As violence has declined in Iraq, the question of how U.S. troops will disengage from the country is becoming increasingly acute. The best answer lies in the same communitarian thinking and strategies that led to many of the recent security advances on the ground in Iraq: The United States should work with the tribal communities rather than rely on the national government’s police and army.1 In much of Iraq, communal militia groups—Kurds, Sunni and Shia of one faction or another—are the main source of local security (as well as security risks when they are deployed in, or penetrate, other communities’ turf). Further increasing the cooperation with these local, tribal militias would allow a great reduction in the footprint of foreign troops, who could then be largely limited to enforcing the "borders" among the various communities and providing security in the relatively few (and ever decreasing) remaining heterogeneous areas.
The communitarian approach also points to the need for a different conception of representation than the democratic theory which the United States and its allies have attempted to apply in these traditional, tribal societies. Differences are often better worked out among tribal chiefs than elected representatives, especially when their elections are slanted by Western preferences. All this holds for Afghanistan as well, where the national government is even more ephemeral than in Iraq, and where the tribal chiefs (disparagingly called "warlords") and their troops have even greater control of the country.
Communitarian thinking has long pointed to the key observation that in dealing with societies like Iraq and Afghanistan, one must tailor the institutions of the state to fit the sociological reality on the ground, rather than trying to force that reality into an imported preexisting mold. That is, instead of promoting a strong centralized government, a national police force (which, it should be pointed out, even the United States does not have) and a unified national identity, we must work with ethnic and confessional communities to build security from the ground up. The main reason is simple, but was long ignored: The prime loyalty of the citizens of these two countries is to their tribe—not to their state.
Some of the evidence for this communitarian strategy is well-known. Iraqi Kurdistan, which is solidly under the rule of the 50,000 (or more) strong Peshmerga, has suffered very few casualties, civilian or American, since Saddam’s regime was overthrown. In the parts of Iraq controlled by the Shiite Mahdi army, for instance Sadr City (2.5 million inhabitants), relative security prevailed and some basic services were even restored, although fighting among Shiite factions is far from unknown. (As Martha Raddatz showed in her book, The Long Road Home, many casualties in these areas occurred when the U.S. army tried to disarm the Shiite militias on the mistaken assumption that the national Iraqi forces and no other should be the source of security).
It is also well-known that the Taliban were initially defeated by a coalition of tribal forces (the Northern Alliance), although the implications of this basic fact have been too often ignored. Hence, in Afghanistan as well as Iraq, extensive efforts have been made to build national forces and disband the sizable tribal armies, to little avail.
Recent progress in Iraq provides further evidence in favor of the communitarian approach. The relative success of the surge has been often attributed to the increase in the number of American troops and in some cases, to Iraqi troops providing some of the needed forces. Actually, much of what has been achieved is akin to what in the United States is called community policing. Instead of dashing by in humvees and rushing back to their centralized safety zones, many U.S. troops have been stationed in various neighborhoods, and left their cars behind as they engage in foot-patrols. This strategy enabled the troops, admittedly in select cases, to form bonds with the local communities and gain their trust and collaboration.
The strategy of working with local militias rather then relying on the national forces has been particularly successful in the Sunni areas north of Baghdad once known as "the triangle of death." Here, the United States ceased trying to kill off or disband the Sunni militias as well as trying to integrate them into the national Iraqi forces, and instead began working with them to fight against al-Qaeda. This change has been widely credited with the recent significant reduction of violence and casualties in Iraq.
Though initially the United States and its allies may well have to rely on these kinds of communal forces to provide basic security and reduce their military footprint, this certainly does not mean that Iraq must be left in tatters, let alone partitioned along sectarian lines. As the local militias provide and sustain local security, the time grows ripe to develop national agreements among the tribal representatives on a wide range of contested matters, from the distribution of oil revenues to the treatment of heterogeneous areas such as Kirkut. Such give-and-take and reconciliation should also initially take a largely communitarian form, rather than relying on the Western idea of political settlements by elected representatives.
The fact is that many of the elected officials, whose selection is often affected by Americans, are not considered legitimate representatives by the major ethnic and confessional communities they supposedly represent. Hence, initially give-and-take may well have to take place among leaders who acquired their power and legitimacy in other ways. These may be heads or scions of "important" families and clans; mullahs; or commanders who proved their mettle fighting the Russians, Iran or against other tribes. The potential success to be gained from dealing with these kinds of representatives has been very much in evidence in Anbar, where elected officials played no role in negotiating the collaboration of the Sunni tribes with the U.S. troops; the arrangements were worked out with tribal leaders, most notably Sheikh Zaidan al Awad. And, following yet another walkout of Sunni politicians from the national government, it is tribal leaders—in the form of a group called the "Anbar salvation council"—that have stepped in to fill the political power vacuum.
