Amitai Etzioni Notes

Onward with the Mediterranean Union

On July 13 the new EU president, Nicolas Sarkozy, will re-launch his idea of forming a community of nations on the southern side of the Mediterranean. Instead of joining the EU, nations such as Turkey, Jordan, and Israel will be called upon to form a union of their own, which in turn will have a close relationship with the northern community, the EU. It is an idea whose time has come (and which we have been advocating since 2004).

One of the main virtues of the Mediterranean Union is that Turkey will be its most important and leading member. Turkey is thus invited to help form and lead a union of its own—rather than having its membership in the EU rejected on the grounds that it is an unsuitable member for that community of free nations. Instead, the argument is that because one recognizes that Turkey has made considerable progress toward becoming a democratic society, it should assume its responsibility to lead the Middle East in the same direction. Moreover, promoting regionalism beyond the EU would fit well into the emerging multi-regional global design. Thus, the Turkish people should not feel rejected by Europe but proud and challenged by the invitation to form a Mediterranean Union.

In effect, Turkey could play a role similar to that which Germany had in the formation of the EU when it worked with a nation that was previously its arch enemy, France. In the Middle East, Turkey—a nation whose population is 99% Muslim-- has already formed a rarely mentioned military and economic alliance with Israel, which included joint military maneuvers by the air forces and navies of both nations, joint production of missiles, and intelligence sharing. A Turco-Israeli Free Trade Area accord was signed in 1996. And as of 2005, the trade between these two nations tops $2 billion annually. Granted, this close relationship has been scaled back since the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan took over, but it could be readily resurrected, especially once the Palestinians have their own state.

Other promising candidates for membership of the new regional community in the Middle East include Lebanon (particularly as Syrian control of this nation is reduced), Jordan (which in effect has considerable ties with Turkey and Israel), and eventually Egypt (as it reforms). And hopefully, a democratic Palestinian state could also join such a community, making for the equivalent of the Inner Six, the first members of the EU. Here too, the links may well first be economic, including freer trade and travel. Harmonization of laws and the formation of shared institutions could then follow. Above all, as in Europe, the best assurance that these nations will not war with one another, or support groups that would terrorize their neighbors, lies in their becoming members of one regional community, as they internally democratize.

In addition, it is far from obvious that the best way to proceed is for more and more nations to join the same community (i.e. the EU), leaving isolated those who do not qualify for membership because of one criterion or another. A more multipolar view of regionalism suggests itself, one in which various nations form an array of communities. For instance, the East Asian nations could forge a regional body of their own, which may find its beginnings in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (Japan is promoting still another regional body in the area.) Similarly, Latin American or Central American nations could form their own communities along the lines of MERCOSUR, rather than be encompassed in the North American, US-dominated grouping. Thus, a Middle Eastern community, serving as a democratizing magnet for other states in the region, would well complement such a global architecture.

There have always been those who worry that regional bodies may get into trade wars with one another, if not shooting ones. However, experience so far has shown that regional bodies can work out trade disagreements at least as well as nation states and that they serve as political counterweights to one another. Furthermore, there are no signs that they will challenge each other with armed forces.

Most importantly, in the longer run, the shrinking world -- one of the rare clichés that has considerable sociological reality -- will require increased global governing capacities for the growing number of transnational problems that cannot be handled on a national level, such as terrorism, infectious diseases, and computer viruses, to mention but a few. To proceed, one best take to heart the sociological insight that to form shared policies for large groups, it is best to first break them up into subgroups, each creating its own consensus. Then the representatives of these subgroups would meet to develop an overarching consensus. In effect, some movement along these lines is already discernable in the World Bank and the UN, where, instead of trying to involve all nations in every decision made, groups gain joint, regional representation. In short, a world of regional communities may well serve as a major stepping stone to achieving some kind of effective, albeit limited, global governance.

Which brings us back to Turkey and the Mediterranean Union. Calling on Turkey to lead the economic and political development of the Middle Eastern community fits well in a new global design. Moreover, such a development does not mean that Turkey will be denied ties to the EU-just as the EU has joined with other nations to form still larger international bodies, the European Council for instance. Nation states are not about to disappear; however, they will find that the more that they form regional communities, which then build bridges of their own, the better they, and in turn the inchoate world community, will be served.

