Amitai Etzioni Notes

Soft Syria Response Worse Than Inaction

A weak or irrelevant response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria may be even worse than inaction. As long as President Obama delays action—as he waits for all the intelligence he requires—Syrians and others can still assume that when he is finally moved to act, he will unleash a thunderbolt, striking a blow against the regime that will convince one and all not to cross red lines drawn by the United States. But if Obama again follows his proclivity to split the difference—to appease the critics, but not address the challenge—he will demonstrate weakness.

Among the suggestions that have been made are for Obama to arm the rebels, to introduce a no-fly zone or to create a safe haven for refugees. Calls for such actions have come from both sides of the aisle: Republican senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, as well as Democratic senator Carl Levin and representative Eliot Engel. But these acts are not likely to turn the tide against the rush of fighters—many with combat experience—from Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon that are joining in the defense of Assad, or the elite cohort of “advisers” and many thousands of troops supplied by Iran. And if the intervention by the United States were to tip the scales, we would have a new Libya on our hands, with one very devastating difference: jihadists with chemical weapons.

The notion advanced by Senator Graham that if we only arm “our” rebels (the few pro-Western ones) they will fight against both Assad and the extremists, is wishful thinking. “Ours” are the weakest of the lot. However, even if somehow “our” rebels prevailed, we should note that it did not take long for those who the United States armed in Afghanistan against the Soviets to turn on us, or for arms we supplied in Libya to flow into the hands of Al Qaeda in Mali.

Increasing humanitarian aid, especially helping Jordan and Turkey cope with the flood of refugees and providing more medical and food supplies to refugees in Syria, is both a very good idea and an irrelevant one. We should extend this aid whether or not Assad used chemical weapons, but such good deeds will not be, and will not be seen as, a response to the regime’s (or the rebels') violation of Obama’s red line.

Read the rest at The National Interest-->

Drones: Say it with figures

Originally published in United Press International

Attacking drones, the most effective counter-terrorism tool the United States has found thus far, is a new cause celebre among progressive public intellectuals and major segments of the media.

Their arguments would deserve more of a hearing if, instead of declaring their contentions as fact, they instead coughed up some evidence to support their claims.

One argument that is repeated again and again is that killing terrorists with drones generates resentment from Pakistan to Yemen, thereby breeding many more terrorists than are killed. For example, Akbar Ahmed, a distinguished professor at American University, told the BBC on April 9 that, for "every terrorist drones kill, perhaps 100 rise as a result."

The key word is "perhaps"; Ahmed cites no data to support his contention.

Similarly, in The New York Times, Jo Becker and Scott Shane write that "Drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants," citing as their evidence one line Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square, used in his 2010 trial seeking to justify targeting civilians.

At the same time, when HBO interviewed children who carry suicide vests, they justified their acts by the presence of foreign troops in their country and burning of Korans.

No such self-serving statements can be taken as evidence in themselves.

And Peter Bergen, a responsible and serious student of drones, quotes approvingly in The Washington Post a new book by Mark Mazzetti, who claims that the use of drone strikes "creates enemies just as it has obliterated them." Again, however, Mazzetti presents no evidence.

One may at first consider it obvious that, when American drones kill terrorists who are members of a tribe or family, other members will resent the United States. And hence if the United States would stop targeting people from the skies, that resentment would abet and ultimately vanish.

In reality, ample evidence shows that large parts of the population of several Muslim countries resent the United States for numerous and profound reasons, unrelated to drone attacks.

These Muslims consider the United States to be the "Great Satan" because it violates core religious values they hold dear; it promotes secular democratic liberal regimes; it supports women's rights; and it exports a lifestyle that devout Muslims consider hedonistic and materialistic to their countries.

These feelings, data show, are rampant in countries in which no drones attacks have occurred, were common in those countries in which the drones have been employed well before any attacks took place, and continue unabated, even when drone attacks are greatly scaled back.

Read the rest at United Press International

The Risk of Blurring the Red Lines

The Obama administration is ignoring two of the most elementary rules of the use of power: First of all, the more credible threats are, the less power one needs to marshal (and hence less one needs to spend on building it up), and the less often power needs to be actually exercised. Second, every time one makes a threat, one is tested twice: will it bring about the desired outcome? And will it build up or diminish the credibility of one’s power?

