PLAN Z: A COMMUNITY BASED SECURITY PLAN FOR IRAQ*

A Communitarian, Sociological Approach

The Baker-Hamilton Commission dismisses an effective, communitarian way to deal with the crisis in Iraq, namely, introducing a High Devolution State (HDS). This would entail granting a high level of autonomy to the 18 provinces that make up Iraq (including in matters concerning security). Most likely, several provinces would combine to form regional governments united by ethnicity or confessional links. (There are differences within each community as to the preferred combinations, especially among the Shia, which need not concern us here, because we hold that each community should be left to work out these combinations on its own.) This approach would seek to tailor state institutions to fit the sociological reality on the ground, rather than to try to force the sociological reality of Iraq to suit an imported, alien national state model. 

Granted, an HDS is far from an ideal institutional format and moving in its direction entails some risks. However under the given conditions it is the best option, and possibly the only viable one. Above all, it allows for a rapid drawdown of foreign troops, as each community, whether ethnic or confessional, would be solely in charge of securing its own order and laws, for its members—rather than being expected to submit to a national pattern. The United States and its allies’ primary remaining role would be to help secure the regional and national borders.

Underlying the following discussion is one key point: most discussions about Iraq (and other newly liberated states such as Afghanistan and Kosovo) start with what outsiders consider a preferred end state. For instance, for these countries the ideal end state is often viewed as a multiethnic, united, democratic, rights-respecting nation-state. The question then is asked: how can the United States and its allies bring about these desiderata in the subject states? Often, despite considerable human and economic costs caused by such overly ambitious designs, the foreign powers persist in the pursuit of their utopian goals.

A key example of this highly unrealistic approach is the continuous attempt to convert the militias (in Iraq) and warlord armies (in Afghanistan) into single national forces. This is highlighted by the folly of deliberately positioning Shia militias as security units in Sunni areas and vice versa—ostensibly to build up their national identification and loyalty. The fact, though, is that the first and foremost loyalty of most Iraqis (as well as Afghans, Kosovars, and many others), is to their ethno-religious community, and not to their nation. (In effect, there is a global trend towards shifting loyalties from nation-states to member communities, and towards responding to this shift by granting more autonomy and devolving more authority to the member communities. This is the case even in well established nations such as Canada and the United Kingdom. Nations that resist this trend—such as Spain and Sri Lanka—face ethnic based terrorism, civil war, and bloodshed.)

As part of letting Iraqis develop the state that suits their societal structure, and one that can command their loyalty, Iraqis should best be allowed a very high level of latitude in governing themselves in their respective provinces. Shia militias should be allowed to police Shia areas, Kurds their parts, and Sunnis theirs—as in effect they often already do. They would no longer be posted on the other groups’ turf. The benefits to be reaped from this approach are made evident by the current security situation in Kurdistan. In a February 2007 interview, Major General Benjamin Mixon, the commanding officer of U.S. forces in northern Iraq and Kurdistan, told 60 Minutes that of 20,000 troops under his command, a mere 60 or 70are stationed in Kurdistan. Because Kurdish areas are patrolled by Kurdish troops, “there’s no need” for an American presence in Kurdistan. (1)

This kind of self-governance can be achieved not merely in the relatively homogenous ethnic regions such as the Kurdish Dahuk or the Shia Maysan provinces, but even in mixed cities, in which neighborhoods—such as the overwhelmingly Shia Sadr City or the Sunni Adhamiya neighborhood in Baghdad—are relatively homogenous and becoming increasingly so. As much as 70% of Baghdad is already ethnically segregated.

Such a separation of the vying parties into their respective corners, which experience shows greatly reduces the violent conflicts among them, will not prevent them from working out nationwide differences, such as the distribution of oil revenues. Those could be negotiated by the regional representatives in the way that other federations hammer out such policies. There is no evidence to show that devolution would make such negotiations more difficult than they have been recently; in effect, if devolution leads to a decrease in hostilities among the groups involved, it will have the opposite effect, making settlement of differences more attainable.