No armed interventions in Zimbabwe

The opposition to the government of Robert Mugabe just called for the African nations to send peace keepers to Zimbabwe. Given that there is no peace in this battered nation, the troops are in effect called to impose one. At first blush this may seem highly justified given the abuses that recently took place in Zimbabwe. Sanctions (many forms of which have yet to be imposed and ought to be) may indeed be insufficient. However, the situation must be examined in the context of a global triage.  If one takes into account that this is a natural time to consider the foundations of a foreign policy for the next president, all this leads one to view the highly disturbing situation in Zimbabwe as an opportunity to consider under what conditions armed humanitarian interventions are justified.

The tragic fact which the supporters of armed humanitarian intervention find it difficult to fully take into account is that global conditions are like what Hobbes used to say about domestic conditions: they make life nasty, brutish, and short. There are numerous countries in which abuses occur, on a much larger scale, over much longer periods, than in Zimbabwe. Abuses in Zimbabwe are foremost in our minds because of the CNN effect—they are news. However, it is too easy to forget that the number of people killed in Zimbabwe is estimated to be somewhere between 65 to 86 or somewhat higher; those detained without cause, in the scores; several white farmers have been driven off their land; and many citizens are terrorized, all despicable acts that call for strong reactions from the global community. But these abuses pale in comparison to the “old” ones, those that faded from news but are inflicted on many hundreds of thousands—if not millions— of people who are killed, subject to the systematic campaigns of mass rape, burned out of their villages in the Congo and Sudan.

If grossly manipulated elections—and a terrorized electorate—are a cause for armed interventions, there is reason to march into Tibet, Burma, North Korean, Kazakhstan, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, Kenya and Libya, just to mention a few.

Now add to this oppressive list the incontestable and deeply distressing fact that the international community finds it very difficult, to put it mildly, to put together the forces need for armed humanitarian interventions. One must first get the UN Security Council to resolve to act, which is no small feat, given that one power or another is quick to slow down the process if not block it all together (for instance, as China has done with Sudan). Then one must find the budget to pay for the intervention and—above all—nations willing to volunteer the troops to be shipped to the country at issue—and keep them there as the body bags pile up. Then one must ensure that these peace keeping troops do not perpetuate crimes themselves, such as selling drugs and prostituting young girls. The brutal fact is that after many years of outcry, the international community has not yet stopped the atrocities in the Congo and Sudan, and did not act when nearly a million people were killed or maimed in Rwanda, and before that in Cambodia. In short, the global need for intervention is very considerable and the resources available are very meager. Calling for armed humanitarian interventions is easy; getting them going is excruciatingly difficult.

The global situation is akin to a disaster zone, in which bodies are strewn all over the place. For some, it is too late to help (e.g. Rwanda). Some have relatively minor injuries (e.g. Zimbabwe), and their treatment should not take priority over those most in need, such as Sudan and the Congo. Zimbabwe may be next in line, but for now sanctions will have to do. For instance, the international community should declare that if any of the leaders of the government and of Mugabe’s party set foot outside their country, they will be subject to arrest. However, if there are forces available for armed interventions, these are urgently needed elsewhere.
Good people find the need for triage and the setting of priorities for care that it entails offensive. So do I. In a better world the global community would have sizable stand-by forces, ready to stop humanitarian crises at the first sign of trouble. The very fact that such forces would be readily available would make such abuses much less likely. Maybe the next president can convince the other powers that be and the UN to vastly increase the forces available for humanitarian intervention. Until this happens, triage is unavoidable if we are not to leave those most in need without help, and assist those who are second—or third—in line.

To argue that triage is a moral must is not to argue against action. There is a world of difference between doing the best we can with our limited resources—they are always limited even if they are much increased—and not doing anything; between well-focused action and inaction.

Above all, instead of vainly promising to institute a new global order, in which all nations will prosper and democratize, we best start with delivering an international very basic minimum: to stop genocides. Once this is achieved—we can turn to second priorities, which may get us to the likes of Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, sanctions rather than troops will have to do.