In March, President Obama announced that if the Assad regime will use chemical weapons this would be a “game changer.” When reports first surfaced that such weapons were used, the Obama administration pointed out that these appeared to be riot control agents, such as pepper spray and tear gas, which is often used by police forces. These may be considered chemical weapons in the Middle East, but the United States does not consider them as such. (It was also unclear whether it was the rebels or the government who had employed these agents.)

Most recently, however, when Britain, France, and Israel reported that nerve gas agents were used by the Assad regime, the Obama administration responded that the United States was investigating the matter. As these reports come in, the study continues.

One can readily understand the reluctance of the Obama administration to act, given the large quantities, varying kinds, and wide dispersion of the chemical agents in Syria. Moreover, the chemical weapons are not easily handled; safely destroying them will very likely entangle the United States in the civil war; and such involvement would almost certainly lack UN authorization. However, all this was known before the United States drew the red line. Hence, if the Obama administration continues to dillydally, it will further undermine the credibility of the United States as a superpower, a position already shaken by its failing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The same holds for the shifting red lines—the plural “lines” is not a misprint—drawn, redrawn and repositioned on Iran’s nuclear development. From the beginning of his first term, President Obama indicated that the United States would find it “unacceptable” if Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapon program. Yet it seems that Iran’s nuclear development did not stop. In September 2009 the administration threw its support behind a proposal that would allow Iran to pursue uranium enrichment up to 5 percent. The deal was rejected, and by February 2010, Iran was producing 20 percent enriched uranium. The administration decided that 20 percent was now acceptable—as long as Iran did not move toward constructing a bomb. The president pledged “not to contain, but to prevent an Iranian bomb,” even if that meant military action.

Read the rest at The National Interest-->

Time for New Paradigms

It is easy to understand why so many mavens are trying desperately to conceptualize cyber warfare, drones and transnational terrorists in yesterday’s terms. However, the dissonance has grown to a point where we are forced to look for new concepts and principles rather than try in vain to fit a new reality into obsolete paradigms. We often act like someone who can’t squeeze a size-fourteen foot into a size-nine boot—and would rather cut off the toes than find a larger pair.

True, if we discard and adopt new principles as frequently as we replace footwear, principles will cease to carry much normative heft. However, currently we suffer from a severe case of the opposite problem: We forget that laws were not etched in stone and that all constitutions are living documents. After all, segregation was once legal in the United States, women could not vote until 1920 and the federal right to privacy did not exist until the mid-1960s.

Nowhere is the lag in legal and ethical frameworks more obvious than in the notion that lethal force can only be used against a declared enemy if an attack is imminent—that is, if there is evidence that it is about to occur in short order. However, in a world where a cyber attack launched from the other side of the world has the potential to instantly—and without any visible warning—bring down not only IT systems but also critical infrastructure such as power stations and water supplies, new criteria for what constitute legitimate preventive defensive measures are desperately needed.

The same holds for terrorism. Because terrorists pose as civilians up until the moment they strike, counterterrorist forces seeking to prevent attacks and save innocent lives must intervene before terrorists reveal their true colors. This means acting before attacks are considered "imminent" by the old rules.

Similarly, the constant lip service paid to the increasingly obsolete concept of sovereignty undermines U.S. efforts in places such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. By enshrining the myth of absolute sovereignty, we give Afghan President Hamid Karzai endless fodder for stoking nationalism and lashing out against NATO forces when they act without his clearance—for supposedly violating his country’s right to self-governance. The fact is, Karzai was installed by the United States and would not have survived long without our protection. Washington pays an estimated 91 percent of Afghan security expenditures. The Afghan economy is heavily subsidized by the United States and its international partners, with 90 percent of its public expenditures coming from donors. We need a new definition for nations and regimes that survive thanks to blood we shed and monies we expend. A tempered or conditional understanding of sovereignty is necessary for working with those who refuse to act as reliable junior partners.