In Afghanistan, initial attempts were made to remove the tribal chiefs, or to "integrate" them into the national government, by giving them various appointments. These attempts, like the efforts to incorporate local militias into a cohesive national army, have by and large failed. For instance, Ismael Khan was moved from his position as a regional warlord in Herat to Kabul, to become a minister in the national government. Soon sectarian riots broke out between Shia and Sunnis in Herat, which Khan had previously been able to prevent. And in his new national position, Khan has been repeatedly charged with being more concerned with his tribe than with the national interest of Afghanistan.
In 2002, Jalaluddin Haqqani, a powerful warlord, offered to support the American forces but was rebuffed. He has since become one of the major rebel leaders roiling Afghanistan. Only very recently have the United States and its allies begun to adopt communitarian security policies in western Afghanistan, hoping to lure local tribal leaders away from al-Qaeda and enlist their support in building basic security.
The British forces in Afghanistan, largely restricted to the southern province of Helmand, are finally planning to apply the communitarian approach. In December 2007, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced his government’s plans for "community defense initiatives," where local volunteers are recruited to defend homes and families. These local forces will be modeled after the traditional Afghan arbakai system, which has deep roots in eastern Afghan villages and has provided security to some of the more remote sections of the country for centuries.
All this holds even for Pakistan, in which the national army is much more effective than in Iraq and Afghanistan. After years of hoping that the national army will be able to deal with the tribes that host al-Qaeda and provide bases for pro-Taliban forces, the United States recently decided to spend $350 million to train and equip an 85,000-strong paramilitary force, composed of fighters from local tribes, known as the Frontier Corps.
In general, the more the United States and its allies embrace the communitarian approach, the fewer foreign troops will be necessary to maintain basic security in Iraq and Afghanistan and other tribal societies. And the more tribal chiefs negotiate with one another—rather than waiting for the national legislature to work things out—the more likely society-wide peace can be achieved and the role of foreign troops minimized.
The plan I am sending you has been approved by many prominent thinkers and
activists in the field. Which includes: Benjamin Ferencz, Chief Prosecutor
at the Nuremburg Trials, Ken Livingstone-Mayor of London,
Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit, Tom Hayden, Richard Falk, Matthew Rothschild, Anthony Arnove, Danny Schecter, Tony Benn- Former Member of the British parliament ,Reggie Rivers,Frida Berrigan,
Robert Jensen, Andrew Bard Schmookler, Burhan Al-Chalabi and others.
I formulated this plan in September 2004, based on a comprehensive
study of the issues. For my plan to be successful it must be implemented
with all seven points beginning to happen within a very short period of
time.
I have run up against a wall of doubt about my plan due to its
rational nature ,and due to its adherence to placing the blame on the
invaders, and then trying to formulate a process of extrication which would
put all entities in this conflict face to face, to begin to finally solve
the dilemmas that exist.
If you read my plan you will see that it is guided by a reasonable
and practical compromise that could end this war and alleviate the
internecine civil violence that is confronting Iraq at this juncture in its
history.
I am making a plea for my plan to be put into action on a wide-scale.
I need you to circulate it and use all the persuasion you have to bring it
to the attention of those in power.
Just reading my plan and sending off an e-mail to me that you received
it will not be enough.
This war must end-we who oppose it can do this by using my plan.
We must fight the power and end the killing.
If you would like to view some comments and criticism about my plan
I direct you to my blog: sevenpointman
Thank you my dear friend,
Howard Roberts
A Seven-point plan for an Exit Strategy in Iraq
1) A timetable for the complete withdrawal of American and British forces
must be announced.
I envision the following procedure, but suitable fine-tuning can be
applied by all the people involved.
A) A ceasefire should be offered by the Occupying side to
representatives of the Sunni insurgency and the Shiite and Kurdish communities. These
representatives would be guaranteed safe passage, to any meetings. The
individual insurgency groups and communities would designate who would attend.
At this meeting a written document declaring a one-month ceasefire,
witnessed by a United Nations authority, will be fashioned and eventually
signed. This document will be released in full, to all Iraqi newspapers, the
foreign press, and the Internet.
( The inclusion of Kurdish communities in this sub-section was added in early September 2006-
as an attempt to define the goals of parity and fairness and to avoid any sectarian splitting
of Iraq.)