For more discussion, see Amitai Etzioni’s latest book Security First: For a Moral, Muscular Foreign Policy (Yale University Press 2007). www.securityfirstbook.com

Israel's Nukes: a response

In reaction to my report that national leaders can act irrationally, and hence it is best if they cannot put their hands on weapons of mass destruction, I received a handful of messages. They held that as long as Israel had nuclear weapons there was no cause to complain about those which Iran may be acquiring. Not one of these commentators noted the fact that Israel has repeatedly declared itself willing to give up its nukes if other nations in the area would agree to form a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, as part of a comprehensive peace deal.

Before I proceed, I should note that I do not view criticizing Israeli policies as inappropriate, and surely not as anti-Semitic. Indeed, most Israelis criticize their nation’s policies in no uncertain terms—and they are Semites. Second, I consider Israel’s commitment not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East as sheer PR. What it means is that Israel has all the elements in place, and they can be assembled into a weapon on very short notice if it is attacked. However, Israel’s offer to give up all nukes should not be ignored.

Take, for example, the comment of someone who does not disclose his or her identity and goes by the alias “jhNY”: “Unless and until Israel's nuclear weapons are included in this anti-proliferation discussion, I'm going to believe that the discussions themselves are dishonest, in that certain facts (like the 150+ weapons Israel presently possesses) have been deliberately placed outside the bounds of discourse. Enough already.” I assume that now that he or she has learned that Israel aspires to a zone free of WMDs and Iran does not, he/she will change his/her tune.

The same holds for the comment by someone whose alias is a least a bit revealing, namely “V4Vigilance” who writes “If I were Iran, I'd tell the U.S. and it's allies that it will agree to any nuclear inspection regime that Israel agrees to also abide by. Presumably this farce is being perpetrated in the name of Israeli security. That's fine, except that giving Israel a free pass to have a clandestine nuclear weapons program is a crock of sh*t. What's good for the goose, is good for the gander.” Fair enough. How about the other way around? As Israel has agreed to much more than inspections, giving up these horrible weapons, can one now ask the same of Iran?

One more case in point: the comment by one Henry states “It is high time that we got a little bit ashamed of ourselves. I think that goes for our cousins (or is that subsidiary?) Israel. If Israel has nooks, why not Iran?” Fair enough. Let’s “hook” all the nations in the Middle East—and then the world—into giving up their WMDs.

Finally, I agree that Iran has good reasons to fear that it will be attacked by the United States. Hence, I have repeatedly argued that the United States should agree to Iran’s suggestions to form a non-aggression treaty, if this treaty entails putting all the other relevant issues on the table-- above all forming a zone free of WMDs. [For more on this, visit here and here].

All this does not change the fact that none of us can sleep safely as long as nukes are in the hands of irrational leaders, and I would add even the hands of those who seem rational. I agree: what is good for goose should be good for the gander, as well as all the other birds.

Terrorists are a unique breed

McCain maintains that the Supreme Court decision that acknowledged that terrorists have some rights, is “one of the worst decisions in the history of this country.” Obama states that we can hunt down the terrorists using constitutional means, that is, deal with them like other criminals. As a former terrorist, let me tell you that both are wrong.

Clearly terrorists are human beings, and as such they are entitled to some basic rights, for instance not to be tortured and not to be held indefinitely without being charged. However it does not follow that they are entitled to the same rights as an American citizen who never lifted his hand against his country. They are best treated as a category in and of themselves.

One major reason they cannot be treated as criminals is that suicide bombers, as a rule, cannot be hauled into a court, brought to justice, or deterred by the threat of life in prison. What gives pause to criminals has little effect on terrorists. They are gone once they have carried out their mission.

Moreover, typically criminals do not set out to terrorize a nation, to change its policies or replace its regime. Criminals do not aspire to use weapons of mass destruction and do not commit suicide as a tactic in pursuit of some collective goal. Because the threats posed by terrorists are of a much higher magnitude than those posed by criminals, curbing terrorism requires a different approach than that of law enforcement. The first goal in dealing with terrorists must not be prosecution, which takes place after the act has been committed and is generally the way society limits criminality, but should instead be prevention.