Most elementarily, we need to ditch the notion that we can only fight terrorists within declared theaters of war. Terrorists operate easily across borders; so must those who pursue them. True, Congress should maintain the right to authorize the use of lethal force outside our borders. Given that many hold that the current authorization for the use of military force is too vague, the president should ask Congress to reauthorize the campaign against terrorists, wherever they are found. Hopefully, even a divided Congress can agree on that much. However, there is little merit in the notion that we cannot take out Al Qaeda’s leaders and their associates because they are not in a country on some preapproved list.

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Israel -- 65 Years Ago

Sixty-five years ago it was far from obvious that Israel would survive; it was even far from obvious that a Jewish state would be created in the first place.

In 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted for a resolution calling for the division of British-controlled Palestine into two states -- one of which would be a Jewish state and one of which would be predominantly Palestinian. Specifically, Palestine would be divided into seven sections, three Jewish and four Arab, with Jerusalem placed under international administration. Jewish representatives accepted the deal; however, both the Arab League as well as the Palestinian organizations rejected the plan.

In the same year, I attended a most remarkable meeting. I was quite aware that I was only invited because I was a member of Mapai (labor party). And, those who convened the meeting wanted to have "someone young" because "after all, it was their future we will be discussing."

The meeting, which took place early in March 1947, was composed of leaders of Mapai, at the time the most powerful party of the Yishuv. Its leader, David Ben Gurion, headed the informal government with the Yishuv. Those assembled were exploring the position these leaders would stroke later that month at a meeting in Jerusalem. The subject: should the Yishuv settle merely for a homeland under continued British rule (couple with more leeway for intracommunity decisions), or should we dare hold out for true independence -- for statehood? In other words, should the Yishuv risk losing the possible, in favor of going for the deal?

The issue was rapidly coming to a head after years of tense negotiations. Numerous proposals had been advanced concerning the disposition of Palestine after World War II. Britain had been governing Palestine since World War I. Faced with growing unrest, Jewish defiance of British rules, some Jewish terrorism, and Arab riots, Britain was growing weary of maintaining its rule. In 1947, Britain dumped the future of Palestine in the lap of the United Nations. Ben Gurion and other Mapai leaders were exploring which of the several proposals before the United Nations they were going to fight for. The offer that seemed the most attainable (although not very much so) was a fair measure of self-government for the Jewish community; the least plausible was statehood.

Ben Gurion opened this part of the meeting by stating with much gusto, as if speaking to a much larger audience, "It is time to finalize our decision one way or the other." He added bluntly, "the time is right for us to take the ultimate risk and demand and fight for the formation of a full-blown state. Anything less will not allow us to realize the dream of Zion, to defend ourselves, to ensure that there will be a land any Jew in the world who seeks refuge will be able to come to unencumbered; that we shall never again be taken like lambs to the slaughter."

Moshe Shertok spoke much more softly. "I realize of course the wonder of having a state all our own. But we could get there gradually, in stages. For now we should limit ourselves to asking for a Jewish homeland within the framework of the British 'Mandate,' which we should insist be extended and truly implemented. Here, we can base ourselves on the British promise included in the Balfour Declaration, which calls for a Jewish homeland, not for a state. This way we are much more likely to win the support of the United Nations and not unnecessarily provoke the Arab nations that surround us."

Ben Gurion reacted impatiently, almost angrily. He argued, with a rising voice, "The time is now. The British Empire has been weakened as a result of the war. The British people are anxious to focus on rebuilding their land and not squandering their resources by holding on to a piece of desert in the Middle East, especially if we make the occupation of Palestine more costly for them. While we may be the first British colony to push them out, I hear rumblings from India and other British colonies, even French ones; the days of empires are numbered."

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North Korea and U.S. Priorities

If someone could get jumping-bean secretary of state Kerry off of his jet long enough to preside over a review of U.S. foreign priorities, he might discover why we are in such a pickle in our dealings with North Korea—and what might be done. It is a nation that openly threatens the United States and its allies—not less than with nuclear attacks—and all we can say is, “well, the kid seems to be bluffing.”

