Amitai Etzioni Notes

The NPT Test

Today the representatives of 188 nations (give or take a few) assembled in New York City to debate ways to revise the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The issue could not be more important. As President Obama's new Nuclear Posture Review declares, the greatest threats to global security are not the old Cold War adversaries but rogue states armed with nukes and terrorists with access to such bombs or the materials from which they can be made. Moreover, the NPT is severely challenged by Iran, which, the IAEA has repeatedly reported, is not living up to its obligations under the treaty. Other nations with nuclear ambitions are watching to see how the international community will react to Iran's violations, as they figure out their own military futures.

If one examines previous meetings of the NPT signatories, one does not find them very reassuring, to put it mildly. During the last meeting of this group -- which includes representatives of most nations of the world -- those present debated the agenda for two weeks, and then went home.

This time the meeting is viewed with special interest because President Obama is seeking to garner support from many nations that in the past were very critical of the U.S. and other nations that already have nukes for not living up to their commitment under the NPT, namely to give up their nukes. President Obama thus declared that indeed zero nukes is the goal, and showed that he means business by working out a treaty with Russia that would scale back the number deployed on the top of launchers. He also obtained a measure of new support from a recent meeting of 47 nations in Washington, to better secure the remaining nukes and blend down the materials from which they can be made.

How is one to assess the achievements of the NPT conference? I predict that much attention will be focused on the posturing of various nations (Iran is a member), criticisms of the members of the nuclear club (who still have enough nukes to kill most everyone three times over) and the nations that did not join the NPT (Pakistan, India, and Israel). Possibly some progress will be made in passing a resolution that urges the member nations to endorse the so-called "Additional Protocol," which widens the scope of IAEA inspections. However, the true test of the 2010 NPT conference lies elsewhere.

The NPT has one major, debilitating flaw. It has a loophole so large that aircraft carriers can sail through it unnoticed. The NPT allows a nation to build nuclear reactors using highly enriched uranium, which is weapons-grade material, as well as to build the facilities needed to enrich additional uranium to this level -- as long as the nation claims that these materials are to be used for peaceful purposes. The nation is then entitled to send a notice that it is quitting the treaty and three months later do so, taking with it all these facilities, and legally begin making bombs. A nation hence need not cheat, hide its bomb making from inspectors, or face criticism and possible UN sanctions. All it takes is basically a postcard.

Thus when one evaluates whether the NPT review conference is truly succeeding, or mainly dealing with atmospherics and debating points and possibly some secondary issue, ask whether this loophole is closed. My expectation? Do not hold your breath, lest you turn very blue.

Bush Waves a White Flag

President Bush has surrendered the rationalization that he used for seven years as a fig leaf to cover his limp foreign policy. By removing North Korea from the list of terrorist supporting states and by lifting sanctions imposed on it for decades, Bush put a nail in the coffin of the Neo Con theory. Bush started his misbegotten administration with the Neo Con theory that only democratic states make reliable partners in peace. He embraced Fukuyama’s rosy prediction that history was ending as nation after nation was embracing our kind of politics. Bush and company then claimed that they were out to accelerate history by sending the US military, the CIA, and mercenaries to change those regimes that did not rush along. North Korea was at the top of the list of the three regimes to be changed one way or the other.

Now Bush is acting to shore up the North Korean communist totalitarian regime in exchange for its promise to give up its program of producing and selling nuclear arms. He finally, during his waning days, is turning to the sensible position that if a nation is willing to give up its weapons of mass destruction, it should be encouraged, rewarded, and appreciated. (For more arguments in support of this approach, and for more details, see Security First [Yale 2007] here).

The same approach has been applied, with great success but much more reluctantly, in dealing with Libya. Here too, the nefarious regime gave up its support for terrorism and allowed the US and its allies much more than to just inspect its WMD program-- it allowed the program to be shut down and the hardware involved to be shipped out.

None of this entails giving up our soul for more security. We do not have the troops or even the stomach to invade more and more countries in order to change their regimes, and when we try to democratize nations by the use of force, most times we make unholy, bloody mess. We need to leave such changes to the locals and help them, through non-violent means, when they ask for it, as those in Zimbabwe do.

