme Court decision that acknowledged that terrorists have some rights, is “one of the worst decisions in the history of this country.” Obama states that we can hunt down the terrorists using constitutional means, that is, deal with them like other criminals. As a former terrorist, let me tell you that both are wrong.

Clearly terrorists are human beings, and as such they are entitled to some basic rights, for instance not to be tortured and not to be held indefinitely without being charged. However it does not follow that they are entitled to the same rights as an American citizen who never lifted his hand against his country. They are best treated as a category in and of themselves.

One major reason they cannot be treated as criminals is that suicide bombers, as a rule, cannot be hauled into a court, brought to justice, or deterred by the threat of life in prison. What gives pause to criminals has little effect on terrorists. They are gone once they have carried out their mission.

Moreover, typically criminals do not set out to terrorize a nation, to change its policies or replace its regime. Criminals do not aspire to use weapons of mass destruction and do not commit suicide as a tactic in pursuit of some collective goal. Because the threats posed by terrorists are of a much higher magnitude than those posed by criminals, curbing terrorism requires a different approach than that of law enforcement. The first goal in dealing with terrorists must not be prosecution, which takes place after the act has been committed and is generally the way society limits criminality, but should instead be prevention.

To hold that terrorists cannot be treated as criminals is not to suggest that the "war on terrorism" is the best metaphor or that terrorists are to be treated as soldiers. As I see it, both images - along with the strategies, tactics and laws they invoke - are misleading. It is best to view terrorists as a distinct category. Unlike bona fide soldiers, terrorists do not wear uniforms indicating which government is responsible for their acts. They frequently and easily pass themselves off as civilians, leading to a unique set of burdens on those who must fight them. This is what I did when I helped blow up British installations in Palestine, erected to prevent Jews escaping Nazi Europe from reaching their new homeland.

Terrorists are surely entitled to basic human rights, as are all human beings. However, we cannot allow them full access to all the evidence against them, which criminals are entitled to, without creating unacceptable security risks. I favor allowing terrorists to choose among lawyers who have security clearances, allowing these lawyers to see the government evidence but not sources and methods. Terrorists should not be detained endlessly without being charged in a court of law, but the government should have a right to hold them longer than regular criminals to allow time for finding their partners before it is disclosed that they have been captured.

Up to a point these anti-terrorism measures can be viewed as merely modifications of the criminal justice system. However, given their scope and number, in effect they amount to a different approach. This is most evident when we acknowledge that prevention requires questioning and even detaining people who have not yet violated any law.

In short, although one might differ about how far one can go in trying to deter terrorism, and how to proceed, one may still agree that it makes little sense to treat terrorists either as criminals or as soldiers. At issue is not a matter of neat classifications, but ways to maintain the institutions of a free society while also protecting it from devastating attacks.

The EU Bombers

I live in a building owned jointly by a hundred families, a cooperative. The other day the board asked the members to vote on a plan to spend four million dollars on renovating the building. When the members voted “nay,” the board asked for another vote, on a slightly reconfigured loan. The membership reacted with great dismay, as it was obvious that if they had voted for the loan, no second vote would have been called for. They felt manipulated, and their resentment is still agitating our small community and threatening future plans to act in unison.

EU politicians are responding to the Irish “nay” vote on the Lisbon Treaty in the same high handed manner my board did, and the effect will be the same. EU leaders are all for democracy—as long as the people vote the way they prefer the vote to come out. In effect, leading EU politicians are more devious than my board. At first they pressured Ireland to hold a swift second referendum. When the Irish refused, the EU politicians called for others to proceed anyhow.

First of all, both German and French leaders, and even the highly respected Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxemburg, called for the other 26 nations to proceed in ratifying the treaty. This move makes little sense if the EU is going to abide by the procedures it itself set, namely that all 27 member nations must ratify the treaty for it to take effect. Why ask for the remaining 26 to go through the trouble if the treaty cannot be legally implemented anyhow?

One response is that, as France's Europe minister, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, put it, that the EU will find some “specific means of cooperation” with Ireland. Another-- a two speed Europe, in which those nations that will ratify the treaty will work more closely together than the others. In either case, the remaining 26 countries do not plan to allow their people to vote on the very consequential treaty, and will rely on ratification by the parliaments. The result? Growing alienation from the whole EU project by large segments of the European publics.