Forming what is called here a High Devolution State in Iraq is an idea that has been laid out already by the former head of the Council on Foreign Relations, Leslie Gelb, in 2003 and again in 2004; Senator Joseph Biden, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 2006; Richard Betts, head of the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution and others. (I elaborated it in Security First published by Yale University Press} Some public figures and academics have called for partition—dividing Iraq into three independent states. Former ambassador to Croatia and Kurd expert Peter Galbraith has proposed at least a partial partition, with the Kurdish north gaining sovereignty and the Sunni/Shiite areas either partitioning entirely or forming a loose confederation. In contrast, under discussion here is some form of federation or confederation. We prefer the term HDS because it would avoid the confusion between partition, in the sense of dividing Iraq into three sovereign nations, not here favored, and federalism, which is close to the HDS. At the same time, the HDS does not presume any particular institutional form. Thus, for instance, the United Kingdom is not a federation, but has significantly increased its devolution during the Blair years. An HDS merely entails that a large proportion of the state’s missions and powers are held by various member communities rather than by the national state, whatever the legal-institutional format.

David Brooks called federation the most promising approach to dealing with Iraq, but pointed out that it is lacking in details. Indeed, many of the details remain to be worked out; some follow. The specific features of an HDS in Iraq can be developed best by a new Council of Eighteen to be formed from the governors or representatives of the 18 provinces that make up Iraq—rather than being selected by foreign powers. This Council may choose to follow the U.S. federal model on some matters (e.g., have an assembly for each province or for several), and in other matters—different models. This would allow for much higher collection of taxes, tolls and royalties by the provinces compared to those collected by the national federation. (The United States follows the opposite model.)  Special attention should be paid to the current E.U. model that requires unanimous decision on many issues, which in effect accords each member veto power on key issues. Such a model would work best to protect the Sunni minority without violating the rights of the other groups.

It is essential that each province (or combination of several) is allowed to control its borders. Checkpoints (which are already common) could be set up, at which identification cards must be presented (and which Iraqis already carry) in order to enter a given region. If entrants are not citizens of the given province, admission can be denied and their cars searched. In this way, sectarian conflicts could be minimized as each ethno-religious community would control its own area—and terrorism curtailed because the presence and visibility of foreign troops would be much reduced. Moreover, there would be few, if any, “national” forces (in effect, militias of the other ethnic groups) present in a given region—another favorite target of terrorism today.  In contrast, local forces composed of the same ethnic or religious background as the citizens of the areas they control, have been able to bring considerable peace to their regions. This is not true merely for the Kurds in the north and the Shia militias in parts of the south, but even in Baghdad.  Thus for instance Sadr City was reported to be an area of relative peace and prosperity—because the area has been patrolled by a Shia militia, the Mahdi Army. (When, early in 2007, under pressure from the United States and its allies, the Mahdi Army withdrew in order to show to the Sunnis that Shia areas are also under control of the “national” army and police, violence increased. Sunnis bombed mosques in this area.) Similarly, the Mosque of the Golden Dome in Samarra, destroyed in 2006, has not yet been rebuilt due to security concerns. The mosque sits in a Sunni neighborhood, and yet Iraqi officials chose a brigade of Shia soldiers to oversee its reconstruction.

Interregional matters, from sharing of the oil revenue to limited population exchanges, would be worked out through negotiation among the members of the said councils. However, intraregional matters, from licenses for barbershops to the legality of liquor stores, would be worked out within each province or group of provinces and would not be subject to an overarching national policy.

The suggested approach would prevent the United States from siding with the Shia against the Sunnis, as some have suggested, which might help the U.S. position in Iraq but hurt it in the region, or vice versa—support the Sunnis against the Shia, which would have the opposite effect. The United States would benefit by acting to separate both warring parties without “tilting” towards one or the other.

