The Basra Lessons

The way the British are abandoning Basra is hardly novel. I saw British troops sneaking out like thieves at night from Palestine in 1947, without turning over their installations or the authority to govern either to the Jewish or to the Arab communities, nor dividing the turf among the contending sides. A bloody war immediately followed. Although the turn over of power in India in 1947 was much more orderly, the parting arrangements the British made were very unstable. They became one reason many hundred thousands of people were driven out of their homes and land and armed strife ensued.

The way the British are abandoning Basra is hardly novel. I saw British troops sneaking out like thieves at night from Palestine in 1947, without turning over their installations or the authority to govern either to the Jewish or to the Arab communities, nor dividing the turf among the contending sides. A bloody war immediately followed. Although the turn over of power in India in 1947 was much more orderly, the parting arrangements the British made were very unstable. They became one reason many hundred thousands of people were driven out of their homes and land and armed strife ensued.

Now the British are claiming that they can leave Basra with impunity because Iraqi forces are ready to take over security there...

...which is about as accurate as if Senator Larry Craig claimed that he went to the public restroom merely to benefit from their conventional use. In effect, Basra is engulfed in a wave of violence propelled by the strife between militias of three Shia factions as well as among various criminal gangs.

The reason the retreat from Basra deserves much more attention than it has received is because the conditions in Basra were especially favorable for a peaceful transition into the post-Saddam Iraq. The population is relatively homogenous; there are no Sunnis or Kurds to speak of. The area sits on a wealth of oil and the city has a major port, both major sources of revenue and employment. The local population was united in its hatred of Saddam’s regime, as it had been one of it major targets. Moreover, in 2003, the people of Basra welcomed the British troops, if not with rose petals the Neo-Cons expected, at least with offerings of sweet tea. The British troops prided themselves at the time for not needing to wear their helmets when touring the city.

If the British could not make a go of it here, if they could establish neither security nor democracy in this city, it makes it even harder to expect that the United States and its allies can succeed on the much more complex and divided and less endowed nation, that of the whole of Iraq.

Basra provides lessons not only for Neo-Cons, who fantasize about flipping the Middle East into peace-loving democracies in short order, but also for those progressive people who believe in “reconstruction”. Many, including those who opposed the invasion of Iraq (and of Afghanistan) accept the Pottery Barn moral tenet evoked by Colin Powell. It is said to hold that ‘if you break it, you own it’. Meaning: if you occupy a nation, you incur an obligation to tend to it. (International law holds a similar concept.) Law professor Noah Feldman wrote a whole book on “What We Owe Iraq.”

Some wits have already pointed out that Pottery Barn has no such rule. The question still stands: What is the scope of the moral obligation of an occupying power? Must it make the nation whole by rebuilding what war destroyed? Should it make up for past abuses, such as the effects of Western sanctions on Iraqi children? Must it also make amends for the colonial era?

As Basra shows, all of this is highly theoretical. Despite considerable efforts, the occupying forces have been simply unable to foster economic development, to reconstruct Iraq, let alone Afghanistan (which can hardly be reconstructed as it was never constructed as a modern economy in the first place). Moreover, in both countries, much of what is repaired or built during the day is blown up at night, and indeed, quite often in broad daylight. Corruption is so high that large parts of the funds dedicated to reconstruction are stolen. And, excessive optimism about what can be achieved stands time and again in the way of that which can be accomplished, as the occupying forces have started scores of projects and completed precious few.

Particularly challenging is that the British retreat leaves the door wide open to the violent imposition of various religious laws based on the Sharia. If the sale of alcohol was banned by local ordinances, one might say that the United States had dry states. If it was only a matter of requiring women to wear the Burqa, one could say—albeit stretching the matter quite a bit—that the West also has dress codes. However, when barbershops in Basra are bombed and liquor stores are blown sky high, that is when the theocracy turns violent—one cannot but wonder what the liberation was all about. To argue, as Francis Fukuyama (the guru of global democratization on the run) does, that these are childhood diseases that every democracy must outgrow, is a cruel indictment. Violent regimes often last for decades, terrorize millions who live in abject poverty and fear, and leave behind killing fields where other millions of bodies are buried.

All these lessons from Basra are horribly depressing. The only silver lining I can discern is that hopefully, from now on, the calls of those who urge the powers that be to march into some country, will be subject to much more careful scrutiny.

Not less noteworthy is the extent to which the Allies’ micro-management of the new political institutions in Basra and elsewhere prevented these institutions from peacefully settling differences among the various factions. This micro-management includes the selection of those who wrote the new constitution, what wording was finally adopted, the selection of those who served as elected leaders—especially the prime minister. It also significantly limited the devolution of power to local provinces.

