Amitai Etzioni Notes

East/West Bank Commonwealth?

As Israelis and Palestinians are getting together for direct talks, a waxing question is: what will be the final form of their relationship? Most observers expect two states (although some outliers hold for one state, in which Jews and Arabs have equal rights--but in effect the Palestinians soon will have the majority). Many observers on both sides agree on what the final outcome will look like: the line that separates the West and East Banks (the future Palestinian state and Israel) will be adjusted a bit, in both directions; different parts of Jerusalem will serve as a capital for both states; and the refugees, who cannot return, will be compensated.

There is, though, a sticking point that is rarely discussed. Israel fears that the West Bank will be dominated by Hamas, which will rain rockets on Israel, up and down its long border with the West Bank. Rightly or wrongly, it hence holds out for Palestine to be a demilitarized state; one in which Israel would control what is entering by land and air, the electromagnetic spectrum, and much else. These measures are by nature restrictive and confining. One can argue about whether all are essential, but even if they are, they would deprive the new Palestinian entity of what is considered to be the most fundamental quality of a state: the right to act like a sovereign.

An approach that is much more likely to win support from America, other nations, and the Palestinian Authority--and which would still meet Israeli security needs--is one modeled on the power-sharing arrangement in Vienna. From 1945 to 1955, the U.S., U.K. and France patrolled the center of Vienna jointly with the U.S.S.R., which was already emerging as a Cold War adversary. Small units, composed of military police from the four powers, jointly patrolled the streets and ensured public safety.

A similar security arrangement was agreed upon between the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as part of the 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement. It called for Palestinian border-crossing officials to examine the passports of all those who wanted to enter Palestine, while "invisible" Israeli security officers, in a back room, would vet the clearance given in the front. A similar arrangement had been agreed upon regarding the flow into the fledgling state of commodities, whose entry could be delayed up to 48 hours for Israeli inspection.

Such an approach could be incorporated into a much broader cooperative relationship. The two nations could readily form a free trade zone. (Much was made of the barrier that separates the two but few note that it has numerous gates, and that it can be opened in a jiffy). The two nations could cooperate in curbing crime. (Many of the laptops and cars stolen by Israeli thieves end up in the West Bank). And--in helping each other remove incitements from their textbooks and other education material. One can even dream--this is a good time to unfurl some heartwarming visions--of an East/West Bank commonwealth, composed of the two independent states, although obviously it will need a much more fortuitous name.

Shameless

If you believe that corporations would be willing to make a little less money in order not to put the nation - their nation - at risk, you should read Richard Clarke’s excellent, just-issued book, Cyber War.

As Clarke reports, prior to the 1990s, the Pentagon made extensive use of specialized software designed by in-house programmers and a few defense contractors. But under pressure from libertarian ideologues and business’s lobbyists, the Pentagon began to use commercial software instead – in particular, Microsoft software.  However, it turned out that Microsoft had built a low-cost brand and based a principle of “one format for all” –  rather than software that was tailored to special security needs. Problems soon arose, including, as Clarke recounts, a 1997 incident when the USS Yorktown, a Ticonderoga-class cruiser whose ship operations were administered on computers running Windows NT, was rendered inoperable after Windows crashed. “When the Windows system crashed, as Windows often does,” Clarke writes, “the cruiser became a floating i-brick, dead in the water.” After this and a “legion of other failures of Windows-based systems,” the Pentagon considered a shift to free, open-source operating systems like Linux. The code of open-source software can be altered by the user, and so the government would be free to change the software without interference from companies jealously guarding their design. It is also free.  

Such a switch, though, would have been disastrous for Microsoft’s lucrative dealings with the government. The company was already fiercely opposed to regulation of its products’ security; it did not want the added delay and cost of improving its software in order to decrease its vulnerability. If the government switched to open-source software, it could make the improvements itself – but doing so would deal a major blow to Microsoft’s profits. So Microsoft moved to prevent the government from exploring any alternatives. It “went on the warpath,” writes Clarke, threatening to “stop cooperating” with the government if it adopted an open-source platform. It made major campaign contributions and hired a small army of lobbyists. Clarke outlines their purpose as: “don’t regulate security in the software industry, don’t let the Pentagon stop using our software no matter how many security flaws it has, and don’t say anything about software production overseas or deals with China." (China security experts feared, could plant logic bombs and malware into the software.)