Detailed Arguments

I turn here to provide specific points made by advocates of one form or another of HDS. Shortly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Leslie Gelb called for a federal system in Iraq. Even before the insurgency found its legs, Gelb saw the danger in the fact that “the United States has worshipped at the altar of a unified yet unnatural Iraqi state.” In a November 2003 op-ed he predicted the ferocious sectarian bloodshed that would result from a single ethnic or sectarian group attempting to rule a unified Iraq. Instead he proposed a plan that would “make the north and south into self-governing regions,” drawn along ethnic lines, as well as a U.S.-protected population shift in the more heterogeneous center of the country. (2) A year later, in late 2004, he and Peter Galbraith flatly asserted that “if Iraq is to survive as a state, it can do so only as a loose confederation of at least three self-governing entities, with multiethnic Baghdad as a special capital district.” (3).

Senator Biden, in an article comparing Iraq to Bosnia, advocates a three-region solution in which the central government would control border defense, oil production and foreign policy, and the regional governments all else. He notes, “The United States need not impose this solution. Iraq already has a federalist structure. The new constitution provides for Iraq’s 18 provinces to join together in like-minded regions. In the Iraqi constitution, not unlike our own Articles of Confederation, local law trumps the national.”(4) In his piece written together with Leslie Gelb they echo this plan, calling for three general regions—one Sunni, one Shia and one Kurdish. And they note that the “sectarian cleansing” so feared by opponents of autonomy is already underway.

A longtime advocate of higher autonomy for Iraq’s regions, and for Kurdish separation in particular, Peter Galbraith spells out his vision of a partition of Iraq:

The most realistic option is for the U.S. to abandon the idea of creating a new, united Iraq and instead allow the country to break apart, enabling each of the country’s three groups to choose its own government and provide for its own security. It is possible that Sunni and Shi’ite regions would remain together in a loose confederation, but Kurdistan’s full independence is almost certainly a matter of time. Partition is an Iraqi solution. The U.S. could help make it go more smoothly, but it mostly needs to get out of the way. The Kurds already have their region. Last month Iraq’s parliament approved a law to allow the Shi’ites to merge Iraq’s nine southern provinces into a single state. The one group that resists dividing Iraq is the Sunnis, some out of nostalgia for the days when they ran the country and others because they reject all that has happened since Saddam’s overthrow. But with the Kurds and Shi’ites having their regions, partition becomes an accomplished fact. It is hard to see any alternative for the Sunnis except to do the same. (5)

Another advocate of partition, Alexander Downes, draws a parallel between Iraq and Kosovo: after six years, he reports, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo has finally realized that “partition cannot be avoided.” The same should be true of Iraq:

The conventional wisdom among scholars and policymakers opposes solving ethnic conflicts by drawing new borders and creating new states. This view, however, is flawed because the process of fighting civil wars imbues the belligerents with a deep sense of mistrust that makes sharing power after the conflict difficult. This is especially true in ethnic civil wars, in which negotiated power-sharing agreements run a high risk of failing and leading to renewed warfare….the article suggests that the United States should recognize and prepare for the coming partition of Iraq rather than pursuing the futile endeavor of implementing power-sharing among Iraq’s Shi’ites, Kurds, and Sunnis.(6)

Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, advocates a voluntary ethnic relocation (as an alternative to forced ethnic cleansing), but stops just short of partition. Instead, he favors a confederation based on these ethnic relocations. Although he does not explicitly mention it, his language, like that of many others writing on the subject, evokes the similar situation in Kosovo:

Although we should generally favor and support multiethnic democracy, it is not our most important objective – especially not in today’s Iraq, where it may no longer even be achievable. For people trying to cope with the country’s daily perils, staying alive is a higher priority than living in a diverse neighborhood. (7).

Writing in 2006, Gareth Stansfield also came down on the side of a solution that avoids all-out partition but still goes farther than hard federalism. The danger of the latter, he believes, is in vesting the central government with too much power, a mistake that will only attract infighting and obstructionism and highlight ethnic rifts:

History may suggest that a loose confederation of three semi-autonomous statelets is the best long-term solution for Iraq. If the three main groups cannot even agree on a mild form of federalism then the status quo will not hold for long. But if they cannot agree on a modest federalism they are unlikely to agree on a more radical untangling and, as we have seen, recentralisation is also not a realistic option. The best hope for a resolution is to convince some of the main opponents of a looser federation, in particular Muqtada al-Sadr, that it is in their interests…. America and Britain still have some influence over events. We need to consider the most realistic and appropriate options still available. The return to a looser form of the Iraq state is a difficult process that requires careful management. If it can be achieved with little bloodshed and disruption, it will be a great prize. (8)

