Amitai Etzioni Notes

"Regional peace" -- A New Idea for the Middle East!

If you thought that after all these years there could not possibly be a new idea for making peace between Israel and the Palestinians, well, as the cliché goes, think again. Better yet, it is a damn good idea. It holds that Israel would implement the long talked about two state solution (a Palestinian and a Jewish state, “living next to each other in security and peace”)—and Iran would actually give up its military nuclear program. 

So far, there have been those who held that the road to Tehran, Damascus, Beirut and the rest of the Arab world leads through Jerusalem, meaning that peace in the Middle East requires that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict first be resolved. Only in this way, we have been told a score of times, one can hope to “turn the Arab street” to agree to support other changes that peace in the region requires. Others held that given that Israel sees the Iranian bombs as directly threatening its very existence and that the time is near at which Iran will have nuclear bombs, this is the matter that must be most urgently attended to. And—nobody moved. The new idea is that we can get out of this stalemate by moving on both fronts at one and the same time.

Some are sure to hold that Israel already agreed to a two state solution, hence it will give nothing new in exchange for a deproliferation of Iran. However, the same holds for Iran—it has long and repeatedly declared that its nuclear program is strictly dedicated to peaceful pursuits. Hence, if it would show to IAEA inspectors that it has not been militarizing its nuclear program, it merely would be showing that it was not lying through its teeth.

Both arguments are disingenuous. Although previous Israeli governments declared themselves in favor of a two state solution, the “details”—what such a solution entails and above all the ways to get there—were never agreed upon. And Iran keeps threatening to wipe Israel off the map, which it can hardly hope to do without nuclear arms, which many believe it is rushing to develop. In short, a mutually and simultaneously implemented deal not only makes a great deal of sense, but breaks the stalemate.

There is room here from some truly creative thinking and adroit diplomacy. Step 1? Israel freezes the settlements on the West Bank; Iran freezes the enrichment of uranium. Step 2? Iran opens up some parts of its nuclear industry to international inspection; Israel turns over some parts of the West Bank to Palestinian forces and so on. 

Other scenarios can surely be developed. All will have to survive those who will maintain that the whole deal is unfair for one reason or another. I rush hence to reiterate a point Shibley Telhami (a leading Palestinian-American) and I made some years ago, that this is not the time to sort out what ultimate justice entails, who is at fault, who started it all, etc. These kinds of arguments are used by both sides to demand that the other side—the guilty one—yield, and that their sides need not make any concessions. For now, we argued, all sides should focus on where we go from here. Later we can have a Truth Commission to figure out who the real culprit was. The time to make peace is now, all other matters will wait.

The new idea has one more attractive feature. Many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are very keen for Iran not to have nuclear bombs. They also favor the two state solution. In short, the regional peace plan has a ready-made, significant political constituency right there in the Middle East.

Although the US is expected to lead the negotiations that must take place, above all by ensuring that both Israel and Iran take parallel steps to implement their part of the deal, Russia should also be involved. Russia is the power that could tip the scales in Iran if it joins the West in promoting an end to the nuclear military ambitions of Iran. Hence, Russian support should be courted, and if need be rewarded, by granting Russia some of the items on their long agenda – for instance, as Obama in effect already offered, the US folding the missile defense system that Bush planned to place in Poland and the Czech Republic to stop Iranian missiles.

Finally, the regional peace plan will serve as a sort of Rorschach test. There are those whose reaction will reveal that they are so confident that Iran has no intentions to build a bomb, or that if it did it “would never be so crazy to use it” that they will not support the plan. There are those so mad at Israel that they want to force it to make major concessions to the Palestinians, come what may. And there are some who see Iran as a major threat to many nations in the Middle East, and are less preoccupied by the Palestinians, especially those who still declare that they are out to destroy Israel. One cannot but hope that all these players would put aside their special takes on the situation and their special pleadings, and recognize a good deal when it is laid out right in front of them. Otherwise, even this sage plan may end up where so many attempts to bring peace to the Middle East have ended up—in the dustbins of history, followed by more bloodshed.