To hold that terrorists cannot be treated as criminals is not to suggest that the "war on terrorism" is the best metaphor or that terrorists are to be treated as soldiers. As I see it, both images - along with the strategies, tactics and laws they invoke - are misleading. It is best to view terrorists as a distinct category. Unlike bona fide soldiers, terrorists do not wear uniforms indicating which government is responsible for their acts. They frequently and easily pass themselves off as civilians, leading to a unique set of burdens on those who must fight them. This is what I did when I helped blow up British installations in Palestine, erected to prevent Jews escaping Nazi Europe from reaching their new homeland.

Terrorists are surely entitled to basic human rights, as are all human beings. However, we cannot allow them full access to all the evidence against them, which criminals are entitled to, without creating unacceptable security risks. I favor allowing terrorists to choose among lawyers who have security clearances, allowing these lawyers to see the government evidence but not sources and methods. Terrorists should not be detained endlessly without being charged in a court of law, but the government should have a right to hold them longer than regular criminals to allow time for finding their partners before it is disclosed that they have been captured.

Up to a point these anti-terrorism measures can be viewed as merely modifications of the criminal justice system. However, given their scope and number, in effect they amount to a different approach. This is most evident when we acknowledge that prevention requires questioning and even detaining people who have not yet violated any law.

In short, although one might differ about how far one can go in trying to deter terrorism, and how to proceed, one may still agree that it makes little sense to treat terrorists either as criminals or as soldiers. At issue is not a matter of neat classifications, but ways to maintain the institutions of a free society while also protecting it from devastating attacks.

Sorry, sanctions will not do

    

In seeking ways to pressure Iran to stop enriching uranium and clear the air about its nuclear ambitions, adding tougher sanctions to those already in place is often mentioned. For instance, John McCain stated at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) policy conference last week that he favors imposing limits on Iranian imports of gasoline and a worldwide campaign to freeze Iranian assets. Barack Obama, speaking before the same body, said that he would pursue a similar policy if Iran remained uncooperative, stating that “If Iran fails to change course… we [will] insist on stronger sanctions in the Security Council.”  Nancy Pelosi holds that: "Sanctions that are far-reaching and tough demonstrate to Iranian leaders that their behavior is recognized as a threat….”

Most recently, following a joint statement with the Bush Administration on intensifying sanctions, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the European Union will freeze the overseas assets of Iran’s largest commercial bank; he also stated that if Iran persists in defying existing United Nations resolutions, European leaders would begin considering further sanctions on investments in Iran’s oil and natural gas industries. 

It’s easy to understand why politicians love sanctions. They sound tough. They’re more than just talk but less than dreaded acts of war (which surely should only be considered—if at all—if all other means have been exhausted). Moreover, there are not many other arrows in the quiver of foreign policy.
But sanctions often do not work; indeed they often backfire, and they have some very undesirable side effects. 

The United States isolated Castro’s Cuba for four decades, banning trade with and travel to and from the island as well as exerting pressure on other nations to follow the same course.  Containment of Cuba failed to grant its people more rights or to introduce democratic reforms.  North Korea and Saddam’s Iraq are two regimes which were long under sanctions but which persisted for decades. 
In contrast, when China was still very much under totalitarian Communist rule in 1972, the United States decided to engage it in commerce, tourism, and more. It is far from a shining democracy, but it has become much more moderate since those days. The same holds true for Vietnam.  The fifteen former Soviet Republics have changed even more, including on the political front, largely after the West engaged them instead of trying to isolate them through the use of sanctions.

The comprehensive sanctions imposed by the U.S. and others on Iraq in the 1990s failed to impress Saddam, who made out like a bandit due to the smuggling which various corrupt international players engaged in to circumvent the sanctions. At the same time the sanctions exacted a harsh price from the citizens of Iraq, leading to the deaths of many children, as access to needed supplies were limited. 

True, the sanctions that have been imposed against Iran are different, more “graduated and targeted” than those that were imposed against Iraq in the 1990s. In the words of Matthew Levitt, director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy at the Washington Institute, “these are not your grandfather’s sanctions.” They are designed to exert coercive power only against “those elements of Iranian society specifically engaged in illicit conduct” rather than against the entire society.