The EU politicians involved are emboldened by the decades in which they made what they considered great progress without truly involving the people. The EU’s European Commission made hundred of decisions without effective public hearings or proper consultations with the citizens of the countries involved or even with the weak EU Parliament. Those decisions stuck because they often dealt with highly technical matters (e.g. harmonizing the axle widths of the railroads of the various countries);  the EU ignored the fact that many member nations did not implement the policies the EU pronounced (e.g. the requirement that each member nation dedicate 3% of its public budget to research and development); or — the decisions did cause a measure of resentment, but an initially limited one. However over the years, the high-handed ways of the Commission have become one reason major segments of European publics have soured on the whole idea of a united Europe. True, when the French and the Dutch voted “no” on a previous round of the treaty (then called a constitution), they had several reasons, but among them was a lack of ardor for the whole EU project.

Moreover, the issues the EU now faces are far from limited technical ones, but tap into deep-seated political, moral and emotional issues, such as what is to be done about immigration (which the citizens of several nations are keen to limit, while other EU nations allow immigrants in quite readily-- immigrants quick to move to other parts of the EU); terrorists (different nations have very different notions about civil rights); further enlargement (esp. the admission of Turkey); and above all, the surrender of sovereignty, which the significant increases in EU majority voting, detailed in the new treaty, will result in.

These are not matters that lawyers, civil servants, and a few representatives can rule upon in secret or opaque meetings, or ram through parliaments-- if the majority of the public has other preferences. Either the majorities will have to be persuaded, or the policies adapted. If the EU continues to proceed in the same high-handed, undemocratic way it has been acting, it will face ever more resentment and opposition.
The rejection of the further expansion and enlargement of the EU will express itself in many ways. In some cases, national governments that are pro-EU will be voted out of office. In others, voters will flock to nationalistic right wing parties or movements. Or, they will support strikes, demonstrations, and even civil disobedience to EU measures, or vent their frustrations in some other way.

The time has come when the EU authorities and those who champion the EU project either win more people over to their cause, or sharply modify their project. Most likely they must do both if the EU is to continue to grow and not regress to a merely trade union.

Sorry, sanctions will not do

    

In seeking ways to pressure Iran to stop enriching uranium and clear the air about its nuclear ambitions, adding tougher sanctions to those already in place is often mentioned. For instance, John McCain stated at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) policy conference last week that he favors imposing limits on Iranian imports of gasoline and a worldwide campaign to freeze Iranian assets. Barack Obama, speaking before the same body, said that he would pursue a similar policy if Iran remained uncooperative, stating that “If Iran fails to change course… we [will] insist on stronger sanctions in the Security Council.”  Nancy Pelosi holds that: "Sanctions that are far-reaching and tough demonstrate to Iranian leaders that their behavior is recognized as a threat….”

Most recently, following a joint statement with the Bush Administration on intensifying sanctions, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the European Union will freeze the overseas assets of Iran’s largest commercial bank; he also stated that if Iran persists in defying existing United Nations resolutions, European leaders would begin considering further sanctions on investments in Iran’s oil and natural gas industries. 

It’s easy to understand why politicians love sanctions. They sound tough. They’re more than just talk but less than dreaded acts of war (which surely should only be considered—if at all—if all other means have been exhausted). Moreover, there are not many other arrows in the quiver of foreign policy.
But sanctions often do not work; indeed they often backfire, and they have some very undesirable side effects. 

The United States isolated Castro’s Cuba for four decades, banning trade with and travel to and from the island as well as exerting pressure on other nations to follow the same course.  Containment of Cuba failed to grant its people more rights or to introduce democratic reforms.  North Korea and Saddam’s Iraq are two regimes which were long under sanctions but which persisted for decades. 
In contrast, when China was still very much under totalitarian Communist rule in 1972, the United States decided to engage it in commerce, tourism, and more. It is far from a shining democracy, but it has become much more moderate since those days. The same holds true for Vietnam.  The fifteen former Soviet Republics have changed even more, including on the political front, largely after the West engaged them instead of trying to isolate them through the use of sanctions.

The comprehensive sanctions imposed by the U.S. and others on Iraq in the 1990s failed to impress Saddam, who made out like a bandit due to the smuggling which various corrupt international players engaged in to circumvent the sanctions. At the same time the sanctions exacted a harsh price from the citizens of Iraq, leading to the deaths of many children, as access to needed supplies were limited. 

