Amitai Etzioni Notes

Love the bomb?

Some years back I wrote an essay for Time magazine. When I met with the editor, he told me that wanted “a forehead slapping piece.” When I meekly replied that I did not know what this meant, he explained that he wanted the “reader to exclaim ‘Wow, why did I not think about that?!’” The editor was much less keen to find out  whether the idea could be well supported. All this came to mind when I read an article in a recent issue of Newsweek by a journalist, one Jonathan Tepperman. Time magazine would have loved his essay.

Mr. Tepperman announced that we are all dead wrong: “Nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous.” Wait, wait, Mr. Tepperman is just warming up. “The bomb may actually make us safer,” he claims. Mr. Tepperman finds that more nuclear-armed states are not dangerous and, in effect, are “agents of peace.”

The Newsweek journalist modestly refers to this revelation as “the truth” and claims that his conclusion is based on a “growing and compelling body of research.” Given that I have been trying to keep up with the field ever since I wrote two books about nukes in the mid-sixties, he surely got my attention.

Soon, it became clear that there is no research—let alone compelling research—to support this forehead-slapping claim, only Mr. Tepperman’s simplistic conclusions. Exhibit number one: He finds we need not fear nukes because they have not been used since 1945. But in 1945, they were used to wipe out two cities, and those who now seek to get their hands on them are much more fanatical and impulsive than the superpowers that monopolized them in the past. 

Moreover, while the US and Russia neutralized each other’s nukes— because of the threat of retaliation—terrorists have no such concerns. They are willing to commit suicide to carry out their mission and, hence, hardly fear retaliation. Furthermore, they would be delighted if the nation whose city they destroyed went and took out, say, Tehran. As they see it, such an attack would serve to mobilize the Muslim world for the ultimate jihad.

The point I just made concerns the future, which I grant is unpredictable (but about which we would rather be safe than sorry). However, Mr. Tepperman fully reveals the depths of his “research” when he writes, “There’s never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that posses them.” I guess he has never heard about India and Pakistan.

I stopped reading after Mr. Tepperman—ignoring the terrorists— declared that we are safe because heads of states are rational actors. Anybody who calls Hitler rational and who thinks it is was rational for the Japanese Emperor and his generals to believe that they could knock out the United States simply does not understand what rational means.

Three cheers for Israel?!

The media is full of stories critical of the way Israel deals with the Palestinians.
There is indeed a lot to criticize, which, by the way, Israelis often do. However, when Israel does something right — and in a big way — that too should be noted. After all, one cannot expect a nation that is boxed around the ears every time it strays, but not rewarded when it gets it right, to mend its ways.

Here what happened which got next to no coverage, except — thanks — in the Washington Post.

The Dead Sea is dying.  Since 1960, its water level has decreased by 75 feet and its surface area by a third.  But this problem is not restricted to one body of water: throughout the Middle East, water is running out.  Israel and Jordan have moved jointly to address this problem.

Israel and Jordan have developed a plan to connect and redistribute water sources throughout their countries to shore up the water supply.  One project under this plan would provide Amman with water by connecting it to the Dissi Reservoir, an underground water source in the south of Jordan, and would desalinate it by connecting it to Israeli desalination plants that are being built on the Mediterranean.  Another plant would send 500 billion gallons of water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea through pipelines and tunnels over a path of 110 miles.  Some of this water would be used to replenish the Dead Sea, while the rest would be desalinated for use by both countries.

The desalinated water from the Dissi Reservoir and Dead Sea would be shared amongst Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The replenished Dead Sea would sustain a tourist attraction and provide economic benefits for both Jordanian and Israeli companies who sell its chemicals.

Critics of the plan argue that these new connections will upset the region’s ecosystem and recommend that their possible effects be studied, which could take several years.  But Jordan and Israel maintain that the plan be implemented immediately to prevent water shortages, as some cities in Jordan have already begun rationing their water supply.

Three cheers for all concerned.

Make Health, Not War

Afghanistan needs more sociologists, not more troops. Sociologists would point out that Americans tend to see this country as one nation, with a central government and national security forces. But it actually is a collection of tribes—(including Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara). The first loyalty of most members of these tribes is to their own kind, not to the national government. Most Afghans correctly perceive the national government as corrupt to the core, in cahoots with drug lords, promoted by foreign powers, and the beneficiary of fraudulent elections.