Meanwhile, all I can say about Bush is better very late than never. And now try the same thing in dealing with Iran—before we get down to blows.

On Deterring Iran

“We just have to get used to a nuclear Iran.” Because of Chatham House rules, I am not allowed to inform you who said that. The rules permit quoting what has been said at a meeting, but forbid indicating by whom or naming the group that hosted the event. The Council on Foreign Relations, the Nixon Center and quite a few other groups in Washington conduct their meetings in accordance with these rules, named after the highly respected London think-tank credited with first introducing this form of deliberation. Trust me, the person who made this statement was a high ranking adviser to one of the leading presidential candidates—someone likely to make it into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Behind this simple phrase looms an important and influential foreign policy thesis; namely, that a nuclear-armed Iran could be reliably deterred from employing nuclear weapons. After all, we are often reminded, despite the dire warnings of scores of experts, scholars, and peace activists (myself included), quite a few nations have acquired nuclear arms over the last several decades, and none have employed them. What explains this nuclear restraint, we are told, is that nations who possess such deadly arms fear that if they strike, they will be wiped off the face of the earth by the retaliatory strikes sure to be launched by rival nuclear states.

This thesis that nuclear deterrence can be reliably achieved through the threat of mutual destruction, so called ‘rational deterrence theory.’ attained a prominent place in American security policy at the height of the Cold War.  Indeed, it worked well; the superpowers did not come to nuclear blows—though on several occasions they did come dangerously close to the brink.

Over the years, this rational deterrence theory gained popularity in Political Science and International Affairs departments as well as in the military. Some scholars have even advocated the proliferation of nuclear weapons in developing nations as a way of bolstering security.  For example, in the early 90s, the University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer pushed for encouraging a newly independent Ukraine to maintain an arsenal of former Soviet nuclear weapons. And, in 2000, he pushed for encouraging a nuclear-armed India. In both cases, Mearsheimer argued that nuclear proliferation would enhance security, because “Simply put, no state is likely to attack the homeland or vital interests of a nuclear-armed state for fear that such a move might trigger a horrific nuclear response.” 

The same rational deterrence theory suggests that even rogue states, such as a Kim Jong Il’s North Korea or Mahmoud Ahmadinijad’s Iran can be counted on to act rationally regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Former CENTCOM commander John Abizaid believes that “Nuclear deterrence would work with Iran” since "Iran is not a suicidal nation.” “We can live with a Nuclear Iran,” Barry Posen, a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, assures us, because it knows that “to threaten, much less carry out, a nuclear attack on a nuclear power is to become a nuclear target.”  

I am one of those who holds that the opposite is true; that many states—Iran, among others—have leaders who are very capable of acting in ways that are profoundly irrational, hence posing a serious threat both to other countries as well as to their own. We now have a new report that says volumes on the limits of rationality of heads of state.

George Piro, the FBI agent who interrogated Saddam Hussein over several months, has just revealed what he learned about the Iraqi dictator’s mindset leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. It turns out that Saddam did not expect that the U.S. would respond to his WMD posturing with a full-scale ground invasion.  Saddam “told me” Piro says, that “he initially miscalculated ... President Bush's intentions. He thought the United States would retaliate with the same type of attack as we did in 1998 ... a four-day aerial attack…He survived that one and he was willing to accept that type of attack."  This was not merely some minor tactical “misunderstanding” or “miscalculation” on Saddam’s part; it turned Iraq into an occupied land, caused hundreds of thousands of casualties, a regime change, and, ultimately, his execution.

(One reason Saddam opened up to this rather low-ranking agent was that he believed that the agent was a direct emissary from President Bush.  This suggests how gullible even heads of state can be—not exactly what we’d consider rational.)

The conclusion is not that the next American president should refuse to talk or negotiate with the likes of Kim Jong Il or Mahmoud Ahmadinijad. After all, we talk even to mental patients. However, to dismiss concerns about verbal threats made by such leaders, especially when they are backed up with nuclear arms, is nothing but irrational.