Mother of all deals- II

I arrived in Moscow from Washington highly optimistic, a day after the vigorous, historic handshake between President Medvedev and President Obama in London. I left—after visits with officials and colleagues—more than a bit concerned. My optimism was not based on such cheerful gestures as pushing reset buttons, although such tone-setting steps have their place. I believed that a major deal between the two countries could be made, one based not on identical or even complementary interests of Russia and the United States—but one that would build on profound differences in saliency.
    
Allow me to explain. When Party A has some things that Party B deeply desires but Party A does not care much about—and Party B has some things Party A keenly wants but Party B is not much invested in, a mother of all deals is plausible. The fact that this notion has some legs became clear when the Obama Administration, which is far from invested in building a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic while Russia is rather troubled by it, offered (in effect) to trade it in. That is, exchange it for Russia’s help in encouraging Iran to give up on its nuclear arming program. As the US sees it, an Iran with nuclear bombs would gravely endanger America’s allies (not just Israel but also Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan) if not the United States itself; that is, Iran’s nuclear program is highly salient for the US, but Russia seems not to have a great stake in a nuclear armed Iran, to put it mildly.

In addition, it seemed that another such exchange could be built into the mother of all deals: The Obama Administration’s interest in expanding the membership of NATO in the foreseeable future is far from salient, while this issue matters a great deal to Russia. At the same time, the United States is much interested in accelerating the Nunn-Lugar programs that aim to neutralize fissile material from which terrorists can make nuclear bombs and further improve the security of tactical nuclear arms, matters which Russia has little reason to oppose. Voila, the conditions of a major deal seem to be in place.

Why did I leave less optimistic, much less optimistic? Both sides seem to have decided to pile on a large number of additional items, some of which have a rather different profile of needs and interests than those mentioned above, including items that gravely concern both sides, especially the quantity and quality of nuclear arms to be maintained. In addition, Russia seems keenly interested in changes in trade and economic policy, such as the additional opening of American markets to Russian products and membership in the WTO and OECD, issues that are particularly difficult to deal with currently given the recent tendency to increase rather than lower national barriers to trade. Half a dozen additional items have been raised, ranging from the incentives Russia seems to have provided to Kyrgyzstan which led it to move to close a major supply line for American troops in Afghanistan to helping Russia secure its “territorial integrity”. (Still other points were raised in a recent editorial by President Medvedev in the Washington Post.)
    
The escalation of ambitions and expectations are by no means one-sided. President Obama’s trademark is thinking big and moving on many fronts at once. Up to a point, one cannot but admire such a drive not just to remake the United States internally, but also to build a new global architecture, with a partnership with Russia as a key element. However, such ambitions become problematic when they pay little mind to matters of relative saliency and respective pace.

Thus, it is rather obvious that the more items that are thrown into the mix, the more complex the negotiations will become and the less likely they are to succeed, especially as they involve items of similar rather than different saliency. Even more detrimental is the fact that some of these processes and policies have internal clocks that run at very different speeds.

This is especially true when one considers Iran’s nuclear arming program, which may well cross a red-line within a year, while matters of trade or even those concerning the conflict in Afghanistan have a significantly longer trajectory. It would be much better to focus first on those items that have hard and short deadlines rather than mixing them up with those that do not. Finally, all items that require action by the US Senate—such as approving treaties or changing laws (e.g., Jackson-Vanik)—must be assumed to face a slow journey, even given the Democratic majority.

I have not lost faith in the dawning of a new era in the Russian-American relationship. I am especially encouraged to find mountains of goodwill (mixed with some residue of feelings of distrust). I just hope that matters that need to be and can be settled in short order will not be undermined by those that cannot and those that must be allowed time to be worked out.

The bizarre case of pirates’ human rights

We are told that the reasons we have such a hard time stopping the pirates is that our forces have a very hard time locating them in the vast sea. An odd statement, given that the pirates have no trouble locating our ships in the same sea, and they have no drones, satellites, AWACS, and all the other means of modern technology. Moreover, we hardly need to look for them; they present themselves to us, quite regularly. Most recently they captured six ships with a few weeks.