Talking heads on TV keep reassuring each other that North Korea is not suicidal. Washington is scaling back military exercises in the area and urging South Korea to be cautious—and to be sure that if attacked their response will be proportional and not escalatory. True, the United States did send some untested missile-defense units to the region and to Alaska, and moved some other military assets around. But altogether, this is not much of a response.

The reason we must be so circumspect is that Kim Jong-un has us over a barrel. It is common knowledge that he can flatten Seoul and may well be able to overrun South Korea. If he proceeds, Washington will be left with very few and very tough options: either using nuclear arms or engaging in a large-scale conventional war, drawing on our worn-out army in a faraway country—all this just as our economy requires retrenching.

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Defending Drone Policy

The question of whether it is justified to use a drone to kill an American terrorist overseas is best answered if we imagine that the target had acted in the same manner—but wearing a uniform. If that soldier was part of an army that had attacked us in the past (call it al-Qaeda) and he was preparing for a new attack—or even regrouping between attacks—then he would be considered a fair and legitimate target. There seems little reason he should be treated more benignly just because he violated the rules of armed conflicts by donning civilian clothes that make him much more difficult to identify.

Thus, the first requirement for targeted killing should be one that is not included in a recently leaked “white paper” that served as the basis for many of the questions hurled at John Brennan: Has the administration verified that the said person is terrorist? Is he a member—worse yet, a high-ranking one—of al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates or some other such terrorist organization? In order for even a non-American to be on the approved kill list, such evidence must be available from two independent intelligence sources.

Even critics concede that before the authorization to kill is granted there is considerable review within the administration. Lawyers review the case and, before it reaches them, it must meet several criteria, including that the terrorist cannot be captured without undue risk to our troops and that the expected collateral damage in taking him out will be limited.

Critics complain that Congress and the courts are not involved in these reviews. Actually, although Congress cannot and should not be involved in reviewing each case, it is actively involved in reviewing the procedures used. Indeed, the white paper made it to the media because it was submitted to Congress as part of that branch’s review of the targeted assassination program.

Moreover, as Senator Diane Feinstein has stated, “the Senate Intelligence Committee is kept fully informed of counterterrorism operations and keeps close watch to make sure they are effective, responsible and in keeping with U.S. and international law.” Further, Feinstein has affirmed that staffers “question every aspect of the program including legality, effectiveness, precision, foreign policy implications and the care taken to minimize noncombatant casualties.”

U.S. civil courts have not been granted oversight for good reason. They are not suited for dealing with cases that involve classified information, sources and methods that need to be protected, and situations wherein the accused can neither be cross-examined nor face his accusers.

Many of the questions and criticisms raised by the white paper have focused on the criterion that targets must pose an “imminent” danger to the United States, which indeed has been given an expansive interpretation. This term is obviously employed in order to try to tie necessary counterterrorism measures to established international norms and laws, which recognize—as the UN charter does—that a nation has a right to act in self-defense when its citizens are in immediate danger. “Imminent” to most people connotes enemy troops lined up across the border ready to attack, or a North Korea or Iran loading nuclear arms onto the tips of transcontinental missiles capable of reaching our shores. However, because terrorists disguise themselves as civilians and attack with no warning—as they did on 9/11—a nation that seeks to defend itself must either broaden the meaning of “imminent” danger or allow its citizens to be killed en masse.

Being a member of an organization such as al Qaeda should suffice. It is not a dual-purpose group whose members engage in social service or political action while some moonlight as terrorists. Its stated goals and main—if not total—body of activities is aimed at killing, maiming, and terrorizing us. This is sufficient reason to take out its members, as long as we have solid evidence that the given person is a member of this or some other terrorist organization.

No mention is made in the white paper of an issue that communitarians, concerned not just with rights but also with responsibilities, find compelling. U.S. citizen terrorists differ from others, not only because they have extra rights, but also because they have committed an extra offense. When they raise their arms against their own community, they commit treason, which cannot be said of terrorists who hail from other countries. And the constitution is exceptionally clear about the way traitors should be treated: “No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act.” So be it.

Read the rest at The National Interest-->

Accommodate Beijing?