Clarke reports that Microsoft insiders admitted that the company “really did not take security seriously,” because “there was no real alternative to its software, and they were swimming in money from their profits."

Nothing has changed since these lines were written last year – and a sitting-duck Navy cruiser is just one example of security risks caused by private corporations’ consistent practice of preferring profits over protecting the nation.

In 2007 an unknown intruder infiltrated the networks of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, and all of the military agencies. The intruder stole an amount of information roughly equal to the entire Library of Congress.

In addition to the theft of sensitive information, a successful cyber attack could dismantle America’s power supply for extended periods of time. Conducting a test, the Department of Energy found that it could hack into a 27-ton power generator control, and remotely causing it to destroy itself. (The generators are run by private companies who are not subject to regulation forcing them to secure their sites – sites which can be accessed and directed using a normal Internet connection.)  The utility companies’ resistance to cyber security regulation echoes the position of Microsoft, which has stymied the government’s efforts even while expanding its business into government activities.

When it comes to cyber attacks, the bottom line for the public is increased defense. But again and again, private corporations have demonstrated that they have a very different bottom line in mind.

The NPT Test

Today the representatives of 188 nations (give or take a few) assembled in New York City to debate ways to revise the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The issue could not be more important. As President Obama's new Nuclear Posture Review declares, the greatest threats to global security are not the old Cold War adversaries but rogue states armed with nukes and terrorists with access to such bombs or the materials from which they can be made. Moreover, the NPT is severely challenged by Iran, which, the IAEA has repeatedly reported, is not living up to its obligations under the treaty. Other nations with nuclear ambitions are watching to see how the international community will react to Iran's violations, as they figure out their own military futures.

If one examines previous meetings of the NPT signatories, one does not find them very reassuring, to put it mildly. During the last meeting of this group -- which includes representatives of most nations of the world -- those present debated the agenda for two weeks, and then went home.

This time the meeting is viewed with special interest because President Obama is seeking to garner support from many nations that in the past were very critical of the U.S. and other nations that already have nukes for not living up to their commitment under the NPT, namely to give up their nukes. President Obama thus declared that indeed zero nukes is the goal, and showed that he means business by working out a treaty with Russia that would scale back the number deployed on the top of launchers. He also obtained a measure of new support from a recent meeting of 47 nations in Washington, to better secure the remaining nukes and blend down the materials from which they can be made.

How is one to assess the achievements of the NPT conference? I predict that much attention will be focused on the posturing of various nations (Iran is a member), criticisms of the members of the nuclear club (who still have enough nukes to kill most everyone three times over) and the nations that did not join the NPT (Pakistan, India, and Israel). Possibly some progress will be made in passing a resolution that urges the member nations to endorse the so-called "Additional Protocol," which widens the scope of IAEA inspections. However, the true test of the 2010 NPT conference lies elsewhere.

The NPT has one major, debilitating flaw. It has a loophole so large that aircraft carriers can sail through it unnoticed. The NPT allows a nation to build nuclear reactors using highly enriched uranium, which is weapons-grade material, as well as to build the facilities needed to enrich additional uranium to this level -- as long as the nation claims that these materials are to be used for peaceful purposes. The nation is then entitled to send a notice that it is quitting the treaty and three months later do so, taking with it all these facilities, and legally begin making bombs. A nation hence need not cheat, hide its bomb making from inspectors, or face criticism and possible UN sanctions. All it takes is basically a postcard.

Thus when one evaluates whether the NPT review conference is truly succeeding, or mainly dealing with atmospherics and debating points and possibly some secondary issue, ask whether this loophole is closed. My expectation? Do not hold your breath, lest you turn very blue.

Love the bomb?

Some years back I wrote an essay for Time magazine. When I met with the editor, he told me that wanted “a forehead slapping piece.” When I meekly replied that I did not know what this meant, he explained that he wanted the “reader to exclaim ‘Wow, why did I not think about that?!’” The editor was much less keen to find out  whether the idea could be well supported. All this came to mind when I read an article in a recent issue of Newsweek by a journalist, one Jonathan Tepperman. Time magazine would have loved his essay.

Mr. Tepperman announced that we are all dead wrong: “Nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous.” Wait, wait, Mr. Tepperman is just warming up. “The bomb may actually make us safer,” he claims. Mr. Tepperman finds that more nuclear-armed states are not dangerous and, in effect, are “agents of peace.”