We have been trying for eight years to straighten out this government, to no avail. We should now work with the local tribes and their natural leaders, rather than seek to impose a false national order on them.We should let the people of Afghanistan duke it out with the Taliban, to determine how much of a sharia regime they are willing to tolerate. However, we should not allow our young people to be killed for rights most Afghans do not want. Surely, they show no sign that they are willing to die for them.

We should make it clear that if the Afghans ever again allow their turf to be used as a base for terrorists, we shall bomb the daylights out of them. However, we need not be in Afghanistan to do this. Finally, we should not lump the Taliban—keen to run their own country— in with Al Qaeda, which seeks to harm us. True, these two are now allies, but this is the case at least in part because we treat them as if they were of one kind.

President Obama conducted a strategic review of Afghanistan. It concluded that we should seek “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” This is a precise and narrow goal that can be achieved, as long as we understand that we cannot get there by nation building—a task which is simply beyond our reach. Let the Afghan people form the local governments they favor, and let these form inter-regional alliances, and let us leave them be. Most of the Afghans will be happy in return to let us be.

A someone who was around during the Vietnam War, I predict that whatever number of troops President Obama will now agree to add to the war in Afghanistan, the generals will come back and ask for more. If those are not sent, critics will attribute to this “failure”—the reason Afghanistan will not be stabilized. Best to get off this bloody escalator now.

North Korea: a test for progressives

North Korean ships are carrying missiles and materials from which chemical and nuclear weapons can be made — to other tyrannies, such as the oppressive regime in Myanmar and in Yemen. The United States leads a group of more than ninety nations that are committed to stopping such traffic, but North Korea has stated that such interventions would lead to war.  One hears extremely little from progressives about what the United States should do next.

North Korea poses a special test for progressives because unlike the invasion of Iraq—and before that, the armed interventions in several other nations including Panama, Grenada, and Haiti—this time the United State is meeting the criteria previously posed by progressives.

The action is undertaken with the full blessing of the United Nations, which on June 12 passed a Security Council resolution that calls for U.N. member states to inspect all ships entering or leaving North Korea if there is a reasonable suspicion that the cargo contains banned nuclear materials or missile technology.

The action is multilateral rather than unilateral, in the sense that far from acting on its own, the U.S. has consulted many other nations, and is working together with them to try to stop North Korean dissemination of WMD.

Finally, at least so far, the use of force is excluded. There will be no forceful inspection of North Korean ships. First, the United States and other nations merely are asking North Korea to give permission to have its ships inspected while on the high seas.  If North Korea refuses, the nation in which the ship docks to refuel will be asked to inspect the cargo. This is very much in line with international law and it does not involve use of force.

Yet, we hear next to no sounds of approval from the progressive camp; one is hard put to find editorials from the left stating that this time we’ve got it right. Are progressives holding that all problems can be treated with merely goodwill, foreign aid, and talk? Or are they willing to fess up and acknowledge that when all other means have been exhausted, and there is clear and present danger—the time to act is now, and to act may entail putting at least one foot down?

For more discussion see Amitai Etzioni’s article “Tomorrow’s Institution Today: The Promise of the Proliferation Security Initiative” in the May/June 2009 Foreign Affairs, here. Etzioni is a professor of international affairs at The George Washington University and the author of Security First (Yale, 2007).  He can be contacted at icps@gwu.edu.  www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html

Non lethal promotion of democracy

Many observers have suggested that Obama's foreign policy agenda has abandoned the Bush Administration's emphasis on promoting democracy, including human rights. Much was made of President Obama's statement in his inaugural address: "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist." Others have pointed out, critically, that Secretary of State Hilary Clinton did not raise objections to China's deplorable human rights record during her first visit to that country as an Obama administration official.

The Bush Administration's policy and the related Neo Con position relied on the observation that only democracies make reliable partners in peace because only democracies do not wage war against other democracies. Hence, when the United States encounters non-democratic regimes (such as those of Saddam's Iraq, Iran, and North Korea), changing these into democratic ones was regarded not merely a matter of promoting political justice, of creating a regime we believe in, or of bringing the fruits and joys of freedom to oppressed people, but was regarded as a prerequisite for peace and security. Forced democratization for the sake of security was a common rationale given for the 2003 invasion of Iraq; for the military and national reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan; the CIA support for opposition groups in Iran, and other Bush administration policies.