True, the sanctions that have been imposed against Iran are different, more “graduated and targeted” than those that were imposed against Iraq in the 1990s. In the words of Matthew Levitt, director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy at the Washington Institute, “these are not your grandfather’s sanctions.” They are designed to exert coercive power only against “those elements of Iranian society specifically engaged in illicit conduct” rather than against the entire society.

But even when sanctions do have a bite, as they seemed to have had in the case of Libya, they take decades to have an effect and required almost universal support. It does not take a degree in rocket science or economics to realize that if the U.S. is imposing sanctions that many other nations are not  adhering to, their main effect will be to deflect trade and other forms of business from the U.S. to other nations. Thus, the extensive U.S. sanctions on Iraq in the ‘90s failed, in part, because many of Iraq's neighbors (and several other nations) did not abide by them.   

There is even less support for sanctions on Iran. Iran is laughing all the way to the bank, as the United States-imposed sanctions cost it much less than the extra revenue it is generating due to rising price of oil, and it is swimming in deals with Russia and in investments from China and India.

In short, sanctions may be good politics, but not good foreign policy. The dealings with Iran will have to follow the same path that Clinton followed and— in its waning days—that the Bush administration is following in their dealings with North Korea: offering to cease trying to overthrow the regime by the use of force if they will give up their nuclear arms ambitions and cease supporting terrorism. Such negotiations, one should not deny, are propelled forward by keeping all other options on the table, including the military one. And that is where that option best stay.

The Irish, the last democrats in the EU?

On June 12 the Irish will be given an opportunity to vote on whether or not they are willing to give up a major chunk of their national sovereignty. It is an opportunity that was denied to all the other citizens of the 27 nations that make up the European Union. The EU champions democracy for other nations, to the four corners of the earth; however, it is refusing most of its own citizens the right to vote on an important issue, namely whether they are willing to allow the EU government to make major decisions directly affecting their lives—circumventing their nationally elected bodies. True, the EU has been making decisions for all its members for decades, but most of the important ones were in effect subject to veto by each nation, as unanimity was required. Now the EU plans to change its setup and allow for majority vote on numerous important matters.
 
The Brown government in the UK, ‘the mother of democracy’, is one of those that, despite repeated promises to allow the people to vote on the matter (through a referendum), is welshing on this commitment. It plans to submit the treaty to discussion and vote only in the Parliament for one simple reason—it looks like the majority of the people would reject this loss of independence.
 
Moreover, other EU member nations are following the same path,
denying their citizens the opportunity to vote on the new treaty, which is replacing the rejected constitution, but is in many ways similar to it. These anti-democratic moves take place despite the fact that there is growing alienation of the EU’s people from the European institutions, especially the Commission (the EU executive branch), caused in part by the often arbitrary ways in which the Commission acts, putting its judgments ahead of and above the preferences of the people.

What would a sociologist on the side of the angels—or at least on that of democracy—do to ‘reconnect’ the EU citizens to the evolving European institutions?  She would insist that the new treaty be voted upon by the people rather than by the parliaments, given that parliaments often do not reflect the voters’ preferences well enough on specific issues. Rather than conducting referendums one nation at a time, she would insist that it be conducted by all EU citizens voting at the same time. And, instead of merely asking the public to vote the whole treaty up or down, voters would be offered alternative formulations to rule in or out. For instance, the public could be asked whether EU enlargement should require a unanimous vote or merely a simple majority; whether the EU should move toward a political union (e.g., have a foreign minister of its own) or merely aspire to be a civil society; and whether limitations on the movement of labor from new members to old ones should be unbounded or curbed.
   
Above all, such a sociologist would urge that for a given period, say six months, an EU-wide focused dialogue should precede the vote. Plebiscites have long been criticized as anti-democratic because, among other reasons, they express the passion of the moment rather than reflecting the results of deliberations. Hence the need to allow for dialogues, periods in which people can consult with each other and their leaders. These tend to be especially effective when the public realizes that they are going to lead to a specific conclusion (in this case, the vote on the ratification of the EU treaty) rather than being merely ‘educational.’

Societies—even ones as large as the United States—do engage in dialogues about public policies. Most times, one or two topics top the public dialogue agenda; for instance, whether or not to allow gay marriages or whether the time has come to withdraw the troops from Iraq. These dialogues often seem endless and impassioned, but actually, most do lead to new, widely shared, public understanding. Such understandings, in turn, often provide the basis for changes in public policy that are well grounded in popular opinion.