The main reason pirates roam freely is only whispered in the corridors of power, because it is very politically incorrect to openly state that pirates are protected by a radical interpretation of human rights. The various navies involved are operating (or more precisely, are not operating) because of one or more of the following points:

•    Do not capture the pirates because if you do, they will have to be brought to trial in some national court. There are no international courts in which they can be tried. To try them, you will need evidence that will hold up in such courts. Most ship hands do not have the kind of police training needed to collect evidence properly, observe the chain of evidence, and so on.

•    Once brought to your homeland, the pirates may seek—and possibly be granted—asylum. (In several European countries one can gain asylum by showing that he or she is coming from a part of the world in which there is a sufficient level of indiscriminant violence that one’s life would be in danger by remaining there. One need not show that he or she was specifically persecuted.) Thus, courts may let them walk and you would then have dozens of Somali marauders roaming free in your country.

•    You will be unable to ship them back to Somalia for trial because there they would likely be subject to torture or execution.

•    Piracy is a crime and crimes are a matter for the police to deal with, not armed forces. But national police forces have no jurisdiction, a high seas catch-22.

•    Pirates cannot be shot when they close in on your ship because they may be fishermen engaging in their peaceful business. The fact that they are armed cannot be used as evidence because in these parts of the world practically all men are armed.

•    If you fail to respect their rights, you may be hauled in front of one or more of your national courts, the European Court of Human Rights, condemned by United Nations, and excoriated by the parts of the media and by human rights activists.

Ignored is the fact that human rights—which ought to be observed—must be balanced with concerns for the common good, as they are in the domestic courts of all free nations. No reasonable interpretation of rights allows them to trump all other considerations, especially gross violations of the safety of innocent people going about their business, business which, in the case of the Maersk Alabama, consisted of carrying humanitarian aid destined for Somalia! Thus, while even pirates, if captured, should not be tortured or held indefinitely without a hearing, a ship’s sovereignty should be extended to an area around it. Any armed party entering this zone, should be asked to leave or surrender; if they refuse and do not heed a warning shot, they should be treated as a hostile force. Civilian airlines have armed marshals. Our commercial ships and cruise ships may need some of those now, equipped with a 007 license.    

At least the way I see it, to treat human rights on the high seas the way we do at home is a much preferred alternative to the desperate suggestion—now increasingly mentioned—that we ought to invade Somalia, in order to get at the pirates’ bases. Such a land-based operation is surely going to involve killing many innocent Somalis, aside from inflicting a considerable number of casualties on our own troops.   
   

Amitai Etzioni professor of international relations at The George Washington University and the author of Security First (Yale 2007). For more, go here.

Obama’s test

Joe Biden was wrong when he stated that he expected President Obama to be tested within six moths of his taking office by some foreign power. Not just Obama is going to be tried. The whole soft power, multilateralism, diplomacy-will-open-all-doors liberal foreign policy is on trial.

Iran has nominated itself as the first foreign tester. President Obama appealed to Iran in a powerful, evocative, noble message. He referred to Iran by its full name, dear to the Mullahs, “The Islamic Republic of Iran.” He celebrated Iran’s contributions to culture, art, poetry, and history, among other great treasures. He addressed Iran with the respect that Mullahs long demanded, stating: “We know that you are a great civilization, and your accomplishments have earned the respect of the United States and the world.”

And he called for turning a new page, in the eloquence that is uniquely his:

Within these [New Year] celebrations lies the promise of a new day, the promise of opportunity for our children, security for our families, progress for our communities, and peace between nations. Those are shared hopes, those are common dreams.

How did Iran respond? By spitting in his face and showing him the finger. Ayatollah Khamenei stated “[Obama] insulted the Islamic Republic of Iran from the first day.  If you are right that change has come, where is that change? What is the sign of that change? Make it clear for us what has changed.” Global headlines: Obama rebuffed by Iran.