Priorities, priorities, priorities

The current debate about the foreign policy of the next administration focuses on select hot spots (Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan). Sometimes, Russia and Chain are mentioned. Very little attention is paid to what over arching principles are going to direct the new foreign policy and what basic strategy it is going to follow. Above all, no one is willing to come clean and openly admit that the United States –“the richest nation in the world”— can do much less than we wish, and hence must set priorities. Moreover, the United States may very well be unable to get very far down the list of what ought to be done, leaving much uncovered.

Review of Security First by Michael Contarino

"Democracy is a beautiful flower, but it does not grow wherever its seed is cast. Both neoconservatives and liberal internationalists have been seduced by the idea that if we promote democracy, peace and security will follow. They have it backwards, according to Amitai Etzioni. He believes that establishing order and protecting people from violence, rather than exporting democracy, should be the first priority of US foreign policy. The house of democracy cannot be built from the attic down.

In the wake of the Iraq war, it is not too difficult to convince people that promoting democracy through war is a fool's errand. Political sociologists have understood for decades a lot about the social requisites of democracy - and it is not surprising that a distinguished sociologist like Etzioni would note the elemental unreality of the Bush policy of democracy-via-blitzkrieg. But Etzioni goes even further than this. He argues that protecting America in today's world requires that we step away from democracy promotion so that we can focus on the urgent need to protect human life, both that of others and our own, in a very violent world.

Who Are Moderate Muslims?

Joshua Muravchik and Charles P. Szrom address this vital question directly in their article in the February issue of Commentary. The importance of this question is well summarized in a quote they provide from Daniel Pipes: “radical Islam is the problem and moderate Islam the solution.” That is, it is wrong to treat all the followers of the Prophet as if they were terrorists or their supporters (the way Samuel Huntington and Sir Bernard Lewis do); it is equally mistaken to view Islam as a religion of peace, which is sometimes “hijacked” by terrorist to justify their act (as President Bush pronounced). It is an empirical fact of considerable ethical and political import that Muslims—like followers of all other major belief systems, religious and secular—differ greatly from one another. Some could make good allies; some, sadly, are unavoidable enemies. The key question is: who is who?

Inside Track: Finding the Exit

As violence has declined in Iraq, the question of how U.S. troops will disengage from the country is becoming increasingly acute. The best answer lies in the same communitarian thinking and strategies that led to many of the recent security advances on the ground in Iraq: The United States should work with the tribal communities rather than rely on the national government’s police and army.1 In much of Iraq, communal militia groups—Kurds, Sunni and Shia of one faction or another—are the main source of local security (as well as security risks when they are deployed in, or penetrate, other communities’ turf). Further increasing the cooperation with these local, tribal militias would allow a great reduction in the footprint of foreign troops, who could then be largely limited to enforcing the "borders" among the various communities and providing security in the relatively few (and ever decreasing) remaining heterogeneous areas.

Stereotyping Muslims

It’s sad to see a highly regarded scholar holding to his neo-con misbegotten worldview, despite mountains of new contradictory evidence pilling up on top of old ones. Fouad Ajami, a leading scholar at Johns Hopkins University, just stated that he has come to agree with Sam Huntington: there is a clash of civilizations, between our free world and the brutal Muslim one.

Hillary: 1, McCain: 0

Hillary Clinton and John McCain unfurled their foreign policy agendas in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs. Hillary used her essay to move her position further away than ever from the Neo Cons' "democratize the world by Monday" position. McCain, instead, showed that he forgot nothing and learned less. (Other candidates have preceded them or will follow. For a discussion of the position taken by Barack Obama in his Foreign Affairs article, click here).

Iraq, beyond generals

After teaching sociology for 50 years, I never expected that my discipline will be called upon to step in where generals are failing. I was hence delighted to read David Brooks, in his New York Times op-ed, observe that "now, at long last, the smartest analysts and policy makers are starting to think like sociologists." Better yet, Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE), the head of the Foreign Relations Committee, is putting a sociological way out of Iraq up for a vote in the U.S. Senate.