David Romano suggests that Iraq might profit from adopting a Canadian-style federal state model:

It should seem obvious that the only way to avoid a tyranny of the majority in Iraq, or a return to tyranny of the Sunni minority, involves adopting something like the Canadian state model – including a respect for diversity and multiculturalism, significant regional autonomy, and defense of civil and human rights. While opponents of federalism in Iraq criticize any attempt to “divide the country along ethnic lines,” a regionally based federalist system, wherein the regions largely (but not completely) coincide with linguistic, ethnic, or religious groupings, would resemble the system already in place in countries such as Canada, Belgium and Switzerland. (9)

According to Marina Ottaway, director of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the key to making federalism in Iraq work hinges on the ability to convince the Sunnis that it is in their own best interests. The Kurds and Shias, she says, are already on board: the Kurds have been pushing for it for many years, and the Shias have recently been converted:

They were forced to face the inevitability of Kurdish autonomy and probably its control over Kirkuk province and thus the northern oil fields, the reality of an extremely violent Sunni insurgency, and very slow progress in the formation of a new Iraqi national army…. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq … reversed its position, accepted federalism and decentralization, and called for the formation of a Shia region. (10)

Thus, Ottaway says, convincing the Sunnis will be the real test: “the only policy option now is to convince Sunnis to accept federalism.”(11) This can be done, she believes, with U.S. assistance in ensuring that Sunni demands are met and that adequate incentives are offered. Without this moderating influence, Shia and Kurdish forces in the national government will strip the Sunni region of assets such as oil revenue, which will in turn lead to ongoing Sunni violence, rejection of federalism and support for the insurgency.

A valuable historical perspective is provided by Lawrence Kaplan of The New Republic in March of 2003. As U.S. tanks rolled towards Baghdad, Kaplan decried the State Department’s unwillingness to consider federalism as a course of action for postwar Iraq and its insistence on a unitary central government. Kaplan observed:

The irony is that, by undermining the prospects for Iraqi federalism, the State Department may be contributing to the very instability it intends to avert. That’s because, in the absence of a federal system, each ethnic group is bound to fear domination of the center by another. By centralizing power in Baghdad, the United States encourages a zero-sum game in which the winner takes all. By contrast, under the vision of “administrative federalism” championed by Pentagon officials, which creates several territorial units per ethnic group, each group will have a say in its own governance no matter what happens in Baghdad. But the case for federalism is not merely utilitarian. Iraqi federalism amounts to a precondition for Iraqi democracy. (12)

Finally, the Fund for Peace, in its report on Iraq as a failed state, “From Failed State to Civil War: The Lebanization of Iraq 2003-2006,” concludes that in its current political and security state, some form of decentralization is necessary:

It is possible, for example, to conceive of a decentralized Iraq, an outcome that could permit the country to function as a common market with shared economic assets and perhaps even a single national identity, facilitated through a pre-agreed revenue allocation formula for distributing oil revenues among autonomous regions that have their own governments, police, army, civil service and systems of justice. Another variant of this approach is a negotiated break-up that would include regional or international guarantees for marginalized groups and disputed territories. Both contain the seeds of a “soft landing” outcome that would be the only way to stem the rapid descent into full-scale civil war.(13)

Historical Arguments

A common thread among the advocates of much higher regional autonomy, referred to here as HDS, is to speak of Great Britain’s folly of combining into one state three different tribes. Britain’s 1921 exercise in nation-building is often given as the underlying reason a unified Iraq is impossible, given that in the 500 years prior to Britain’s intervention, various regional communities enjoyed a considerable measure of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Ivan Eland, a senior fellow at the Independent Institute, writes:

To begin with, Iraq—like Czechoslovakia—is an artificial state. After World War I, Iraq was created by the British through combining three provinces of the defunct Ottoman Empire. These provinces had never been united politically, had no feeling of collective nationality, and contained three different ethnic groups subdivided by tribal loyalties. This situation has made the Iraqi state dysfunctional from the start.(14)