This forced democratization approach has been questioned on several grounds: the same US government that promoted such changes has supported non-democratic regimes in a considerable number of other states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt; the correlations between democratic regimes and peace is much overstated (e.g., Israel invaded Lebanon); the imposed regimes are at best very flawed democracies; and the human costs of forced regime change are very high. Hence, the suggestions to forgo such regime changes altogether.

Several influential foreign policy mavens have argued explicitly for lowering the bar for admission to the international community--for allowing a nation to become a member in good standing without first democratizing. Some of them draw on John Rawls, one of the most highly regarded liberal philosophers of our age, who, in his 1999 The Law of Peoples, argued that liberal societies ought to build an international community that reflected the liberal value of toleration of difference, and which would thus include not only liberal societies, but all "decent" ones--including hierarchical, non-democratic societies. In a recent article in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Charles Kupchan and Adam Mount suggested that "the terms of the next [international] order should be negotiated among all states, be they democratic or not" and should include all nations that are broadly responsive to the needs of their members--that is, which serve their wellbeing. The authors use the term autonomy, but it is clear that they mean to include and accord full measure in rule-setting to such nations as China and Russia. The only nations that would not qualify under this "autonomy rule" are nations that commit genocide or are otherwise abusive of their people such as North Korea and Burma. In short, in sharp contrast to the Bush administration, a democratic regime is not deemed to be a prerequisite for being a full member in the new global order. Earlier, in the November/December 2007 issue of The American Interest as the Bush administration was entering its final throes, Barry Posen called for a foreign policy of "restraint" and "modesty", arguing that "the United States needs to be more reticent about the use of military force; more modest about the scope for political transformation within and among countries..."

These discussions and many others like them ignore a key distinction that is crucial for the issue at hand: the difference between forced regime change and the non-lethal promotion of democracy. In Security First, I suggested that as long as a nation does not support terrorism, did not develop or acquire WMD to threaten with other nations, and did not commit genocide or ethnic cleansing, it should be considered as having met the minimal requirements for membership in the international community (Libya, which abandoned its WMD program and renounced terrorism, is a case in point.) And I detailed the difficulties in developing democracy through long distance social engineering, by a foreign power. I stressed, however, that the rejection of forced regime change as a strategy to promote peace and security need not be understood to mean that we should cease promoting democracy, but only that we must limit ourselves to doing so by non-lethal means.

Like most stark dichotomies, the notion that we either promote democracy or we do not, disregarding differences in means, is a false one. I see no reason the US should cease to educate, persuade, and lead by example toward the development of democratic regimes anytime any place, and--if other nations are so inclined--for them to use such non-lethal means to promote their ideas of what a good regime makes. The list of non-lethal means is well-known and, indeed, very widely employed, usually with little ill effect. These include dissemination of texts, educational films, lectures and the use of scores of other cultural means; exchanges of leaders, students, professional and others; supporting local NGOs; sending of election observers; leading by example by improving our own democracy; providing people with new means of communication such as low costs radios, access to the internet and even cell phones, among others.

To favor the use of non-lethal means of democratization and to reject forced regime changes does not mean that one favors hectoring other regimes, denouncing them publicly, or lecturing them about the defects of their system and the virtues of ours. As with all educational means, the tools of non-lethal democratization are best tailored to fit those we are trying to reach. By and large, humiliating other nations does not work any better than humiliating students in a classroom. True, there are occasions when the conduct of a nation is so outrageous, as when China massacred protesters in Tiananmen Square, that public condemnations are called for. But, most times, being judicious rather than judgmental is more effective.

Economic sanctions do not fit neatly into either category. They are not lethal in the same way as occupations and extensive bombing runs are, and do not constitute outright forced regime changes. At the same time, sanctions are not strictly non-lethal means which seek to change the hearts and minds of the people involved rather than deprive them in order to coerce them to yield; Saddam and many human rights organizations claimed that hundreds thousands of children died as a result of the sanctions imposed on Iraq by US and its allies in the 90s.