The liberals were left utterly undaunted. What spitting? Maybe a few drops of rain. They dug deep into the insult and claim to have found a hint that if the Obama Administration will do Iran’s bidding—lift the economic sanctions, and halt accusations that it is sponsoring terrorism and manufacturing nuclear weapons---it may stop insulting us. And they pointed out that after 30 years of mistreating Iran and the “last eight years,” it will take much more than one appeal by an American president to open the doors to diplomacy. (Though, to its credit, The Economist suggested that Obama should try only one more time).

These good liberals ignore three matters, one minor, one far from minor, and one about as major as they come. First, Iran could have responded to Obama’s overture with its typical list of demands and litany of complains—without disrespecting the President and the United States, without the dismissive, humiliating tone they struck. Second, the last eight years were very rough on Iraq, Iran’s greatest enemy, whom Iran fought for eight years but failed to vanquish. Iran itself, however, was in effect indulged. The U.S. did nothing other than holler when Iranian sophisticated roadside bombs and other arms were delivered to Iraqi insurgents; when Iranian agents were caught training Iraqi insurgents; and when Iran urged the Shia to undermine U.S. efforts to stabilize the new Iraqi regime. Moreover, when Iran was found supplying arms and funds to terrorist organizations in Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank, and other parts of the world—the US largely looked the other way. The US continued to do so when it discovered that Iran was financing Syria’s efforts to build a nuclear bomb. True Cheney talked a big stick, but the only military action the Bush Administration took regarding Iran-- was to prevent Israel from attacking it, late in 2008.

Iran has strong, valid historical reasons to complain about U.S. conduct—a generation ago. Madeline Albright already apologized for these ill deeds. Still, one could argue that these beefs should be aired further. However, if Germany and France can put aside their historical differences,  one could expect Iran to allow those complaints to recede, given a new administration that seeks to turn a page in the Middle East.

By far the most important issue is the one of ticking clocks. There is some evidence that Iran is developing nuclear bombs and soon will have some. If this is the case, Iran is likely to play tough, to expect more courting, make some very minor concessions (a somewhat more conciliatory speech, for instance, would make the liberals dance in the aisles and sing with hope), and try to drag things out until their bombs are good and ready.

The test for Obama and liberal foreign policy is hence what they will do if diplomacy, soft power, and multilateralism are continuously rebuffed. One can—as I do—strongly favor the liberal approach and still urge that the U.S. stop acting like a one-move chess player; one must think ahead to what the other side will do and what our next step is then going to be. More American gestures? Sure. Opening diplomatic relations with Iran (if they are game)—good idea. Meeting at various international gatherings—please remember over tea, not scotch, and bring a Koran, not a Bible—by all means. But there is a good reason to consider now what the Obama Administration will do if all these gestures yield precious little.

The main reason to consider these future steps now is that Iran is thinking about them. Iran was most interested, keenly interested, in solving its differences with the US in May 2003. What was distinct about this time period? The US had just trounced Sadam’s military with minimum American causalities in a few short weeks, something that Iran could not accomplish in eight years.  The Mullahs had good reason to believe they may be next in line. That threat of hard power got their attention. (And that of Libya, which gave up its support for terrorism and its WMD program.) In the years that followed, as the U.S. got mired ever more deeply in Iraq and Afghanistan—Iran became ever more intransient.

All this is not, I cannot stress enough, a call for threatening Iran. It is to call attention to the relationship between soft and hard power. Soft power works much better when those involved realize that if it fails, other powers may come into play. This is the test Obama and liberal foreign policy now face. Can they make soft power work? (Which would be indeed a global blessing.) And are they clear, at least in their own minds and councils, what will they resort to if Iran just plays them for one month after another, until their nukes are placed at the top of their missiles?

The mother of all deals

Among all the difficult choices and severe challenges President Obama will face on January 20th and in the months and years to follow, there is one very attractive change that is relatively easy to bring about. The major reason I am wildly optimistic about a US/Russia deal is that it can be based on a principle that underlies many, if not all, great deals: There are concessions that Russia can make for us that we care about deeply—and that they do not. And there are concessions Russia dearly wants—but about which we do not care nearly as much.