Gareth Stansfield of the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter argues:

It is the centralized Iraq—starting with Britain’s creation of the modern state in 1921-23 and reaching its nadir in the nearly three decades of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship—that has failed and should be allowed to die. (15)

Peter Galbraith adds:

Iraq has never been a voluntary union of its peoples. Winston Churchill, as Britain’s Colonial Secretary, created Iraq from the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire in 1921…. Churchill later described Iraq’s forced unity as one of his biggest mistakes. (16)

For others who argued against a unified Iraq, Britain’s actions after World War I constitute prima facie evidence that such a state is not viable, and has existed only due to authoritarian regimes imposed by the Hashemite monarchs and by Saddam Hussein.

Key Objections and Responses

•    “An HDS will lead to bloodshed,” critics claim. Yet today bloodshed is already widespread, precisely because militias of one group are roaming the territories of the others. Separating the fighting parties is likely to reduce, not increase the bloodshed. The same is true if and when one ceases to impose on all these tribes the same “national” policies.

•    “What about mixed neighborhoods?” ask the critics. The process of making some neighborhoods into largely Shia or Sunni enclaves is already taking place, especially in Baghdad, as Peter Galbraith has pointed out.  Moving to enact such separation—rather than fighting it—is likely to be less bloody than the current way. As a result, the same cities will have mono-ethnic parts that might well be initially separated by partitions in the way Belfast, Beirut, and Jerusalem were. All those were unified after a transition period.

•    “Various nations such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran will oppose such a development and interfere, leading to a much larger, regional war,” fear the critics. Note that we call for an HDS, not a three-way partition. Turkey may not favor a highly autonomous Kurdish region, but it has put up with it since 1992. And it may well prefer it over an independent Kurdish state. There is no sign that Turkey would invade Iraq to prevent an HDS, and if it showed signs of leaning in that direction, the United States and its allies could pressure it to avoid such an intervention. Iranian ties to the Shia areas of Iraq are particularly troubling, yet a closer examination shows that on many issues Iraqi and Iranian Shias do not see eye-to-eye. Moreover, in the longer run, Iran will need to be deterred anyhow one way or the other, if peace is going to be established in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, which has shown increasing interest in playing a role in the conflict, might be invited, rather than denied, the opportunity to send its troops to protect the Sunni parts. The Saudis might well realize that an HDS is the best way to protect Sunnis in Iraq from the Shia majority. Saudi Arabia may well have a special role to play in bringing about an HDS. One of the key issues that would be involved in the establishment of an HDS is the distribution of the revenue from oil. Oil fields in Iraq lie predominantly in non-Sunni areas, but Sunnis are seeking a share of oil profits. There is no reason to believe that settling the question of who gets what percentage of the revenue—and enforcing whatever agreement is made—will be more difficult in an HDS than in the current state of tribal warfare. The most likely outcome is that the Sunnis will receive less than they seek. They may be induced to be more accepting of an HDS if Saudi Arabia made up their revenue shortfall. 

More generally, it is true that Iraqi problems ought to be viewed within the context of the regional dynamic. There are those, for instance, who argue that the road to Baghdad runs via Jerusalem (meaning that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have to be settled first) or via Tehran (suggesting that Iran must first be defanged). Still others argue that the road to Beirut and Damascus goes via Baghdad. While it is true of course that all these regional challenges are linked, they are not so closely related that one cannot make significant progress in one without solving the others. This paper focuses on the least worst option for Iraq in the near future. It would benefit if other regional problems are treated appropriately at the same time, but moving toward an HDS is not dependent on resolving these other conflicts.

Even if some of the regional powers objected to this plan, there is no obvious reason why say Iran or Turkey should be given veto power over the issue or could stop the development of an HDS, especially if endorsed by the Iraqis themselves. In effect, all trends point toward the development of one. The main question is whether the United States and its allies should continue to fight it, in the name of a national utopian endpoint, or accelerate the process and benefit from the reduction in hostilities, to result from separating the warring parties.