Three notes are hence called for in assessing the merits of economic sanctions for democracy promotion. First, truly non-lethal measures are to be preferred to economic sanctions, because the latter can have some lethal effects. Second, sanctions should be rarely applied. I expect that a full study would show that under most conditions engagement is much more effective than sanctions (typically coupled with other isolation measures). For instance, the US has isolated and sanctioned Cuba and North Korea for decades--policies which have not led to democratization or regime change--while it engaged China and Vietnam and achieved comparatively much more favorable results. Finally, even if economic and other sanctions do work under some conditions, there seems to be no reason to doubt that truly non lethal means of the kind listed above--when they work, however slowly--lead to changes that have lower human costs and lead to people and regimes who truly embrace democracy rather than merely pay dues to gain reprise from sanctions.

In short, in the new era, we should not cease promoting democracy in the name of a new global tolerance and pluralism, but rather, should limit such promotion to non-lethal means for all nations that do wage war and terrorize others or their own people.

Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University and author of Security First (Yale, 2007). For more, go here.

Pakistan, outside the box

Social scientists have long used systems theory to point out links that are sometimes overlooked. Such a link now leads to the suggestion that to deal with the crisis in Pakistan and the mounting difficulties in Afghanistan, one should go to, of all places, India. The main reason the Pakistani army is reluctant to take on the Taliban, who threaten to overrun the country, is that the army considers India its enemy.

The main source of tension between the two countries is the question of who will control Kashmir. At first, any suggestion of solving this tricky problem in order to get the Pakistani army to refocus would seem truly far-fetched, if not visionary to the nth degree – like asking someone to improve the climate by first stopping earthquakes. Dealing with the internal tensions in Pakistan is difficult enough; add to the mix a conflict that has been simmering for decades and seems to resist any solution, and your way seems completely blocked.

The good news is that secret negotiations between India and Pakistan about Kashmir have been taking place. Those now need to be restarted, supported, and accelerated. In the process should we also dump the obsolete notion that India should be made to “balance” China, and we may then be on our way to a more stable region in this much contested part of Asia. Both steps require some elaboration.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars and come close to blows on several other occasions, mainly over Kashmir. The Pakistani and Indian armies’ training, formations, and alignments are focused on deterring each other, and are largely concentrated on their mutual border. The terrorists who recently attacked Mumbai, and before that the Indian Parliament and markets in New Delhi, see themselves as Kashmiri freedom fighters. It is hard to imagine major repositioning of the troops involved and changes in the strategic planning of both countries until the Kashmir issue is resolved.

A large variety of suggestions have been made about the way to determine the future of Kashmir. Some favor that the people of the area be allowed to vote on which nation they wish to join, as was prescribed by the UN Security Council after the partition of India; others favor dividing the area between the two nations; still others favor turning it into an area which enjoys a large measure of independence. The secret negotiations that took place between India and Pakistan during Pervez Musharraf’s tenure as president appear to have focused on the idea of ‘making borders irrelevant,’ that is, granting Kashmir a great deal of autonomy to avoid either country having to lose face by giving up their claims to control. Since General Musharraf stepped down these negotiations seem to have stopped. The Obama Administration would do well to apply here the same system-wide approach it is revealing in the Middle East: follow the links. In this case, encourage, cajole, and help Pakistan and India to move toward settling the Kashmir issue. Eliminating this source of terrorism and war, and the reason both nations are keen to maintain nuclear arms, is of course worthy in its own right.  It will also pay off handsomely in getting the Pakistani army to focus on the Taliban, including both those who threaten the government at home and those who cross the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

Obama seems not to shy away from complexities. In this case, dealing with India must take into account two more related matters. One involves a Bush Administration-backed deal with India which allows US companies to sell it nuclear fuel and other nuclear technologies to be used only in India’s civilian reactors. However, the net effect it that this deal allows India to shift from civilian to military use the limited uranium it has from other sources. (Bush assumed that it is acceptable for ‘good’ governments—like that of India and Brazil—to develop their nuclear industries, while only those of ‘bad’ governments, such as Iran and North Korea, need to be reined in.) However, as we now fear in Pakistan, government can change overnight, and above all, if the norm against proliferation is to have a chance to take hold, the fewer nations that go down this road, the greater the chances of enforcing a non-nuke global regime. This means is that even if the US can’t get India and Pakistan to give up their nukes, at this stage at least, it is ill-advised to help them increase their armed nuclear program. Hence the Obama Administration should renegotiate the agreement to provide nuclear fuel and technologies to India, and both India and Pakistan should be encouraged to scale back on the nukes and join the NPT, as their conflicts are resolved.