Before I quickly list the main elements of such a master deal I should note that it requires dropping the remaining vestiges of the neocon fantasy (a) that we can democratize the world and that only countries that embrace our kind of regime are reliable partners in peace, and (b) that we are a superpower which is so rich and omnipotent that we do not need to set priorities and can gain even things that are low on our wish list.

What does the United States want most from Russia? That it stop supplying Iran with nuclear plants and uranium and that it join us and the Europeans in a joint drive to convince Iran to come clean with regard to its nuclear military program. And—that Russia accelerate the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative, our joint project to ensure that the small nuclear bombs Russia has in great numbers (the bombs most suitable for terrorists) and the materials from which such bombs can be made will be better protected or rendered inoperative, and that their contents will be blended down. Russia has no profound reason to refuse to help us on these two fronts. Indeed, it has its own misgivings about facing a Muslim nation armed with nukes or terrorists with such weapons—only it does not feel nearly as threatened by these prospects as we are.

What does Russia most want from the United States? That we not put the instruments of “Star Wars” (our missile defense system) close to its borders and that we not surround it with NATO allies. Putting missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic is one of those far out ideas of the Bush Administration that we cannot pay for anyhow, it is unlikely to work, and it can be located in other areas. And although we may wish to see Georgia and the Ukraine in NATO (some even want to make Russia a member!), we can defer this invitation, say, for ten years without breaking out in sweat or tears or feeling any other great sense of loss.

No Drama Obama has shown so far a keen sense for making moves that keep the voters in rapture. See his rapid fire cabinet appointments, which have stretched out over a fair number of news cycles. See the way he plans to introduce a grand stimulus package on his first day in office, and has invited the Pentagon to prepare an Iraqi pullout, all before the first week of his presidency is completed. Striking a major deal with Russia, a country which following 1990 had worked quite well with the United States but has recently turned into an obstructionist opponent to our foreign policy, would fit well into Obama’s first 100 days. Indeed, there is little that would make the much more difficult moves in the Middle East easier than first taking care of Iran’s nuclear program. This in turn requires finding a way to work with Russia.

Hillary: Get your heavy coat ready. It is freezing in Moscow in January, but you can bring Russia in from the cold.

Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University and author of Security First (Yale, 2007) www.securityfirstbook.com  email: comnet@gwu.edu

Terrorists: neither fish nor fowl

In closing Guantanamo, we are told we must find legal ways to deal with those now  incarcerated there. Some hold that we should treat them like criminals, entitled to the same legal rights as Americans. Others, as soldiers, protected by the Geneva Conventions. As I see it, our minds are big enough to accommodate more than two options. Terrorists clearly are neither garden variety criminals nor soldiers but a third, distinct category.

Clearly terrorists are human beings, and as such they are entitled to some basic rights, for instance not to be tortured and not to be held indefinitely without being charged. However it does not follow that they are entitled to the same rights as an American citizen who never lifted his hand against his country. They are best treated as a category in and of themselves.

One major reason they cannot be treated as criminals is that suicide bombers, as a rule, cannot be hauled into a court, brought to justice, or deterred by the threat of life in prison. What gives pause to criminals has little effect on terrorists. They are gone once they have carried out their mission.

Moreover, typically criminals do not set out to terrorize a nation, to change its policies or replace its regime. Criminals do not aspire to use weapons of mass destruction and do not commit suicide as a tactic in pursuit of some collective goal. Because the threats posed by terrorists are of a much higher magnitude than those posed by criminals, curbing terrorism requires a different approach than that of law enforcement. The first goal in dealing with terrorists must not be prosecution, which takes place after the act has been committed and is generally the way society limits criminality, but should instead be prevention.

To hold that terrorists cannot be treated as criminals is not to suggest that the "war on terrorism" is the best metaphor or that terrorists are to be treated as soldiers. As I see it, both images -- along with the strategies, tactics and laws they invoke -- are misleading. It is best to view terrorists as a distinct category. Unlike bona fide soldiers, terrorists do not wear uniforms indicating which government is responsible for their acts. They frequently and easily pass themselves off as civilians, leading to a unique set of burdens on those who must fight them. This is what I did when I helped blow up British installations in Palestine, erected to prevent Jews escaping Nazi Europe from reaching their new homeland.