The Newsweek journalist modestly refers to this revelation as “the truth” and claims that his conclusion is based on a “growing and compelling body of research.” Given that I have been trying to keep up with the field ever since I wrote two books about nukes in the mid-sixties, he surely got my attention.

Soon, it became clear that there is no research—let alone compelling research—to support this forehead-slapping claim, only Mr. Tepperman’s simplistic conclusions. Exhibit number one: He finds we need not fear nukes because they have not been used since 1945. But in 1945, they were used to wipe out two cities, and those who now seek to get their hands on them are much more fanatical and impulsive than the superpowers that monopolized them in the past. 

Moreover, while the US and Russia neutralized each other’s nukes— because of the threat of retaliation—terrorists have no such concerns. They are willing to commit suicide to carry out their mission and, hence, hardly fear retaliation. Furthermore, they would be delighted if the nation whose city they destroyed went and took out, say, Tehran. As they see it, such an attack would serve to mobilize the Muslim world for the ultimate jihad.

The point I just made concerns the future, which I grant is unpredictable (but about which we would rather be safe than sorry). However, Mr. Tepperman fully reveals the depths of his “research” when he writes, “There’s never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that posses them.” I guess he has never heard about India and Pakistan.

I stopped reading after Mr. Tepperman—ignoring the terrorists— declared that we are safe because heads of states are rational actors. Anybody who calls Hitler rational and who thinks it is was rational for the Japanese Emperor and his generals to believe that they could knock out the United States simply does not understand what rational means.

Three cheers for Israel?!

The media is full of stories critical of the way Israel deals with the Palestinians.
There is indeed a lot to criticize, which, by the way, Israelis often do. However, when Israel does something right — and in a big way — that too should be noted. After all, one cannot expect a nation that is boxed around the ears every time it strays, but not rewarded when it gets it right, to mend its ways.

Here what happened which got next to no coverage, except — thanks — in the Washington Post.

The Dead Sea is dying.  Since 1960, its water level has decreased by 75 feet and its surface area by a third.  But this problem is not restricted to one body of water: throughout the Middle East, water is running out.  Israel and Jordan have moved jointly to address this problem.

Israel and Jordan have developed a plan to connect and redistribute water sources throughout their countries to shore up the water supply.  One project under this plan would provide Amman with water by connecting it to the Dissi Reservoir, an underground water source in the south of Jordan, and would desalinate it by connecting it to Israeli desalination plants that are being built on the Mediterranean.  Another plant would send 500 billion gallons of water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea through pipelines and tunnels over a path of 110 miles.  Some of this water would be used to replenish the Dead Sea, while the rest would be desalinated for use by both countries.

The desalinated water from the Dissi Reservoir and Dead Sea would be shared amongst Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The replenished Dead Sea would sustain a tourist attraction and provide economic benefits for both Jordanian and Israeli companies who sell its chemicals.

Critics of the plan argue that these new connections will upset the region’s ecosystem and recommend that their possible effects be studied, which could take several years.  But Jordan and Israel maintain that the plan be implemented immediately to prevent water shortages, as some cities in Jordan have already begun rationing their water supply.

Three cheers for all concerned.

Make Health, Not War

Afghanistan needs more sociologists, not more troops. Sociologists would point out that Americans tend to see this country as one nation, with a central government and national security forces. But it actually is a collection of tribes—(including Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara). The first loyalty of most members of these tribes is to their own kind, not to the national government. Most Afghans correctly perceive the national government as corrupt to the core, in cahoots with drug lords, promoted by foreign powers, and the beneficiary of fraudulent elections.

We have been trying for eight years to straighten out this government, to no avail. We should now work with the local tribes and their natural leaders, rather than seek to impose a false national order on them.We should let the people of Afghanistan duke it out with the Taliban, to determine how much of a sharia regime they are willing to tolerate. However, we should not allow our young people to be killed for rights most Afghans do not want. Surely, they show no sign that they are willing to die for them.

We should make it clear that if the Afghans ever again allow their turf to be used as a base for terrorists, we shall bomb the daylights out of them. However, we need not be in Afghanistan to do this. Finally, we should not lump the Taliban—keen to run their own country— in with Al Qaeda, which seeks to harm us. True, these two are now allies, but this is the case at least in part because we treat them as if they were of one kind.