Europe has had several such dialogues, but those were conducted largely within each nation—in part because people still see themselves first of all as citizens of this or that nation and not as Europeans, and in part because the points of closure—where these dialogues lead to changes in public policy—often are still national and not EU-wide. Hence, it is important that this time the vote be EU-wide and binding on the EU as a whole.

Critics argue that ‘Brussels’ has succeeded for decades in promoting one policy after another, without such public participation. Such critics ignore that many of these policies are of limited importance (e.g. dealing with the width of trucks’ axles) or are resolutions which, once passed, governments and citizens were largely free to ignore (e.g. a resolution calling for member nations to increase their R&D budgets beyond 3% of the their total budget).  This kind of ineffective legislation has fed into growing alienation that is now bubbling to the surface.

The EU can continue to limp into the future without narrowing the disconnect between its institutions and its citizens. This amounts to a sociological time bomb, as the EU is continuously expanding the scope of its community-wide actions, encompassing issues that are of considerable interest to the public and are highly emotionally charged. For instance, matters concerning immigration, anti-terrorism policy, and enforcement of human rights. It is not too late to follow the Irish and allow all EU citizens an effective vote about key matters concerning their national and shared regional future.

What to do about hate?

Please email me, post below, send it by carrier pigeon or in whatever other way that suits you, any suggestion on what to do about people who hate. I cannot get out of my mind the kinds of things that  were said to white volunteers who were canvassing for Barack Obama.  Some, in Indiana, were told, “Hang that darky from a tree!” while others faced such comments as “I’ll never vote for a black person” and “He's a half-breed and he's a Muslim. How can you trust that?”  In West Virginia, NPR reporters were told that Obama didn’t stand a chance because West Virginians “can’t stand the thought of a black man telling a white man what to do.” I cannot stomach citing more, but trust me, there were many more, each uglier and more hateful than the other.

A large number of Americans tell pollsters that they would not vote for a woman, a Hispanic, an Asian, an African American, or a Mormon—even if they grant that the particular person is qualified for the job.  A recent survey— to be released by Andrew Kohut this summer— shows that anti-Semitism is rising all over the world, including, out of all places, in Germany. Some years back, someone interviewed minority kids who visited the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC. They said that they could not understand what all the fuss was about. The Jews, after all….

If you turn your eyes to the Middle East, not only do Christians and Muslims clash, but two kinds of Muslims-- Sunnis and Shi’ites-- slaughter each other (including killing children and women and pulling people out of hospitals if they are the “wrong” kind of Muslim). In addition, recently Shi’ites have been killing Shi’ites (in Sadr City and Basra, among other places). Actually, you do not have to look that far; if you read some of the comments posted here, they are not particularly loving.

Now, I did social science for fifty years. I am aware that there is a huge body of literature on hate—what drives it and some all too optimistic suggestions on what can be done about it. I know there are all kinds of sensitivity classes and consciousness raising courses, but they often do not work; indeed, some backfire. The main treatment that I am aware of that seems to work is to make those who spout hate walk in the other person’s shoes. 

A powerful example of how one can generate such experiences is the following account of what happened in a classroom in Iowa.  In 1968, a teacher decided that it would be inappropriate to hold a conventional discussion on the plight of black Americans shortly after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.  Instead she decided to try to teach discrimination to her third-graders by affecting their experiences. The teacher divided her class into two groups by eye color—the blue-eyed students in one group and the brown-eyed in the other.  “Today,” she said one Friday, “the blue-eyed people will be on the bottom and the brown-eyed people on the top.”  She continued: “What I mean is that brown-eyed people are better than blue-eyed people.  They are cleaner than blue-eyed people.  They are more civilized than blue-eyed people.  And they are smarter than blue-eyed people.”  Blue-eyed children could not use the nearest water fountain nor go to the yard during break. They were ignored during class discussions.

The experiment’s effects were swift and severe.  “Long before noon, I was sick,” the teacher recalls.  “I wished I had never started it…. By the lunch hour there was no need to think before identifying a child as blue- or brown-eyed.  I could tell simply by looking at them.  The brown-eyed children were happy, alert, having the times of their lives…. The blue-eyed children were miserable.”  In short, the children had learned through experience what discrimination is like. 
The children were deeply affected by the exercise.  A blue-eyed student reported that she “...felt dirty.  And did not feel as smart as [she] did on Friday.”  Another student wrote: “I do not like discrimination.  It makes me feel sad.”