Terrorists are surely entitled to basic human rights, as are all human beings. However, we cannot allow them full access to all the evidence against them, which criminals are entitled to, without creating unacceptable security risks. I favor allowing terrorists to choose among lawyers who have security clearances, allowing these lawyers to see the government evidence but not sources and methods. Terrorists should not be detained endlessly without being charged in a court of law, but the government should have a right to hold them longer than regular criminals to allow time for finding their partners before it is disclosed that they have been captured.

Up to a point these anti-terrorism measures can be viewed as merely modifications of the criminal justice system. However, given their scope and number, in effect they amount to a different approach. This is most evident when we acknowledge that prevention requires questioning and even detaining people who have not yet violated any law.

In short, although one might differ about how far one can go in trying to deter terrorism, and how to proceed, one may still agree that it makes little sense to treat terrorists either as criminals or as soldiers. At issue is not a matter of neat classifications, but ways to maintain the institutions of a free society while also protecting it from devastating attacks.

 

A question for those who care

Public voices that are often raised (frequently for very good reasons!) to criticize many of the policies of the Bush Administration (and Israeli policies in dealing with the Palestinians), are mum about atrocities committed by extremist Muslims. I wonder why we do not hear a peep from these voices when a 13 year old girl is stoned to death for the “sin” of having been raped, as just happened in Somalia. There are good people who are concerned about the pain inflicted on those executed in the United States during the last minutes of their lives by the chemicals they are injected with—a valid concern—but why are these same voices strangely mum when they learn about the particularly prolonged, painful, agonizing death of a child?

Nor did I hear from feminists about the special insult that emanates from blaming the victim of rape for having committed a sin. Or, from anybody about the Taliban who behead their countrymen on buses in Afghanistan --countrymen on their way to visit family or start a new job-- to show that they are in control and not the Karzai government, or to make some other such point.

I am told that public intellectuals refrain from criticizing these Somali and Taliban barbarians (I can practically see some of my colleagues raising their eyebrows as high as they go for my use of such a “harsh” word) because they believe that these killers cannot be reached. “Why waste one’s breath?” I hear the otherwise silent public intellectuals whispering. In contrast, they say, condemning Americans (and Israelis) may yield some good results.

I do not doubt that this position is half-true. Roundly condemning Bush’s policies surely was one factor in bringing us such a dramatic change during the recent presidential election. And one cannot but hope that such criticism will have a similar salutary effect on the forthcoming Israeli elections. But is that a reason to ignore atrocities committed by extremist Muslims?

Nor should one ignore that judging what is right merely by its consequences is a very inadequate measure. If one refrains from doing good or speaking truth to evil (another word that makes some progressives shake in their boots but is here completely appropriate) because it may not have the desired outcomes, half of morality will have to be shut down. In evaluating whether the time is right to raise our moral voices, we ought to take into account intentions, and not just results. Speak up, first of all, because it is the right thing to do. Moreover, consequences typically cannot be anticipated with any degree of assurance anyhow.

Furthermore, it is far from clear that condemning atrocities in no uncertain terms, disregarding who commits them, will have no effect.  Yemen, for instance, recently introduced some reforms, in part due to global pressures. When I visited Iran, I found them surprisingly keen to win the approval of outsiders, and one reason Libya came in from the cold was that its support for terrorism was widely condemned.  Also, the proper outrage enforces the norms that prevent others from even thinking of going down this horrible course. And, just as our silence discourages moderate Muslims, our furor encourages them to speak up. We may well find some allies among those of the thousand or so spectators to the stoning in Somalia who have already protested. We should let them know they command our support.

Finally, clear transnational norms that condemn—and there is never too much reiteration—savage behavior are the foundation for charging those who stone and behead people with crimes against humanity. Such norms make them fair candidates for trial before the International Criminal Court, an institution I do not believe they are looking forward to facing.   

There all kinds of outrages committed in many parts. Some claim that we need a sort of economy of moral voices; we cannot criticize all bad acts, because they are so common; that if we so proceed—we will end up debasing our moral currency. Fair enough. However, stoning and beheading innocent people tops the list. If these savage crimes do not make us speak up, in no uncertain terms, what will?