Before I left for a meeting in Beijing, the leading China hand at George Washington University, David Shambaugh, advised me to read Huge White’s The China Choice. Shortly after I landed in China, the renowned Harvard scholar Weiming Tu (who now makes his home at the Peking University) asked me if I had read the Australian professor’s book.

The recommendation was well-taken and gladly heeded. White holds that the United States has not made up its mind as to whether it will seek to engage or contain China, but in the meantime there are forces in both societies that push the United States and China down a slippery slope—a dynamic that may end very badly for both sides.

Like many other authors, White’s analysis is much keener than his prescriptions. His main recommendation is that the United States should join with China, India, and Japan to form a “concert of powers” comparable to the power-sharing arrangement that emerged in post-Napoleonic Europe. This would create “a new order in which China’s authority and influence grow enough to satisfy the Chinese, and America’s role remains large enough to ensure that China’s power is not misused.” But White is rather unclear on what this would entail. Allow China exclusive rights on the South China Sea? Give up on the U.S.-Japan military treaty? And would China agree to join a body that has two U.S. allies as the main players, nations it does not considers its equals?

White raises all the right questions, and eloquently so. But he leaves it to others to spell out ways to accommodate China—if this is a course the United States can be persuaded to follow.

Read the entire post at the National Interest.

Syrian WMD May Soon Slip Away

The Pakistani moment of truth is coming all too soon—in Syria. For more than a decade, security experts agreed that the greatest threat to the security of the United States is the combination of terrorists and WMD. Pakistan was widely considered the place this is most likely to happen. Now we must expect that shortly jihadists will acquire WMD in Syria as the Assad regime collapses. True, chemical arms are less lethal than nukes, but in Syria they make up in the number and vicious variety what each lacks in relative killing power.

The United States, its allies and the UN did well to warn Assad that there would be “consequences” if he employed these weapons, after intelligence sources reported that his troops were mixing and transporting chemical agents. Why these warnings stated that these consequences will follow if he uses these arms “against his own people” is far from obvious, because this wording makes it sound as if it would be acceptable if Assad used these agents against anybody else. In any case, Assad seems to have desisted.

There are some reports that the United States is training Jordanian Special Forces and some others to grab these arms. And one must assume that the U.S. Navy SEALs and a bunch of others are racing toward Syria. However, this is the place the so-called Obama doctrine—a light footprint, not involving boots on the ground—is reaching its limits. However high a regard one has for Special Forces, CIA agents and drones—which I do—the task is simply too big for them to be able to carry it out on their own. Even adding in some bombings against those sites that can be safely destroyed that way will not do. The Pentagon estimates that it would need some 75,000 troops to do the job. The trouble is that U.S. rapid-deployment forces are underdeveloped and not well-located.

Read the entire post at the National Interest.

A Bad Plan for Obama

After the election, the New York Times editorial board laid out a foreign-policy agenda for President Obama to follow over the next four years. It combines wooly-headed idealism with half-baked thinking.

The leading suggestion—which is dedicated much more text than any other—is to aim for a world free of nuclear weapons. Yet zero is the wrong number, because if any one nation hides a few nukes, it would lord over those who do live up to their disarming commitments. One can surely dial down the numbers, but a low level of mutual deterrence is unavoidable—and history shows it works.

The Times correctly points out that Al-Qaeda is spreading in North Africa and in Pakistan. Ergo? “Dealing with that challenge will likely become harder, as will the choices Mr. Obama must make. For one thing, he will have to examine whether the expanding use of drones is the right approach.” To call for more examination is always a good idea, but—like appointing commissions, study groups and impact evaluations—most of the time it is nothing but a cop out for those who have no idea where to go next.

I am not saying that the Times agenda is without any merit. If the list it provides is turned on its head, the president may do well over the next four years: The Obama administration should focus in the near term on the Middle East. The first priority must be dealing with the nukes there rather than those of Russia. We must limit our ambition to protecting our security and that of our allies, and refrain from nation building overseas. Only then can we restore our economy and thus be able to discharge our international responsibilities.

Read the entire article at The National Interest.