The mother of one of the students reported, “My mother-in-law stays with us a lot, and she frequently uses the word ‘nigger.’  The very first time she did it after your lesson, my daughter went up to her and said, ‘Grandma, we don’t use that word in our house, and if you’re going to say it, I’m going to leave until you go home.’  We were delighted.  And it worked, too.  She’s stopped saying it.”

Such experiences leave strong and lasting impressions.  In 1984 the class had a reunion.  They vividly recalled their 1968 lesson.  Former student Susan Rolland noted that “I still find myself sometimes, when I see some blacks together and I see how they act, I think, well, that’s black…. And then later—as I said, I won’t even finish the thought before I remember back when I was in that position.”  Other students reported that their career choices were influenced by the discrimination experience.  Several chose as a result to join the Peace Corps or work with other cultures overseas.

Very compelling—until you ask how one can take millions of people and get them to participate in such an exercise.  So I am back where I started-- not a good place. Anyone out there, any suggestions?

Irrational Leaders and Nuclear Arms: A Response

Recently, I pointed out that the report of an FBI agent who interviewed Saddam for several months is very telling. It shows that policy makers and my colleagues are wrong when they argue that leaders of nations, such as North Korea and Iran, are rational, and hence can be trusted with nuclear arms. We are told that these leaders and others like them will never use such bombs because they are aware of the devastation which would soon follow. But, as detailed in the report, it turned out that Saddam greatly misjudged the situation he faced in 2003. His mistake did cost his country plenty, and he, of course, is not doing too well either. [previous post here]

In response to my short essay, several commentators pointed out that President Bush is the one who is irrational. However, this claim does not contradict my position; on the contrary, all it shows is that the world would be much safer if fewer nations had nuclear arms and if those who do have them gave up as many of them as we could induce them to.

Others claimed that I am trying to justify an attack on Iran. Actually, I argued the opposite. A lengthy quote follows, which outlines how I believe we can come to terms with Iran without war and without more countries in the Middle East setting out to get nuclear weapons.

“As of mid 2006, the US has continued openly seeking regime change in both Iran and North Korea. We have long condemned the regime of the mullahs, barely acknowledged Iran’s contributions to curbing Al Qaeda, and announced increased funding for Iranian groups that seek to undermine the mullah’s reign. US opposition to Communist forms of government is well known and its condemnations of North Korea’s violation of human rights could not be any harsher. In dealing with both nations, but especially with Iran, the military option for disposing of the regimes has repeatedly and often been discussed by the Bush Administration.
    "Both Iran and North Korea are reported to have sought non-aggression treaties or security guarantees from the West as part of a deproliferation deal. If these deals could be struck and faithfully carried out, they would in effect entail ‘trading’ deproliferation, verified by vigorous inspections and by denying these nations their own uranium enrichment facilities, with leaving their authoritarian regimes in place, subject only to internal challenges….
   “There is no way to determine a priori whether North Korea and Iran made these offers in good faith or merely to gain time in which to advance their nuclear programs.  From their viewpoint, however, one can readily see why they would want such a deal.  Both nations have military bases of the US and its allies on their borders. If the US and its allies were willing to remove these bases and provide international assurances that they would not directly attack these nations nor indirectly seek to subvert their regimes, one can see why these governments might consider an exchange of their nuclear weapons program for such guarantees. However, one can hardly expect them to seriously consider a deal that will also put the governing elites—and the form of regime they hold sacred—into play, which is exactly what regime change entails. It would be like demanding that Bush turn over the White House to Gore and replace the United States Constitution with the Shariah!
    “The implied deal I suggest, which would allow authoritarian regimes to be subject only to internal challenges in exchange for deproliferation and ending the support for terrorism, is less bitter than it seems. It would not mean that the West must engage in some kind of Faustian bargain and give up its liberal soul in exchange for security.  Regime changes are coming on their own in Iran and in communist states—granted North Korea is lagging….
    “No matter how much money and effort the US and its allies expend, they could never make such nations into liberal democracies.  As we have seen time and time again, the West can topple Saddam or the Taliban but it cannot install a regime that respects human rights and democracy in countries with little preparation for such polities.  Hence, there is little to be lost and much to be gained by providing security guarantees and other international “rewards” in exchange for vigorous and verified deproliferation and the end of harboring, financing, and equipping Hezbollah and its ilk.” (Quote is from my book, Security First, published by Yale in mid-2007)

True, it may be tactically unwise to grant one’s adversary what they most seek to gain with negotiations before the negotiations even start. Hence, one can fully favor the idea that the US should talk with its adversaries, but still leave the military option in the air—to be traded off during the give and take. One may well disagree with this tactic. However in either case, what we need is fewer nations with nuclear arms, not more wars.