Freud, International Relations Are Calling

Freud, where are you when we need you? Think tanks in Washington, DC and across the land are furiously issuing position papers in preparation for the new administration. They are full of “we need” statements. They declare: “We need to fix the climate,” “we need to stop Iran from making nuclear bombs,” “we need to restructure the UN Security Council,” and on and on. The sentiments behind these statements are often noble, and they may well find their way into high flying speeches. But they, unfortunately, ignore the main point Freud taught us.

I do not mean to look for sexual interpretations of international relations, but that its study ought to benefit from the grand insight that there are no accidents. If we have a need and it is not responded to, it is usually not because nobody has ever noted it, but because there are powerful causes that block treatment. Thus, it is hardly news that the climate is deteriorating, Iran is nuclearizing, the UN Security Council reflects the power structure of 1945, and so on. A serious analysis needs to lay bare the obstacles faced by those seeking to deal with these problems—and point out the way these may be overcome.

Take the relatively simple matter of changing the composition of the Security Council. Surely Britain and France, two has-been powers, are not entitled to the same status and veto power as the big powers—US, China, and arguably Russia. Rationally, they should be replaced by, say, one vote each for the EU, India, Japan, Brazil, and the African Union, or some other such list, all too easy to draw up. However, it does not take a PhD in international relations — or anything else — to realize that Britain and France are not about to rush to pack up and leave, or that the big powers are not ready to dilute their clout by granting other nations the same privileges. And given that it is hard enough to gain consensus among the five veto powered members, are we really served by increasing the number? 

I am not arguing that one cannot deal with such entrenched problems, but we can do so only if we look below the surface and understand why these problems are entrenched and figure out ways to dig them up. Declaring that “we need to reform the UN” is an opening sentence of a policy analysis, not a substitute for it.

Or, look at one other case in point: stopping the genocide in Sudan. Part of the problem is that China, which has a special relationship with Sudan based on economic interests, especially concerning China’s quest for energy, is not supporting serious action via the UN. The US is ambivalent because the Sudanese government is helping the West with intelligence about Al Qaeda. Also, the US military is overstretched, depleted, and exhausted; it cannot take on another major mission. The African Union forces are not large enough, not properly equipped, and not properly trained. If more troops are somehow found and sent to Sudan, they may protect the refugees in their camps, but—given that Sudan is a large country—they are very unlikely to suffice to enable the displaced people to return to their villages.

I can practically hear the “we need” people exclaiming “we need a diplomatic solution.” It is a mantra worth repeating, but it does not get you very far beyond showing that your heart may be in the right place.

I do not wish to fall prey to the same serious mistake by arguing that “we need” ‘Freudian’ policy analysis without suggesting why we rarely get it, and how we might. A good place to start is by changing the training provided to future policy analysts, which is given by about twenty major universities that have public policy schools and by a few think tanks that specialize in preparing students for this vocation. This training is best provided by seasoned researchers,  not has-been politicians or those waiting for the next administration.

In the process, future policy analysts will discover that there are many more needs than can be served, and learn that we better scale back our expectations and promises and focus our resources and resolve on our highest priorities—rather than spin endless lists of desiderata which are well beyond our reach.

Next, the position papers by think tanks and individual policy analysts that are long on declarations of needs should be sent to the speech writers of various elected officials, but otherwise ignored. If there will be no market for such papers, the good people who composed them may well start looking for ways to improve what they are producing, leading them to look below the surface, to conduct a sort of Freudian analysis of international relations (and domestic politics), not a moment too soon.

Victory in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Senator McCain claims that the U.S. is “winning” in Iraq and that a surge will lead to victory in Afghanistan.  This, despite the fact the General Petraeus keeps stressing that the U.S. gains are “fragile,” and that Brigadier Carleton-Smith, former commander of the British forces in Afghanistan, recently observed that a military victory in Afghanistan is impossible and the U.S. and its allies must find a way to negotiate some kind of a mutually beneficial deal with the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Taliban are gaining ground while the corrupt government propped up by the U.S. is becoming more deeply involved in the opiate trade.