President Obama conducted a strategic review of Afghanistan. It concluded that we should seek “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” This is a precise and narrow goal that can be achieved, as long as we understand that we cannot get there by nation building—a task which is simply beyond our reach. Let the Afghan people form the local governments they favor, and let these form inter-regional alliances, and let us leave them be. Most of the Afghans will be happy in return to let us be.

A someone who was around during the Vietnam War, I predict that whatever number of troops President Obama will now agree to add to the war in Afghanistan, the generals will come back and ask for more. If those are not sent, critics will attribute to this “failure”—the reason Afghanistan will not be stabilized. Best to get off this bloody escalator now.

North Korea: a test for progressives

North Korean ships are carrying missiles and materials from which chemical and nuclear weapons can be made — to other tyrannies, such as the oppressive regime in Myanmar and in Yemen. The United States leads a group of more than ninety nations that are committed to stopping such traffic, but North Korea has stated that such interventions would lead to war.  One hears extremely little from progressives about what the United States should do next.

North Korea poses a special test for progressives because unlike the invasion of Iraq—and before that, the armed interventions in several other nations including Panama, Grenada, and Haiti—this time the United State is meeting the criteria previously posed by progressives.

The action is undertaken with the full blessing of the United Nations, which on June 12 passed a Security Council resolution that calls for U.N. member states to inspect all ships entering or leaving North Korea if there is a reasonable suspicion that the cargo contains banned nuclear materials or missile technology.

The action is multilateral rather than unilateral, in the sense that far from acting on its own, the U.S. has consulted many other nations, and is working together with them to try to stop North Korean dissemination of WMD.

Finally, at least so far, the use of force is excluded. There will be no forceful inspection of North Korean ships. First, the United States and other nations merely are asking North Korea to give permission to have its ships inspected while on the high seas.  If North Korea refuses, the nation in which the ship docks to refuel will be asked to inspect the cargo. This is very much in line with international law and it does not involve use of force.

Yet, we hear next to no sounds of approval from the progressive camp; one is hard put to find editorials from the left stating that this time we’ve got it right. Are progressives holding that all problems can be treated with merely goodwill, foreign aid, and talk? Or are they willing to fess up and acknowledge that when all other means have been exhausted, and there is clear and present danger—the time to act is now, and to act may entail putting at least one foot down?

For more discussion see Amitai Etzioni’s article “Tomorrow’s Institution Today: The Promise of the Proliferation Security Initiative” in the May/June 2009 Foreign Affairs, here. Etzioni is a professor of international affairs at The George Washington University and the author of Security First (Yale, 2007).  He can be contacted at icps@gwu.edu.  www.gwu.edu/~ccps/securityfirst.html

Non lethal promotion of democracy

Many observers have suggested that Obama's foreign policy agenda has abandoned the Bush Administration's emphasis on promoting democracy, including human rights. Much was made of President Obama's statement in his inaugural address: "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist." Others have pointed out, critically, that Secretary of State Hilary Clinton did not raise objections to China's deplorable human rights record during her first visit to that country as an Obama administration official.

The Bush Administration's policy and the related Neo Con position relied on the observation that only democracies make reliable partners in peace because only democracies do not wage war against other democracies. Hence, when the United States encounters non-democratic regimes (such as those of Saddam's Iraq, Iran, and North Korea), changing these into democratic ones was regarded not merely a matter of promoting political justice, of creating a regime we believe in, or of bringing the fruits and joys of freedom to oppressed people, but was regarded as a prerequisite for peace and security. Forced democratization for the sake of security was a common rationale given for the 2003 invasion of Iraq; for the military and national reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan; the CIA support for opposition groups in Iran, and other Bush administration policies.

This forced democratization approach has been questioned on several grounds: the same US government that promoted such changes has supported non-democratic regimes in a considerable number of other states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt; the correlations between democratic regimes and peace is much overstated (e.g., Israel invaded Lebanon); the imposed regimes are at best very flawed democracies; and the human costs of forced regime change are very high. Hence, the suggestions to forgo such regime changes altogether.