On the campus: forty years later

A 1968 issue of the New York Times magazine carries a picture of yours truly waving a finger at a mass of students at Columbia University. The picture accompanies an article I wrote on my experience, called “confessions of a professor caught in a revolution.” At the time, left-leaning students had occupied several buildings on campus after the university’s president ignored their repeated requests to discuss their grievances. Right-wing students sought to rush the buildings and drive out the occupying students. I belonged to a group of faculty that formed a cordon between the two groups, to prevent a confrontation sure to turn violent.  We succeeded.

Columbia, along with most other American colleges and universities, has come a long way from 1968. True, some still have stuck up presidents, and some still follow policies that give grief to anyone with a social consciousness. However, the fortieth anniversary of the student uprising at Columbia is a good time to note how far things have come. Doing so gives hope to those of us who continue to campaign for change on the societal level as well as in the university system.

•In 1968, all professors in my department were white males. At meetings of the admissions committee for graduate students, faculty often scrutinized photos of the candidates (required as part of the application in those days) and preference was sometimes given to those applicants found to be good looking  by the faculty (many of whom had student mistresses). These days faculties are diverse; perhaps not as much as they ought to be, but a long way from what they used to be. Also, colleges have adopted strict policies on intimate relations between professors and students, although these are not always enforced.

•Grayson L. Kirk, president of Columbia University in 1968, paid little mind not only to the preferences and views of students but also those of the faculty. He did not survive the 1968 uprising, and was unceremoniously retired. The new president, Andrew W. Cordier was much more accessible. Today you do still find presidents who pursue their own lights, but they tend to end up like Harvard’s former President Larry Summers—looking for another job.

•In 1968, Columbia University was expanding, paying little mind to the needs of its mostly lower income, mostly African American neighbors at the edge of Harlem. Today, many worry it is doing the same with its controversial plans for a new campus in Manhattanville. Although, to be sure, it is proceeding much more cautiously and somewhat more openly than in 1968.  Since then, the relationships between Town and Gown have continued to be complex and tense, in. colleges from Yale to UCLA. Still universities tend to pay more attention to the needs of their neighbors, especially if these are poor or members of minorities, than they did forty years ago.

•Columbia University prided itself in 1968 on its ‘core curriculum’—a series of courses (required for all undergraduates) on the history, philosophy, and culture of Western Civilization, with a strong emphasis on the classics.  Since then, partially in response to criticism that a curriculum dominated exclusively by ‘dead white men’ hardly amounted to adequate preparation for ‘contemporary civilization,’ the required curriculum has expanded to include numerous courses in non-western cultures, as well as more female and non-white author who write in the Western tradition. In effect, currently there are some who believe that Columbia and other universities have gone too far in trying to be multicultural, and have lost their role as institutions dedicated to transmitting the core of Western culture.

•The least amount of change since 1968 has occurred in the academic pecking order. Columbia and other high prestige universities still tend to scoff at “applied” disciplines such as criminology, education and social work, even business and engineering and tend to extol abstract subjects such as pure math, economic theory, and scientific models. The fact that applied and abstract disciplines have a lot to give each other—that applied ones serve as important corrective to blue yonder theories, and abstract theories can provide strong underpinning and drive new insights in applied ones—is not much better understood today than in 1968. Maybe it will take another forty years to bridge this gap. Given that colleges did make substantial albeit insufficient progress on the other fronts, hope springs eternal.

Lessons from Myanmar

The weeks of delay in delivering humanitarian aid to the suffering millions in Myanmar highlighted one more time a new transnational norm, that governments have a duty to protect their people, and—that if they do not discharge it, they forfeit their right to sovereignty. It is a fine norm, but as it turns out, more than a new norm is needed.