But even when sanctions do have a bite, as they seemed to have had in the case of Libya, they take decades to have an effect and required almost universal support. It does not take a degree in rocket science or economics to realize that if the U.S. is imposing sanctions that many other nations are not  adhering to, their main effect will be to deflect trade and other forms of business from the U.S. to other nations. Thus, the extensive U.S. sanctions on Iraq in the ‘90s failed, in part, because many of Iraq's neighbors (and several other nations) did not abide by them.   

There is even less support for sanctions on Iran. Iran is laughing all the way to the bank, as the United States-imposed sanctions cost it much less than the extra revenue it is generating due to rising price of oil, and it is swimming in deals with Russia and in investments from China and India.

In short, sanctions may be good politics, but not good foreign policy. The dealings with Iran will have to follow the same path that Clinton followed and— in its waning days—that the Bush administration is following in their dealings with North Korea: offering to cease trying to overthrow the regime by the use of force if they will give up their nuclear arms ambitions and cease supporting terrorism. Such negotiations, one should not deny, are propelled forward by keeping all other options on the table, including the military one. And that is where that option best stay.

Irrational Leaders and Nuclear Arms: A Response

Recently, I pointed out that the report of an FBI agent who interviewed Saddam for several months is very telling. It shows that policy makers and my colleagues are wrong when they argue that leaders of nations, such as North Korea and Iran, are rational, and hence can be trusted with nuclear arms. We are told that these leaders and others like them will never use such bombs because they are aware of the devastation which would soon follow. But, as detailed in the report, it turned out that Saddam greatly misjudged the situation he faced in 2003. His mistake did cost his country plenty, and he, of course, is not doing too well either. [previous post here]

In response to my short essay, several commentators pointed out that President Bush is the one who is irrational. However, this claim does not contradict my position; on the contrary, all it shows is that the world would be much safer if fewer nations had nuclear arms and if those who do have them gave up as many of them as we could induce them to.

Others claimed that I am trying to justify an attack on Iran. Actually, I argued the opposite. A lengthy quote follows, which outlines how I believe we can come to terms with Iran without war and without more countries in the Middle East setting out to get nuclear weapons.

“As of mid 2006, the US has continued openly seeking regime change in both Iran and North Korea. We have long condemned the regime of the mullahs, barely acknowledged Iran’s contributions to curbing Al Qaeda, and announced increased funding for Iranian groups that seek to undermine the mullah’s reign. US opposition to Communist forms of government is well known and its condemnations of North Korea’s violation of human rights could not be any harsher. In dealing with both nations, but especially with Iran, the military option for disposing of the regimes has repeatedly and often been discussed by the Bush Administration.
    "Both Iran and North Korea are reported to have sought non-aggression treaties or security guarantees from the West as part of a deproliferation deal. If these deals could be struck and faithfully carried out, they would in effect entail ‘trading’ deproliferation, verified by vigorous inspections and by denying these nations their own uranium enrichment facilities, with leaving their authoritarian regimes in place, subject only to internal challenges….
   “There is no way to determine a priori whether North Korea and Iran made these offers in good faith or merely to gain time in which to advance their nuclear programs.  From their viewpoint, however, one can readily see why they would want such a deal.  Both nations have military bases of the US and its allies on their borders. If the US and its allies were willing to remove these bases and provide international assurances that they would not directly attack these nations nor indirectly seek to subvert their regimes, one can see why these governments might consider an exchange of their nuclear weapons program for such guarantees. However, one can hardly expect them to seriously consider a deal that will also put the governing elites—and the form of regime they hold sacred—into play, which is exactly what regime change entails. It would be like demanding that Bush turn over the White House to Gore and replace the United States Constitution with the Shariah!
    “The implied deal I suggest, which would allow authoritarian regimes to be subject only to internal challenges in exchange for deproliferation and ending the support for terrorism, is less bitter than it seems. It would not mean that the West must engage in some kind of Faustian bargain and give up its liberal soul in exchange for security.  Regime changes are coming on their own in Iran and in communist states—granted North Korea is lagging….
    “No matter how much money and effort the US and its allies expend, they could never make such nations into liberal democracies.  As we have seen time and time again, the West can topple Saddam or the Taliban but it cannot install a regime that respects human rights and democracy in countries with little preparation for such polities.  Hence, there is little to be lost and much to be gained by providing security guarantees and other international “rewards” in exchange for vigorous and verified deproliferation and the end of harboring, financing, and equipping Hezbollah and its ilk.” (Quote is from my book, Security First, published by Yale in mid-2007)