Last, but not least, we can learn that political development cannot be rushed along and that it is best promoted with non-lethal means—i.e. the ways we are cajoling and motivating China and Vietnam, and not the ways we isolate and threaten Cuba and Iran. If all these lessons are learned, the misery of Basra will still be profound, but at least it may be said that it yielded some major foreign policy insights.

****

Micro- blogging: In Sweden, they have a new bumper sticker. It reads: "Be nice to Americans— or they will bring you democracy.”

Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international relations at The George Washington University. His most recent book is Security First: For A Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy just published by Yale University Press.

...which is about as accurate as if Senator Larry Craig claimed that he went to the public restroom merely to benefit from their conventional use. In effect, Basra is engulfed in a wave of violence propelled by the strife between militias of three Shia factions as well as among various criminal gangs.

The reason the retreat from Basra deserves much more attention than it has received is because the conditions in Basra were especially favorable for a peaceful transition into the post-Saddam Iraq. The population is relatively homogenous; there are no Sunnis or Kurds to speak of. The area sits on a wealth of oil and the city has a major port, both major sources of revenue and employment. The local population was united in its hatred of Saddam’s regime, as it had been one of it major targets. Moreover, in 2003, the people of Basra welcomed the British troops, if not with rose petals the Neo-Cons expected, at least with offerings of sweet tea. The British troops prided themselves at the time for not needing to wear their helmets when touring the city.

If the British could not make a go of it here, if they could establish neither security nor democracy in this city, it makes it even harder to expect that the United States and its allies can succeed on the much more complex and divided and less endowed nation, that of the whole of Iraq.

Basra provides lessons not only for Neo-Cons, who fantasize about flipping the Middle East into peace-loving democracies in short order, but also for those progressive people who believe in “reconstruction”. Many, including those who opposed the invasion of Iraq (and of Afghanistan) accept the Pottery Barn moral tenet evoked by Colin Powell. It is said to hold that ‘if you break it, you own it’. Meaning: if you occupy a nation, you incur an obligation to tend to it. (International law holds a similar concept.) Law professor Noah Feldman wrote a whole book on “What We Owe Iraq.”

Some wits have already pointed out that Pottery Barn has no such rule. The question still stands: What is the scope of the moral obligation of an occupying power? Must it make the nation whole by rebuilding what war destroyed? Should it make up for past abuses, such as the effects of Western sanctions on Iraqi children? Must it also make amends for the colonial era?

As Basra shows, all of this is highly theoretical. Despite considerable efforts, the occupying forces have been simply unable to foster economic development, to reconstruct Iraq, let alone Afghanistan (which can hardly be reconstructed as it was never constructed as a modern economy in the first place). Moreover, in both countries, much of what is repaired or built during the day is blown up at night, and indeed, quite often in broad daylight. Corruption is so high that large parts of the funds dedicated to reconstruction are stolen. And, excessive optimism about what can be achieved stands time and again in the way of that which can be accomplished, as the occupying forces have started scores of projects and completed precious few.

Particularly challenging is that the British retreat leaves the door wide open to the violent imposition of various religious laws based on the Sharia. If the sale of alcohol was banned by local ordinances, one might say that the United States had dry states. If it was only a matter of requiring women to wear the Burqa, one could say—albeit stretching the matter quite a bit—that the West also has dress codes. However, when barbershops in Basra are bombed and liquor stores are blown sky high, that is when the theocracy turns violent—one cannot but wonder what the liberation was all about. To argue, as Francis Fukuyama (the guru of global democratization on the run) does, that these are childhood diseases that every democracy must outgrow, is a cruel indictment. Violent regimes often last for decades, terrorize millions who live in abject poverty and fear, and leave behind killing fields where other millions of bodies are buried.

All these lessons from Basra are horribly depressing. The only silver lining I can discern is that hopefully, from now on, the calls of those who urge the powers that be to march into some country, will be subject to much more careful scrutiny.

Not less noteworthy is the extent to which the Allies’ micro-management of the new political institutions in Basra and elsewhere prevented these institutions from peacefully settling differences among the various factions. This micro-management includes the selection of those who wrote the new constitution, what wording was finally adopted, the selection of those who served as elected leaders—especially the prime minister. It also significantly limited the devolution of power to local provinces.

Last, but not least, we can learn that political development cannot be rushed along and that it is best promoted with non-lethal means—i.e. the ways we are cajoling and motivating China and Vietnam, and not the ways we isolate and threaten Cuba and Iran. If all these lessons are learned, the misery of Basra will still be profound, but at least it may be said that it yielded some major foreign policy insights.

****

Micro- blogging: In Sweden, they have a new bumper sticker. It reads: "Be nice to Americans— or they will bring you democracy.”

Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international relations at The George Washington University. His most recent book is Security First: For A Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy just published by Yale University Press.