Several influential foreign policy mavens have argued explicitly for lowering the bar for admission to the international community--for allowing a nation to become a member in good standing without first democratizing. Some of them draw on John Rawls, one of the most highly regarded liberal philosophers of our age, who, in his 1999 The Law of Peoples, argued that liberal societies ought to build an international community that reflected the liberal value of toleration of difference, and which would thus include not only liberal societies, but all "decent" ones--including hierarchical, non-democratic societies. In a recent article in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Charles Kupchan and Adam Mount suggested that "the terms of the next [international] order should be negotiated among all states, be they democratic or not" and should include all nations that are broadly responsive to the needs of their members--that is, which serve their wellbeing. The authors use the term autonomy, but it is clear that they mean to include and accord full measure in rule-setting to such nations as China and Russia. The only nations that would not qualify under this "autonomy rule" are nations that commit genocide or are otherwise abusive of their people such as North Korea and Burma. In short, in sharp contrast to the Bush administration, a democratic regime is not deemed to be a prerequisite for being a full member in the new global order. Earlier, in the November/December 2007 issue of The American Interest as the Bush administration was entering its final throes, Barry Posen called for a foreign policy of "restraint" and "modesty", arguing that "the United States needs to be more reticent about the use of military force; more modest about the scope for political transformation within and among countries..."

These discussions and many others like them ignore a key distinction that is crucial for the issue at hand: the difference between forced regime change and the non-lethal promotion of democracy. In Security First, I suggested that as long as a nation does not support terrorism, did not develop or acquire WMD to threaten with other nations, and did not commit genocide or ethnic cleansing, it should be considered as having met the minimal requirements for membership in the international community (Libya, which abandoned its WMD program and renounced terrorism, is a case in point.) And I detailed the difficulties in developing democracy through long distance social engineering, by a foreign power. I stressed, however, that the rejection of forced regime change as a strategy to promote peace and security need not be understood to mean that we should cease promoting democracy, but only that we must limit ourselves to doing so by non-lethal means.

Like most stark dichotomies, the notion that we either promote democracy or we do not, disregarding differences in means, is a false one. I see no reason the US should cease to educate, persuade, and lead by example toward the development of democratic regimes anytime any place, and--if other nations are so inclined--for them to use such non-lethal means to promote their ideas of what a good regime makes. The list of non-lethal means is well-known and, indeed, very widely employed, usually with little ill effect. These include dissemination of texts, educational films, lectures and the use of scores of other cultural means; exchanges of leaders, students, professional and others; supporting local NGOs; sending of election observers; leading by example by improving our own democracy; providing people with new means of communication such as low costs radios, access to the internet and even cell phones, among others.

To favor the use of non-lethal means of democratization and to reject forced regime changes does not mean that one favors hectoring other regimes, denouncing them publicly, or lecturing them about the defects of their system and the virtues of ours. As with all educational means, the tools of non-lethal democratization are best tailored to fit those we are trying to reach. By and large, humiliating other nations does not work any better than humiliating students in a classroom. True, there are occasions when the conduct of a nation is so outrageous, as when China massacred protesters in Tiananmen Square, that public condemnations are called for. But, most times, being judicious rather than judgmental is more effective.

Economic sanctions do not fit neatly into either category. They are not lethal in the same way as occupations and extensive bombing runs are, and do not constitute outright forced regime changes. At the same time, sanctions are not strictly non-lethal means which seek to change the hearts and minds of the people involved rather than deprive them in order to coerce them to yield; Saddam and many human rights organizations claimed that hundreds thousands of children died as a result of the sanctions imposed on Iraq by US and its allies in the 90s.

Three notes are hence called for in assessing the merits of economic sanctions for democracy promotion. First, truly non-lethal measures are to be preferred to economic sanctions, because the latter can have some lethal effects. Second, sanctions should be rarely applied. I expect that a full study would show that under most conditions engagement is much more effective than sanctions (typically coupled with other isolation measures). For instance, the US has isolated and sanctioned Cuba and North Korea for decades--policies which have not led to democratization or regime change--while it engaged China and Vietnam and achieved comparatively much more favorable results. Finally, even if economic and other sanctions do work under some conditions, there seems to be no reason to doubt that truly non lethal means of the kind listed above--when they work, however slowly--lead to changes that have lower human costs and lead to people and regimes who truly embrace democracy rather than merely pay dues to gain reprise from sanctions.

In short, in the new era, we should not cease promoting democracy in the name of a new global tolerance and pluralism, but rather, should limit such promotion to non-lethal means for all nations that do wage war and terrorize others or their own people.

Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University and author of Security First (Yale, 2007). For more, go here.

Pakistan, outside the box

Social scientists have long used systems theory to point out links that are sometimes overlooked. Such a link now leads to the suggestion that to deal with the crisis in Pakistan and the mounting difficulties in Afghanistan, one should go to, of all places, India. The main reason the Pakistani army is reluctant to take on the Taliban, who threaten to overrun the country, is that the army considers India its enemy.

The main source of tension between the two countries is the question of who will control Kashmir. At first, any suggestion of solving this tricky problem in order to get the Pakistani army to refocus would seem truly far-fetched, if not visionary to the nth degree – like asking someone to improve the climate by first stopping earthquakes. Dealing with the internal tensions in Pakistan is difficult enough; add to the mix a conflict that has been simmering for decades and seems to resist any solution, and your way seems completely blocked.

The good news is that secret negotiations between India and Pakistan about Kashmir have been taking place. Those now need to be restarted, supported, and accelerated. In the process should we also dump the obsolete notion that India should be made to “balance” China, and we may then be on our way to a more stable region in this much contested part of Asia. Both steps require some elaboration.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars and come close to blows on several other occasions, mainly over Kashmir. The Pakistani and Indian armies’ training, formations, and alignments are focused on deterring each other, and are largely concentrated on their mutual border. The terrorists who recently attacked Mumbai, and before that the Indian Parliament and markets in New Delhi, see themselves as Kashmiri freedom fighters. It is hard to imagine major repositioning of the troops involved and changes in the strategic planning of both countries until the Kashmir issue is resolved.

A large variety of suggestions have been made about the way to determine the future of Kashmir. Some favor that the people of the area be allowed to vote on which nation they wish to join, as was prescribed by the UN Security Council after the partition of India; others favor dividing the area between the two nations; still others favor turning it into an area which enjoys a large measure of independence. The secret negotiations that took place between India and Pakistan during Pervez Musharraf’s tenure as president appear to have focused on the idea of ‘making borders irrelevant,’ that is, granting Kashmir a great deal of autonomy to avoid either country having to lose face by giving up their claims to control. Since General Musharraf stepped down these negotiations seem to have stopped. The Obama Administration would do well to apply here the same system-wide approach it is revealing in the Middle East: follow the links. In this case, encourage, cajole, and help Pakistan and India to move toward settling the Kashmir issue. Eliminating this source of terrorism and war, and the reason both nations are keen to maintain nuclear arms, is of course worthy in its own right.  It will also pay off handsomely in getting the Pakistani army to focus on the Taliban, including both those who threaten the government at home and those who cross the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

Obama seems not to shy away from complexities. In this case, dealing with India must take into account two more related matters. One involves a Bush Administration-backed deal with India which allows US companies to sell it nuclear fuel and other nuclear technologies to be used only in India’s civilian reactors. However, the net effect it that this deal allows India to shift from civilian to military use the limited uranium it has from other sources. (Bush assumed that it is acceptable for ‘good’ governments—like that of India and Brazil—to develop their nuclear industries, while only those of ‘bad’ governments, such as Iran and North Korea, need to be reined in.) However, as we now fear in Pakistan, government can change overnight, and above all, if the norm against proliferation is to have a chance to take hold, the fewer nations that go down this road, the greater the chances of enforcing a non-nuke global regime. This means is that even if the US can’t get India and Pakistan to give up their nukes, at this stage at least, it is ill-advised to help them increase their armed nuclear program. Hence the Obama Administration should renegotiate the agreement to provide nuclear fuel and technologies to India, and both India and Pakistan should be encouraged to scale back on the nukes and join the NPT, as their conflicts are resolved.

All this assumes that one drops the obsolete notion that nations can be used to balance each other and that a militarily powerful India somehow will serve to countervail a rising China. China is focused on its economic development, and its military has a very long way to go before it will pose a threat to the United States, even if there was reason to believe that it would seek such a confrontation. And if China has such intentions, whether India has a few extra nukes or not would hardly matter, given the size of the American arsenal. In short, to the extent that the US has any influence on India, it can be used to scale back its nuclear program without any discernible loss to American strategic interest.

