Amitai Etzioni Notes

Lessons from Myanmar

The weeks of delay in delivering humanitarian aid to the suffering millions in Myanmar highlighted one more time a new transnational norm, that governments have a duty to protect their people, and—that if they do not discharge it, they forfeit their right to sovereignty. It is a fine norm, but as it turns out, more than a new norm is needed.

The family provides a good analogy. Once upon a time, it was widely agreed that one’s home was one’s castle, and that whatever happened in one’s home was nobody else’s business. Feminists changed this concept, arguing that when one has reason to believe that child or spousal abuse occurs in a given home, intervention is justified. Thus, if neighbors hear someone being thrown against the wall and a cry for help, the community should rush in. In short, the right to privacy is not absolute. The same notion is now being applied to international relations.

Once upon a time, when a king converted his people from one religion to another—other kings sent their armies to convert them back. The results were very bloody wars. These came to an end in 1648, when the warring nations signed several treaties known together as the Peace of Westphalia, which entail a commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of another nation. Since then, the notion of national sovereignty has become almost sacrosanct.

A challenge to this concept came in 1996, when a Sudanese diplomat by the name of Francis M. Deng, troubled by the resistance of some nations to efforts to provide their people with humanitarian assistance, published a book entitled Sovereignty as Responsibility. Deng argued that sovereignty was not absolute but conditional; for it to be respected, a nation had to be a good citizen of the international community.  If a nation fails in this duty, the international community may intervene to protect the at-risk citizens of the offending nation.

This idea was embraced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, established by the Canadian government, and by Kofi Annan and the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005. Myanmar would have been a place where this new doctrine could have been applied. Indeed, we suggested that the country should be bombed with packages of rice, whether or not the junta welcomed such flights.

Events in recent days show that much more than a change in norms is needed.  We see that all too often, when the United Nations sends in help, especially when it consists of peacekeepers or other personnel needed to deliver humanitarian aid, these individuals can become part of the problem. They pressure children for sexual favors; they deal in controlled substances; and they squander a good part of the aid they bring.  Moreover, whenever the United Nations is called on for help, from Rwanda to East Timor, it typically must first scramble to find the funds and troops to respond.

Clearly what is needed is (a) a much larger contingent of so called Blue Helmets, UN forces. (b) These have to be placed near likely hot spots, on a stand-by basis. (c) These troops ought to be professionalized by mixing personnel from nations whose forces have already been trained properly and have developed the needed upright culture, with forces from nations whose troops still occupy a lower place on the learning curve.

Sadly there will be more Myanmars and Rwandas, indeed there is a need for more humanitarian intervention in the Sudan and the Congo right now. Granted, several other factors stand in the way of doing what ought to be done in these parts, difficult issues that must be tackled. Regrettably, one must add to the list the lack of professional forces ready to help rather than add injury to the massive suffering of the people of these distressed countries. We have a new norm; now we need now the proper forces to make it part of the new international reality.

On Deterring Iran

“We just have to get used to a nuclear Iran.” Because of Chatham House rules, I am not allowed to inform you who said that. The rules permit quoting what has been said at a meeting, but forbid indicating by whom or naming the group that hosted the event. The Council on Foreign Relations, the Nixon Center and quite a few other groups in Washington conduct their meetings in accordance with these rules, named after the highly respected London think-tank credited with first introducing this form of deliberation. Trust me, the person who made this statement was a high ranking adviser to one of the leading presidential candidates—someone likely to make it into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Behind this simple phrase looms an important and influential foreign policy thesis; namely, that a nuclear-armed Iran could be reliably deterred from employing nuclear weapons. After all, we are often reminded, despite the dire warnings of scores of experts, scholars, and peace activists (myself included), quite a few nations have acquired nuclear arms over the last several decades, and none have employed them. What explains this nuclear restraint, we are told, is that nations who possess such deadly arms fear that if they strike, they will be wiped off the face of the earth by the retaliatory strikes sure to be launched by rival nuclear states.

This thesis that nuclear deterrence can be reliably achieved through the threat of mutual destruction, so called ‘rational deterrence theory.’ attained a prominent place in American security policy at the height of the Cold War.  Indeed, it worked well; the superpowers did not come to nuclear blows—though on several occasions they did come dangerously close to the brink.

Over the years, this rational deterrence theory gained popularity in Political Science and International Affairs departments as well as in the military. Some scholars have even advocated the proliferation of nuclear weapons in developing nations as a way of bolstering security.  For example, in the early 90s, the University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer pushed for encouraging a newly independent Ukraine to maintain an arsenal of former Soviet nuclear weapons. And, in 2000, he pushed for encouraging a nuclear-armed India. In both cases, Mearsheimer argued that nuclear proliferation would enhance security, because “Simply put, no state is likely to attack the homeland or vital interests of a nuclear-armed state for fear that such a move might trigger a horrific nuclear response.” 

The same rational deterrence theory suggests that even rogue states, such as a Kim Jong Il’s North Korea or Mahmoud Ahmadinijad’s Iran can be counted on to act rationally regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Former CENTCOM commander John Abizaid believes that “Nuclear deterrence would work with Iran” since "Iran is not a suicidal nation.” “We can live with a Nuclear Iran,” Barry Posen, a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, assures us, because it knows that “to threaten, much less carry out, a nuclear attack on a nuclear power is to become a nuclear target.”  

I am one of those who holds that the opposite is true; that many states—Iran, among others—have leaders who are very capable of acting in ways that are profoundly irrational, hence posing a serious threat both to other countries as well as to their own. We now have a new report that says volumes on the limits of rationality of heads of state.

George Piro, the FBI agent who interrogated Saddam Hussein over several months, has just revealed what he learned about the Iraqi dictator’s mindset leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. It turns out that Saddam did not expect that the U.S. would respond to his WMD posturing with a full-scale ground invasion.  Saddam “told me” Piro says, that “he initially miscalculated ... President Bush's intentions. He thought the United States would retaliate with the same type of attack as we did in 1998 ... a four-day aerial attack…He survived that one and he was willing to accept that type of attack."  This was not merely some minor tactical “misunderstanding” or “miscalculation” on Saddam’s part; it turned Iraq into an occupied land, caused hundreds of thousands of casualties, a regime change, and, ultimately, his execution.

(One reason Saddam opened up to this rather low-ranking agent was that he believed that the agent was a direct emissary from President Bush.  This suggests how gullible even heads of state can be—not exactly what we’d consider rational.)

The conclusion is not that the next American president should refuse to talk or negotiate with the likes of Kim Jong Il or Mahmoud Ahmadinijad. After all, we talk even to mental patients. However, to dismiss concerns about verbal threats made by such leaders, especially when they are backed up with nuclear arms, is nothing but irrational.