B) US and British command will make public its withdrawal, within
sixth-months of 80 % of their troops.
C) Every month, a team of United Nations observers will verify the
effectiveness of the ceasefire.
All incidences on both sides will be reported.
D) Combined representative armed forces of both the Occupying
nations and the insurgency organizations and major community factions. that agreed to the cease fire will
protect the Iraqi people from actions by terrorist cells.
E) Combined representative armed forces from both the Occupying
nations and the insurgency organizations/community factions will begin creating a new military
and police force. Those who served, without extenuating circumstances, in
the previous Iraqi military or police, will be given the first option to
serve.
F) After the second month of the ceasefire, and thereafter, in
increments of 10-20% ,a total of 80% will be withdrawn, to enclaves in Qatar
and Bahrain. The governments of these countries will work out a temporary
land-lease housing arrangement for these troops. During the time the troops
will be in these countries they will not stand down, and can be re-activated
in the theater, if the chain of the command still in Iraq, the newly
formed Iraqi military, the leaders of the insurgency/community factions, and two international
ombudsman (one from the Arab League, one from the United Nations), as a
majority, deem it necessary.
G) One-half of those troops in enclaves will leave three-months after they
arrive, for the United States or other locations, not including Iraq.
H) The other half of the troops in enclaves will leave after
six-months.
I) The remaining 20 % of the Occupying troops will, during this six
month interval, be used as peace-keepers, and will work with all the
designated organizations, to aid in reconstruction and nation-building.
J) After four months they will be moved to enclaves in the above
mentioned countries.
They will remain, still active, for two month, until their return to
the States, Britain and the other involved nations.
2) At the beginning of this period the United States will file a letter with
the Secretary General of the Security Council of the United Nations, making
null and void all written and proscribed orders by the CPA, under R. Paul
Bremer. This will be announced and duly noted.
3) At the beginning of this period all contracts signed by foreign countries
will be considered in abeyance until a system of fair bidding, by both
Iraqi and foreign countries, will be implemented ,by an interim Productivity
and Investment Board, chosen from pertinent sectors of the Iraqi economy.
Local representatives of the 18 provinces of Iraq will put this board
together, in local elections.
4) At the beginning of this period, the United Nations will declare that
Iraq is a sovereign state again, and will be forming a Union of 18
autonomous regions. Each region will, with the help of international
experts, and local bureaucrats, do a census as a first step toward the
creation of a municipal government for all 18 provinces. After the census, a
voting roll will be completed. Any group that gets a list of 15% of the
names on this census will be able to nominate a slate of representatives.
When all the parties have chosen their slates, a period of one-month will be
allowed for campaigning.
Then in a popular election the group with the most votes will represent that
province.
When the voters choose a slate, they will also be asked to choose five
individual members of any of the slates.
The individuals who have the five highest vote counts will represent a
National government.
This whole process, in every province, will be watched by international
observers as well as the local bureaucrats.
During this process of local elections, a central governing board, made up
of United Nations, election governing experts, insurgency organizations, US
and British peacekeepers, and Arab league representatives, will assume the
temporary duties of administering Baghdad, and the central duties of
governing.
When the ninety representatives are elected they will assume the legislative
duties of Iraq for two years.
Within three months the parties that have at least 15% of the
representatives will nominate candidates for President and Prime Minister.
A national wide election for these offices will be held within three months
from their nomination.
The President and the Vice President and the Prime Minister will choose
their cabinet, after the election.
5) All debts accrued by Iraq will be rescheduled to begin payment, on the
principal after one year, and on the interest after two years. If Iraq is
able to handle another loan during this period she should be given a grace
period of two years, from the taking of the loan, to comply with any
structural adjustments.
6) The United States and the United Kingdom shall pay Iraq reparations for
its invasion in the total of 120 billion dollars over a period of twenty
years for damages to its infrastructure. This money can be defrayed as
investment, if the return does not exceed 6.5 %.
7) During the interim period all those accused of crimes against the Iraqi people,
or against international law will be given access to a fair trial.
The extent of the implications of the international nature of the crime, and the
security standards which exist in Iraq will dictate the place of the trial, and its subsequent procedures.
All defendants will have the right to present any evidence they want, and to
choose freely their own lawyers.
If they are found guilty they will be given all necessary appeals provided for by the jurisdiction
of their trials, and will be sentenced in Iraq, after all these appeals are exhausted.
If they are found not guilty they will be released and given protection under international law,
with the strict adherence to these laws by the judicial organs of a sovereign Iraq.
Posted by: Howard Roberts | January 30, 2008 at 08:28 PM