The family provides a good analogy. Once upon a time, it was widely agreed that one’s home was one’s castle, and that whatever happened in one’s home was nobody else’s business. Feminists changed this concept, arguing that when one has reason to believe that child or spousal abuse occurs in a given home, intervention is justified. Thus, if neighbors hear someone being thrown against the wall and a cry for help, the community should rush in. In short, the right to privacy is not absolute. The same notion is now being applied to international relations.

Once upon a time, when a king converted his people from one religion to another—other kings sent their armies to convert them back. The results were very bloody wars. These came to an end in 1648, when the warring nations signed several treaties known together as the Peace of Westphalia, which entail a commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of another nation. Since then, the notion of national sovereignty has become almost sacrosanct.

A challenge to this concept came in 1996, when a Sudanese diplomat by the name of Francis M. Deng, troubled by the resistance of some nations to efforts to provide their people with humanitarian assistance, published a book entitled Sovereignty as Responsibility. Deng argued that sovereignty was not absolute but conditional; for it to be respected, a nation had to be a good citizen of the international community.  If a nation fails in this duty, the international community may intervene to protect the at-risk citizens of the offending nation.

This idea was embraced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, established by the Canadian government, and by Kofi Annan and the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005. Myanmar would have been a place where this new doctrine could have been applied. Indeed, we suggested that the country should be bombed with packages of rice, whether or not the junta welcomed such flights.

Events in recent days show that much more than a change in norms is needed.  We see that all too often, when the United Nations sends in help, especially when it consists of peacekeepers or other personnel needed to deliver humanitarian aid, these individuals can become part of the problem. They pressure children for sexual favors; they deal in controlled substances; and they squander a good part of the aid they bring.  Moreover, whenever the United Nations is called on for help, from Rwanda to East Timor, it typically must first scramble to find the funds and troops to respond.

Clearly what is needed is (a) a much larger contingent of so called Blue Helmets, UN forces. (b) These have to be placed near likely hot spots, on a stand-by basis. (c) These troops ought to be professionalized by mixing personnel from nations whose forces have already been trained properly and have developed the needed upright culture, with forces from nations whose troops still occupy a lower place on the learning curve.

Sadly there will be more Myanmars and Rwandas, indeed there is a need for more humanitarian intervention in the Sudan and the Congo right now. Granted, several other factors stand in the way of doing what ought to be done in these parts, difficult issues that must be tackled. Regrettably, one must add to the list the lack of professional forces ready to help rather than add injury to the massive suffering of the people of these distressed countries. We have a new norm; now we need now the proper forces to make it part of the new international reality.

On Deterring Iran

“We just have to get used to a nuclear Iran.” Because of Chatham House rules, I am not allowed to inform you who said that. The rules permit quoting what has been said at a meeting, but forbid indicating by whom or naming the group that hosted the event. The Council on Foreign Relations, the Nixon Center and quite a few other groups in Washington conduct their meetings in accordance with these rules, named after the highly respected London think-tank credited with first introducing this form of deliberation. Trust me, the person who made this statement was a high ranking adviser to one of the leading presidential candidates—someone likely to make it into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Behind this simple phrase looms an important and influential foreign policy thesis; namely, that a nuclear-armed Iran could be reliably deterred from employing nuclear weapons. After all, we are often reminded, despite the dire warnings of scores of experts, scholars, and peace activists (myself included), quite a few nations have acquired nuclear arms over the last several decades, and none have employed them. What explains this nuclear restraint, we are told, is that nations who possess such deadly arms fear that if they strike, they will be wiped off the face of the earth by the retaliatory strikes sure to be launched by rival nuclear states.

This thesis that nuclear deterrence can be reliably achieved through the threat of mutual destruction, so called ‘rational deterrence theory.’ attained a prominent place in American security policy at the height of the Cold War.  Indeed, it worked well; the superpowers did not come to nuclear blows—though on several occasions they did come dangerously close to the brink.

Over the years, this rational deterrence theory gained popularity in Political Science and International Affairs departments as well as in the military. Some scholars have even advocated the proliferation of nuclear weapons in developing nations as a way of bolstering security.  For example, in the early 90s, the University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer pushed for encouraging a newly independent Ukraine to maintain an arsenal of former Soviet nuclear weapons. And, in 2000, he pushed for encouraging a nuclear-armed India. In both cases, Mearsheimer argued that nuclear proliferation would enhance security, because “Simply put, no state is likely to attack the homeland or vital interests of a nuclear-armed state for fear that such a move might trigger a horrific nuclear response.” 