All this assumes that one drops the obsolete notion that nations can be used to balance each other and that a militarily powerful India somehow will serve to countervail a rising China. China is focused on its economic development, and its military has a very long way to go before it will pose a threat to the United States, even if there was reason to believe that it would seek such a confrontation. And if China has such intentions, whether India has a few extra nukes or not would hardly matter, given the size of the American arsenal. In short, to the extent that the US has any influence on India, it can be used to scale back its nuclear program without any discernible loss to American strategic interest.

I will be the first to grant that this kind of social science thinking leads one to try to tackle some very tough and persistent international problems as a way to treat some very acute local problems inside Pakistan and in Afghanistan. In that sense, it is truly far-fetched.  However, these pestering international conflicts call for resolution anyhow, and if they can at least be curbed, such progress would help on the local fronts.  Dealing with the Taliban may entail going to Kashmir, New Delhi, and Islamabad, and forgetting for now about China.

"Regional peace" -- A New Idea for the Middle East!

If you thought that after all these years there could not possibly be a new idea for making peace between Israel and the Palestinians, well, as the cliché goes, think again. Better yet, it is a damn good idea. It holds that Israel would implement the long talked about two state solution (a Palestinian and a Jewish state, “living next to each other in security and peace”)—and Iran would actually give up its military nuclear program. 

So far, there have been those who held that the road to Tehran, Damascus, Beirut and the rest of the Arab world leads through Jerusalem, meaning that peace in the Middle East requires that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict first be resolved. Only in this way, we have been told a score of times, one can hope to “turn the Arab street” to agree to support other changes that peace in the region requires. Others held that given that Israel sees the Iranian bombs as directly threatening its very existence and that the time is near at which Iran will have nuclear bombs, this is the matter that must be most urgently attended to. And—nobody moved. The new idea is that we can get out of this stalemate by moving on both fronts at one and the same time.

Some are sure to hold that Israel already agreed to a two state solution, hence it will give nothing new in exchange for a deproliferation of Iran. However, the same holds for Iran—it has long and repeatedly declared that its nuclear program is strictly dedicated to peaceful pursuits. Hence, if it would show to IAEA inspectors that it has not been militarizing its nuclear program, it merely would be showing that it was not lying through its teeth.

Both arguments are disingenuous. Although previous Israeli governments declared themselves in favor of a two state solution, the “details”—what such a solution entails and above all the ways to get there—were never agreed upon. And Iran keeps threatening to wipe Israel off the map, which it can hardly hope to do without nuclear arms, which many believe it is rushing to develop. In short, a mutually and simultaneously implemented deal not only makes a great deal of sense, but breaks the stalemate.

There is room here from some truly creative thinking and adroit diplomacy. Step 1? Israel freezes the settlements on the West Bank; Iran freezes the enrichment of uranium. Step 2? Iran opens up some parts of its nuclear industry to international inspection; Israel turns over some parts of the West Bank to Palestinian forces and so on. 

Other scenarios can surely be developed. All will have to survive those who will maintain that the whole deal is unfair for one reason or another. I rush hence to reiterate a point Shibley Telhami (a leading Palestinian-American) and I made some years ago, that this is not the time to sort out what ultimate justice entails, who is at fault, who started it all, etc. These kinds of arguments are used by both sides to demand that the other side—the guilty one—yield, and that their sides need not make any concessions. For now, we argued, all sides should focus on where we go from here. Later we can have a Truth Commission to figure out who the real culprit was. The time to make peace is now, all other matters will wait.

The new idea has one more attractive feature. Many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are very keen for Iran not to have nuclear bombs. They also favor the two state solution. In short, the regional peace plan has a ready-made, significant political constituency right there in the Middle East.