McCain never comes clean and explains that he has vastly watered down what he considers a victory. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynahan is widely credited with the phrase “defining deviancy down.” He showed that when major American cities were awash in violent crime, the police were able to make great strides by ceasing to consider various crimes to be, well, crimes, and then dropping those numbers from their statistics. McCain is now trying to pull the same trick.

Once upon a time, victory was defined by the Bush Administration—and by Senator McCain-- as the establishment of a democratic state in Iraq and in Afghanistan, not merely because we were out to help the people of these nations gain liberty and the blessings of our kind of political system, but also because neocons maintained that only democracies make reliable partners in peace. The U.S., we were told, needs these nations to become democracies for our security. Onward and forward with regime change.

Now, victory is defined as two stable countries, able to defend themselves and to prevent their land from being used a base for terrorists. I am not belittling this goal. But, even after any notion of genuine democratization has been dropped like so much extra baggage, this goal is still a rather tall one, likely to be defined down further. It reminds me of one of my students, who came to class wearing a medal he won for coming in second in a race that had only two paticipants.

One may say, wait a moment; did not these nations have elections? Sadly, elections are by themselves not democracy makers. Egypt, Syria, Russia, and China all conduct regular elections. Democracies require a free press; viable competing political parties; and a civil society in which future leaders can gain political experience, rather than be hand picked by the established government or the occupying power.  Very few of the elementary components of democracy are available in Afghanistan, and Iraq is not fairing much better. Indeed, there is a little doubt that if these nations developed strong authoritarian leaders-- local Putins-- the populations would embrace them in a jiffy, especially if they could put an end to the sectarian violence and the waves of crime, and provide basic services, starting with electricity in their homes.

In short, anyway you look at it, the claims of victory in Iraq and Afghanistan are shallow and hollow, if not outright deceptive.

Talking does not make a foreign policy

I listened recently to three people who claim to advise Barack Obama on foreign policy. They all extolled the virtues of talking to our adversaries and allies. I have read a considerable number of blogs and op-eds arguing for and against Obama’s declaration that he will talk to friend and foe alike. I believe it is a good idea, under practically all circumstances, and a vast improvement over the Bush Administration’s bankrupt unilateralism. However, talking does not a foreign policy make. Neither does the very welcome call for more diplomacy and less saber rattling. Talking and diplomacy are merely means to an end. The question is: to what end?

The French philosopher Montesquieu wrote in the days of sailing ships that no wind will do for a boat that has no port it is seeking to reach. Take the most dangerous part of the world, Pakistan. No one is denying that it has nuclear weapons, and a lot of Taliban running around, and that they have friends and allies in the Pakistani intelligence services. What do Obama and company plan to tell Pakistan? And what if there is no one who can speak for Pakistan? And what if those who do, point out that they have other concerns than ours, for instance not to piss off the Taliban?

I am sure some progressive people will say, and not without merit, that it is ‘all our fault.’ If the CIA had not trained and armed Afghani troops, working with the Pakistani intelligence services; if American corporations… etc etc. But this is all water under the bridge. There is no way to rewind history. We now have a problem we do need to talk about, but first we must figure out what we are seeking, an outcome that will serve both us and Pakistan. I do not hear Obama and company talking about this thorny subject.

There are half a dozen others. Surely one should talk to Iran, Syria Russia, among others. But on the way to sitting down with them, one must note that—surprise, surprise—they have their own agendas and needs. I see no sign that all the good people who surround Obama, or for that matter McCain, have drafted a plan or envisioned a new international architecture that the US can promote in talking to these agitated parties.

Actually there is a model that President Clinton worked out and which has been recently revived. In dealing with North Korea, the US did talk to other nations, including China, Japan and South Korea, and to North Korea. However, it also had a plan. It was willing to forego any notions of regime change, indeed to shore up the last Communist tyranny in the world, by granting it fuel and food—in exchange for its giving up its nuclear weapons. We do not know yet if all will work out, but it is a clear policy. Talking is not the main point; what we are talking about is.