The same rational deterrence theory suggests that even rogue states, such as a Kim Jong Il’s North Korea or Mahmoud Ahmadinijad’s Iran can be counted on to act rationally regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Former CENTCOM commander John Abizaid believes that “Nuclear deterrence would work with Iran” since "Iran is not a suicidal nation.” “We can live with a Nuclear Iran,” Barry Posen, a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, assures us, because it knows that “to threaten, much less carry out, a nuclear attack on a nuclear power is to become a nuclear target.”  

I am one of those who holds that the opposite is true; that many states—Iran, among others—have leaders who are very capable of acting in ways that are profoundly irrational, hence posing a serious threat both to other countries as well as to their own. We now have a new report that says volumes on the limits of rationality of heads of state.

George Piro, the FBI agent who interrogated Saddam Hussein over several months, has just revealed what he learned about the Iraqi dictator’s mindset leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. It turns out that Saddam did not expect that the U.S. would respond to his WMD posturing with a full-scale ground invasion.  Saddam “told me” Piro says, that “he initially miscalculated ... President Bush's intentions. He thought the United States would retaliate with the same type of attack as we did in 1998 ... a four-day aerial attack…He survived that one and he was willing to accept that type of attack."  This was not merely some minor tactical “misunderstanding” or “miscalculation” on Saddam’s part; it turned Iraq into an occupied land, caused hundreds of thousands of casualties, a regime change, and, ultimately, his execution.

(One reason Saddam opened up to this rather low-ranking agent was that he believed that the agent was a direct emissary from President Bush.  This suggests how gullible even heads of state can be—not exactly what we’d consider rational.)

The conclusion is not that the next American president should refuse to talk or negotiate with the likes of Kim Jong Il or Mahmoud Ahmadinijad. After all, we talk even to mental patients. However, to dismiss concerns about verbal threats made by such leaders, especially when they are backed up with nuclear arms, is nothing but irrational.

Obama is back!

For a while, on the long and torturous campaign trail, Obama seemed to focus excessively on the easier side of communitarianism: that we are all one; the hope and joy of togetherness. However, during his recent Wesleyan speech he revived the other half of his message: the call for service for the common good, a much more demanding subject.

For a time, we heard a lot of “we are not from red states, not from blue states, but from the United States.” We were invited to join the feel-good politics sprinkled liberally with the holy water of hope which has no cost.

In The Audacity of Hope, written before Obama declared his bid for the presidency, he was more mindful of the other half of the communitarian message, that we should “ground our politics in the notion of a common good.” He wrote, “We value the imperatives of family and the cross-generational obligations that family implies…We value patriotism and the obligations of citizenship, a sense of duty and sacrifice on behalf of our nation.”

On the campaign trail many of these profound insights faded. We heard painless declarations, such as “Our prosperity can and must be the tide that lifts every boat…we rise or fall as one nation,” and such undemanding observations as “…too often, we lose our sense of common destiny; [the] understanding that we are all tied together.”

The nation is upon hard times. Its coffers are empty; creditors are at the gate; the military is exhausted and depleted; the regard in which America is held overseas is at an all time low; and major economic and security challenges pile up like so many storm clouds. The nation demands a prolonged period of restoration, one in which merely replenishing all that was squandered will entail raising taxes and keeping new expenditures on a tight leash. In plain English— restoration means sacrifices and a commitment to serve, to give rather than just to take.

At Wesleyan, Obama re-embraced this theme. He told the graduating  class—and the rest of us— about the days in which he first served as a community organizer in Chicago: “…I had worked for weeks on this project. We waited and waited for people to show up, and finally, a group of older people walked into the hall. And they sat down. And a little old lady raised her hand and asked, ‘Is this where the bingo game is?’”
    
He continued, “It wasn't easy, but eventually, we made progress. Day by day, block by block, we brought the community together, and registered new voters, and we set up after school programs, and fought for new jobs, and helped people live lives with some measure of dignity.”
      
Better yet, he introduced a new note, one of great import: “I also began to realize that I wasn't just helping other people. Through service, I found a community that embraced me; citizenship that was meaningful; the direction that I'd been seeking. Through service, I discovered how my own improbable story fit in to the larger story of America.”

If you want to read more, go here, but the main point is clear: unless we all put our shoulders to the wheel, America with be stuck in the rut that it is in now. Right on, Obama.