Although the US is expected to lead the negotiations that must take place, above all by ensuring that both Israel and Iran take parallel steps to implement their part of the deal, Russia should also be involved. Russia is the power that could tip the scales in Iran if it joins the West in promoting an end to the nuclear military ambitions of Iran. Hence, Russian support should be courted, and if need be rewarded, by granting Russia some of the items on their long agenda – for instance, as Obama in effect already offered, the US folding the missile defense system that Bush planned to place in Poland and the Czech Republic to stop Iranian missiles.

Finally, the regional peace plan will serve as a sort of Rorschach test. There are those whose reaction will reveal that they are so confident that Iran has no intentions to build a bomb, or that if it did it “would never be so crazy to use it” that they will not support the plan. There are those so mad at Israel that they want to force it to make major concessions to the Palestinians, come what may. And there are some who see Iran as a major threat to many nations in the Middle East, and are less preoccupied by the Palestinians, especially those who still declare that they are out to destroy Israel. One cannot but hope that all these players would put aside their special takes on the situation and their special pleadings, and recognize a good deal when it is laid out right in front of them. Otherwise, even this sage plan may end up where so many attempts to bring peace to the Middle East have ended up—in the dustbins of history, followed by more bloodshed.

Mother of all deals- II

I arrived in Moscow from Washington highly optimistic, a day after the vigorous, historic handshake between President Medvedev and President Obama in London. I left—after visits with officials and colleagues—more than a bit concerned. My optimism was not based on such cheerful gestures as pushing reset buttons, although such tone-setting steps have their place. I believed that a major deal between the two countries could be made, one based not on identical or even complementary interests of Russia and the United States—but one that would build on profound differences in saliency.
    
Allow me to explain. When Party A has some things that Party B deeply desires but Party A does not care much about—and Party B has some things Party A keenly wants but Party B is not much invested in, a mother of all deals is plausible. The fact that this notion has some legs became clear when the Obama Administration, which is far from invested in building a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic while Russia is rather troubled by it, offered (in effect) to trade it in. That is, exchange it for Russia’s help in encouraging Iran to give up on its nuclear arming program. As the US sees it, an Iran with nuclear bombs would gravely endanger America’s allies (not just Israel but also Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan) if not the United States itself; that is, Iran’s nuclear program is highly salient for the US, but Russia seems not to have a great stake in a nuclear armed Iran, to put it mildly.

In addition, it seemed that another such exchange could be built into the mother of all deals: The Obama Administration’s interest in expanding the membership of NATO in the foreseeable future is far from salient, while this issue matters a great deal to Russia. At the same time, the United States is much interested in accelerating the Nunn-Lugar programs that aim to neutralize fissile material from which terrorists can make nuclear bombs and further improve the security of tactical nuclear arms, matters which Russia has little reason to oppose. Voila, the conditions of a major deal seem to be in place.

Why did I leave less optimistic, much less optimistic? Both sides seem to have decided to pile on a large number of additional items, some of which have a rather different profile of needs and interests than those mentioned above, including items that gravely concern both sides, especially the quantity and quality of nuclear arms to be maintained. In addition, Russia seems keenly interested in changes in trade and economic policy, such as the additional opening of American markets to Russian products and membership in the WTO and OECD, issues that are particularly difficult to deal with currently given the recent tendency to increase rather than lower national barriers to trade. Half a dozen additional items have been raised, ranging from the incentives Russia seems to have provided to Kyrgyzstan which led it to move to close a major supply line for American troops in Afghanistan to helping Russia secure its “territorial integrity”. (Still other points were raised in a recent editorial by President Medvedev in the Washington Post.)
    
The escalation of ambitions and expectations are by no means one-sided. President Obama’s trademark is thinking big and moving on many fronts at once. Up to a point, one cannot but admire such a drive not just to remake the United States internally, but also to build a new global architecture, with a partnership with Russia as a key element. However, such ambitions become problematic when they pay little mind to matters of relative saliency and respective pace.

Thus, it is rather obvious that the more items that are thrown into the mix, the more complex the negotiations will become and the less likely they are to succeed, especially as they involve items of similar rather than different saliency. Even more detrimental is the fact that some of these processes and policies have internal clocks that run at very different speeds.

This is especially true when one considers Iran’s nuclear arming program, which may well cross a red-line within a year, while matters of trade or even those concerning the conflict in Afghanistan have a significantly longer trajectory. It would be much better to focus first on those items that have hard and short deadlines rather than mixing them up with those that do not. Finally, all items that require action by the US Senate—such as approving treaties or changing laws (e.g., Jackson-Vanik)—must be assumed to face a slow journey, even given the Democratic majority.