True, it may be tactically unwise to grant one’s adversary what they most seek to gain with negotiations before the negotiations even start. Hence, one can fully favor the idea that the US should talk with its adversaries, but still leave the military option in the air—to be traded off during the give and take. One may well disagree with this tactic. However in either case, what we need is fewer nations with nuclear arms, not more wars.

Lessons from Myanmar

The weeks of delay in delivering humanitarian aid to the suffering millions in Myanmar highlighted one more time a new transnational norm, that governments have a duty to protect their people, and—that if they do not discharge it, they forfeit their right to sovereignty. It is a fine norm, but as it turns out, more than a new norm is needed.

The family provides a good analogy. Once upon a time, it was widely agreed that one’s home was one’s castle, and that whatever happened in one’s home was nobody else’s business. Feminists changed this concept, arguing that when one has reason to believe that child or spousal abuse occurs in a given home, intervention is justified. Thus, if neighbors hear someone being thrown against the wall and a cry for help, the community should rush in. In short, the right to privacy is not absolute. The same notion is now being applied to international relations.

Once upon a time, when a king converted his people from one religion to another—other kings sent their armies to convert them back. The results were very bloody wars. These came to an end in 1648, when the warring nations signed several treaties known together as the Peace of Westphalia, which entail a commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of another nation. Since then, the notion of national sovereignty has become almost sacrosanct.

A challenge to this concept came in 1996, when a Sudanese diplomat by the name of Francis M. Deng, troubled by the resistance of some nations to efforts to provide their people with humanitarian assistance, published a book entitled Sovereignty as Responsibility. Deng argued that sovereignty was not absolute but conditional; for it to be respected, a nation had to be a good citizen of the international community.  If a nation fails in this duty, the international community may intervene to protect the at-risk citizens of the offending nation.

This idea was embraced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, established by the Canadian government, and by Kofi Annan and the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005. Myanmar would have been a place where this new doctrine could have been applied. Indeed, we suggested that the country should be bombed with packages of rice, whether or not the junta welcomed such flights.

Events in recent days show that much more than a change in norms is needed.  We see that all too often, when the United Nations sends in help, especially when it consists of peacekeepers or other personnel needed to deliver humanitarian aid, these individuals can become part of the problem. They pressure children for sexual favors; they deal in controlled substances; and they squander a good part of the aid they bring.  Moreover, whenever the United Nations is called on for help, from Rwanda to East Timor, it typically must first scramble to find the funds and troops to respond.

Clearly what is needed is (a) a much larger contingent of so called Blue Helmets, UN forces. (b) These have to be placed near likely hot spots, on a stand-by basis. (c) These troops ought to be professionalized by mixing personnel from nations whose forces have already been trained properly and have developed the needed upright culture, with forces from nations whose troops still occupy a lower place on the learning curve.

Sadly there will be more Myanmars and Rwandas, indeed there is a need for more humanitarian intervention in the Sudan and the Congo right now. Granted, several other factors stand in the way of doing what ought to be done in these parts, difficult issues that must be tackled. Regrettably, one must add to the list the lack of professional forces ready to help rather than add injury to the massive suffering of the people of these distressed countries. We have a new norm; now we need now the proper forces to make it part of the new international reality.

Hillary: 1, McCain: 0

Hillary Clinton and John McCain unfurled their foreign policy agendas in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs. Hillary used her essay to move her position further away than ever from the Neo Cons' "democratize the world by Monday" position. McCain, instead, showed that he forgot nothing and learned less. (Other candidates have preceded them or will follow. For a discussion of the position taken by Barack Obama in his Foreign Affairs article, click here).