I will be the first to grant that this kind of social science thinking leads one to try to tackle some very tough and persistent international problems as a way to treat some very acute local problems inside Pakistan and in Afghanistan. In that sense, it is truly far-fetched.  However, these pestering international conflicts call for resolution anyhow, and if they can at least be curbed, such progress would help on the local fronts.  Dealing with the Taliban may entail going to Kashmir, New Delhi, and Islamabad, and forgetting for now about China.

"Regional peace" -- A New Idea for the Middle East!

If you thought that after all these years there could not possibly be a new idea for making peace between Israel and the Palestinians, well, as the cliché goes, think again. Better yet, it is a damn good idea. It holds that Israel would implement the long talked about two state solution (a Palestinian and a Jewish state, “living next to each other in security and peace”)—and Iran would actually give up its military nuclear program. 

So far, there have been those who held that the road to Tehran, Damascus, Beirut and the rest of the Arab world leads through Jerusalem, meaning that peace in the Middle East requires that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict first be resolved. Only in this way, we have been told a score of times, one can hope to “turn the Arab street” to agree to support other changes that peace in the region requires. Others held that given that Israel sees the Iranian bombs as directly threatening its very existence and that the time is near at which Iran will have nuclear bombs, this is the matter that must be most urgently attended to. And—nobody moved. The new idea is that we can get out of this stalemate by moving on both fronts at one and the same time.

Some are sure to hold that Israel already agreed to a two state solution, hence it will give nothing new in exchange for a deproliferation of Iran. However, the same holds for Iran—it has long and repeatedly declared that its nuclear program is strictly dedicated to peaceful pursuits. Hence, if it would show to IAEA inspectors that it has not been militarizing its nuclear program, it merely would be showing that it was not lying through its teeth.

Both arguments are disingenuous. Although previous Israeli governments declared themselves in favor of a two state solution, the “details”—what such a solution entails and above all the ways to get there—were never agreed upon. And Iran keeps threatening to wipe Israel off the map, which it can hardly hope to do without nuclear arms, which many believe it is rushing to develop. In short, a mutually and simultaneously implemented deal not only makes a great deal of sense, but breaks the stalemate.

There is room here from some truly creative thinking and adroit diplomacy. Step 1? Israel freezes the settlements on the West Bank; Iran freezes the enrichment of uranium. Step 2? Iran opens up some parts of its nuclear industry to international inspection; Israel turns over some parts of the West Bank to Palestinian forces and so on. 

Other scenarios can surely be developed. All will have to survive those who will maintain that the whole deal is unfair for one reason or another. I rush hence to reiterate a point Shibley Telhami (a leading Palestinian-American) and I made some years ago, that this is not the time to sort out what ultimate justice entails, who is at fault, who started it all, etc. These kinds of arguments are used by both sides to demand that the other side—the guilty one—yield, and that their sides need not make any concessions. For now, we argued, all sides should focus on where we go from here. Later we can have a Truth Commission to figure out who the real culprit was. The time to make peace is now, all other matters will wait.

The new idea has one more attractive feature. Many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are very keen for Iran not to have nuclear bombs. They also favor the two state solution. In short, the regional peace plan has a ready-made, significant political constituency right there in the Middle East.

Although the US is expected to lead the negotiations that must take place, above all by ensuring that both Israel and Iran take parallel steps to implement their part of the deal, Russia should also be involved. Russia is the power that could tip the scales in Iran if it joins the West in promoting an end to the nuclear military ambitions of Iran. Hence, Russian support should be courted, and if need be rewarded, by granting Russia some of the items on their long agenda – for instance, as Obama in effect already offered, the US folding the missile defense system that Bush planned to place in Poland and the Czech Republic to stop Iranian missiles.

Finally, the regional peace plan will serve as a sort of Rorschach test. There are those whose reaction will reveal that they are so confident that Iran has no intentions to build a bomb, or that if it did it “would never be so crazy to use it” that they will not support the plan. There are those so mad at Israel that they want to force it to make major concessions to the Palestinians, come what may. And there are some who see Iran as a major threat to many nations in the Middle East, and are less preoccupied by the Palestinians, especially those who still declare that they are out to destroy Israel. One cannot but hope that all these players would put aside their special takes on the situation and their special pleadings, and recognize a good deal when it is laid out right in front of them. Otherwise, even this sage plan may end up where so many attempts to bring peace to the Middle East have ended up—in the dustbins of history, followed by more bloodshed.