I have not lost faith in the dawning of a new era in the Russian-American relationship. I am especially encouraged to find mountains of goodwill (mixed with some residue of feelings of distrust). I just hope that matters that need to be and can be settled in short order will not be undermined by those that cannot and those that must be allowed time to be worked out.

The bizarre case of pirates’ human rights

We are told that the reasons we have such a hard time stopping the pirates is that our forces have a very hard time locating them in the vast sea. An odd statement, given that the pirates have no trouble locating our ships in the same sea, and they have no drones, satellites, AWACS, and all the other means of modern technology. Moreover, we hardly need to look for them; they present themselves to us, quite regularly. Most recently they captured six ships with a few weeks.

The main reason pirates roam freely is only whispered in the corridors of power, because it is very politically incorrect to openly state that pirates are protected by a radical interpretation of human rights. The various navies involved are operating (or more precisely, are not operating) because of one or more of the following points:

•    Do not capture the pirates because if you do, they will have to be brought to trial in some national court. There are no international courts in which they can be tried. To try them, you will need evidence that will hold up in such courts. Most ship hands do not have the kind of police training needed to collect evidence properly, observe the chain of evidence, and so on.

•    Once brought to your homeland, the pirates may seek—and possibly be granted—asylum. (In several European countries one can gain asylum by showing that he or she is coming from a part of the world in which there is a sufficient level of indiscriminant violence that one’s life would be in danger by remaining there. One need not show that he or she was specifically persecuted.) Thus, courts may let them walk and you would then have dozens of Somali marauders roaming free in your country.

•    You will be unable to ship them back to Somalia for trial because there they would likely be subject to torture or execution.

•    Piracy is a crime and crimes are a matter for the police to deal with, not armed forces. But national police forces have no jurisdiction, a high seas catch-22.

•    Pirates cannot be shot when they close in on your ship because they may be fishermen engaging in their peaceful business. The fact that they are armed cannot be used as evidence because in these parts of the world practically all men are armed.

•    If you fail to respect their rights, you may be hauled in front of one or more of your national courts, the European Court of Human Rights, condemned by United Nations, and excoriated by the parts of the media and by human rights activists.

Ignored is the fact that human rights—which ought to be observed—must be balanced with concerns for the common good, as they are in the domestic courts of all free nations. No reasonable interpretation of rights allows them to trump all other considerations, especially gross violations of the safety of innocent people going about their business, business which, in the case of the Maersk Alabama, consisted of carrying humanitarian aid destined for Somalia! Thus, while even pirates, if captured, should not be tortured or held indefinitely without a hearing, a ship’s sovereignty should be extended to an area around it. Any armed party entering this zone, should be asked to leave or surrender; if they refuse and do not heed a warning shot, they should be treated as a hostile force. Civilian airlines have armed marshals. Our commercial ships and cruise ships may need some of those now, equipped with a 007 license.    

At least the way I see it, to treat human rights on the high seas the way we do at home is a much preferred alternative to the desperate suggestion—now increasingly mentioned—that we ought to invade Somalia, in order to get at the pirates’ bases. Such a land-based operation is surely going to involve killing many innocent Somalis, aside from inflicting a considerable number of casualties on our own troops.   
   

Amitai Etzioni professor of international relations at The George Washington University and the author of Security First (Yale 2007). For more, go here.

Obama’s test

Joe Biden was wrong when he stated that he expected President Obama to be tested within six moths of his taking office by some foreign power. Not just Obama is going to be tried. The whole soft power, multilateralism, diplomacy-will-open-all-doors liberal foreign policy is on trial.

Iran has nominated itself as the first foreign tester. President Obama appealed to Iran in a powerful, evocative, noble message. He referred to Iran by its full name, dear to the Mullahs, “The Islamic Republic of Iran.” He celebrated Iran’s contributions to culture, art, poetry, and history, among other great treasures. He addressed Iran with the respect that Mullahs long demanded, stating: “We know that you are a great civilization, and your accomplishments have earned the respect of the United States and the world.”

And he called for turning a new page, in the eloquence that is uniquely his:

Within these [New Year] celebrations lies the promise of a new day, the promise of opportunity for our children, security for our families, progress for our communities, and peace between nations. Those are shared hopes, those are common dreams.

How did Iran respond? By spitting in his face and showing him the finger. Ayatollah Khamenei stated “[Obama] insulted the Islamic Republic of Iran from the first day.  If you are right that change has come, where is that change? What is the sign of that change? Make it clear for us what has changed.” Global headlines: Obama rebuffed by Iran.

The liberals were left utterly undaunted. What spitting? Maybe a few drops of rain. They dug deep into the insult and claim to have found a hint that if the Obama Administration will do Iran’s bidding—lift the economic sanctions, and halt accusations that it is sponsoring terrorism and manufacturing nuclear weapons---it may stop insulting us. And they pointed out that after 30 years of mistreating Iran and the “last eight years,” it will take much more than one appeal by an American president to open the doors to diplomacy. (Though, to its credit, The Economist suggested that Obama should try only one more time).

These good liberals ignore three matters, one minor, one far from minor, and one about as major as they come. First, Iran could have responded to Obama’s overture with its typical list of demands and litany of complains—without disrespecting the President and the United States, without the dismissive, humiliating tone they struck. Second, the last eight years were very rough on Iraq, Iran’s greatest enemy, whom Iran fought for eight years but failed to vanquish. Iran itself, however, was in effect indulged. The U.S. did nothing other than holler when Iranian sophisticated roadside bombs and other arms were delivered to Iraqi insurgents; when Iranian agents were caught training Iraqi insurgents; and when Iran urged the Shia to undermine U.S. efforts to stabilize the new Iraqi regime. Moreover, when Iran was found supplying arms and funds to terrorist organizations in Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank, and other parts of the world—the US largely looked the other way. The US continued to do so when it discovered that Iran was financing Syria’s efforts to build a nuclear bomb. True Cheney talked a big stick, but the only military action the Bush Administration took regarding Iran-- was to prevent Israel from attacking it, late in 2008.

Iran has strong, valid historical reasons to complain about U.S. conduct—a generation ago. Madeline Albright already apologized for these ill deeds. Still, one could argue that these beefs should be aired further. However, if Germany and France can put aside their historical differences,  one could expect Iran to allow those complaints to recede, given a new administration that seeks to turn a page in the Middle East.

By far the most important issue is the one of ticking clocks. There is some evidence that Iran is developing nuclear bombs and soon will have some. If this is the case, Iran is likely to play tough, to expect more courting, make some very minor concessions (a somewhat more conciliatory speech, for instance, would make the liberals dance in the aisles and sing with hope), and try to drag things out until their bombs are good and ready.

The test for Obama and liberal foreign policy is hence what they will do if diplomacy, soft power, and multilateralism are continuously rebuffed. One can—as I do—strongly favor the liberal approach and still urge that the U.S. stop acting like a one-move chess player; one must think ahead to what the other side will do and what our next step is then going to be. More American gestures? Sure. Opening diplomatic relations with Iran (if they are game)—good idea. Meeting at various international gatherings—please remember over tea, not scotch, and bring a Koran, not a Bible—by all means. But there is a good reason to consider now what the Obama Administration will do if all these gestures yield precious little.

The main reason to consider these future steps now is that Iran is thinking about them. Iran was most interested, keenly interested, in solving its differences with the US in May 2003. What was distinct about this time period? The US had just trounced Sadam’s military with minimum American causalities in a few short weeks, something that Iran could not accomplish in eight years.  The Mullahs had good reason to believe they may be next in line. That threat of hard power got their attention. (And that of Libya, which gave up its support for terrorism and its WMD program.) In the years that followed, as the U.S. got mired ever more deeply in Iraq and Afghanistan—Iran became ever more intransient.

All this is not, I cannot stress enough, a call for threatening Iran. It is to call attention to the relationship between soft and hard power. Soft power works much better when those involved realize that if it fails, other powers may come into play. This is the test Obama and liberal foreign policy now face. Can they make soft power work? (Which would be indeed a global blessing.) And are they clear, at least in their own minds and councils, what will they resort to if Iran just plays them for one month after another, until their nukes are placed at the top of their missiles?