Michael Greve, director of the Federalism Project at the American Enterprise Institute, holds that federalism “entrenches the political instabilities it is meant to contain.” (17) Iraq’s current constitution, which provides for highly autonomous federal regions, “is at best a state of (hopefully) suspended civil war…. Cooperative federalism and transfer payments may sometimes be the only way to buy (literally) a temporary respite from regional or ethnic separatism. Even so, the U.N.-U.S. push for proportional representation and cooperative federalism in Iraq looks more like a reflex than a carefully considered option. And it only postpones the hard work of building a stable constitutional order—one not subject to political drift, indecision, gridlock, and sclerosis.” This is another example of how the pursuit of a utopian goal (in this case, a multiethnic “stable constitutional order”), formulated by outsiders and imported—the way Iraq was created in the first place—stands in the way of a workable approach.

Imad Salamey and Frederic Pearson acknowledge that although elements of federalism have been “inherent” in much of the planning of Iraq, and that its constitution provides for it, they fear that the “struggle for resources” would not disappear with a federal solution, and would “fuel tensions.” (18) This is true enough, but there is no sign that this struggle can be avoided even if federalism is not adopted, and nation-wide political solutions might actually be easier to come by once the parties are safely ensconced in their well protected provinces.

Alexander Dawoody notes that the past fifteen years have seen increasingly vocal and unified Kurdish support for autonomy or full, sovereign independence. However he sees a distinct danger that the Kurds’ internal rifts would be magnified by partition. This could be the case, and the same holds true for conflicts between radical and moderate Shia factions. However, these tensions are present today; the low devolution state has not succeeded in overriding these differences. It is, however, a mistake to imply that there is a choice between a well unified nation and regional separation. The first option is not, however much it is wished for, currently attainable, and the second one might well be the shortest way to get to the first one.

Federalism and Regional Autonomy are Compatible with Iraq’s Constitution

Federalism—and by extension, the HDS—is explicitly and amply provided for in Iraq’s new Constitution. Although Article 13 makes the Constitution the “supreme and highest law in Iraq,” Article 116 says, “The regional authority has the right to amend the implementation of federal law in the region in the case of a contradiction between the federal and regional law in matters that do not pertain to the exclusive powers of federal authorities.” Article 111 states that “all that is not written in the exclusive powers of the federal authorities is in the authority of the regions.” In the event of a dispute, the article goes on to say, priority will be given to the regional law. Article 116 also provides for diplomatic representation of its various provinces within its embassies, which, one author notes, makes it unique in the world in that respect.

Regarding security, the Constitution also appears to devolve quite a bit of authority to the regions. Article 129 states, “The region’s government is responsible for all that is required to manage the region, in particular establishing and organizing internal security forces for the region such as police, security and regional guards.” The Constitution also acknowledges the traditional autonomy of the Kurdish region. Finally, Article 117 clearly states that “the regional authority shall have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region.” The Iraqi Constitution obviously does not provide for outright partition of Iraqi into two or more sovereign states, but it does confer a high level of autonomy and legal freedom to the provinces (often, granted, in tension with other articles of the document, articles promoted by the United States).

In Conclusion

Discussions of foreign policy in general and Iraq in particular often start with what is desired—say, a democratic process. These discussions and plans, however, tend vastly to overestimate what foreign powers can accomplish, even if there were to be better planning, more boots on the ground, etc. Second they assume that the players involved are unitary, sovereign nations, when in reality they are increasingly non-state actors. This is especially the case in Iraq where the real power players are various ethnic militias, tribal organizations and religious sects.

An HDS sets the conditions under which most of the work for formatting a new Iraq can be carried out by the main players in that nation—the three main ethno-religious communities. It would reduce the incentive for sectarian armed conflicts, provide a setting for political give-and-take, and greatly curtail the need for foreign troops.

* To be published in National Interest, Issue 92, Nov/Dec 2007

1. Simon, Bob (anchor). “The Other Iraq; Kurdistan, Part of Iraq Where Americans are Beloved.” 60 Minutes, 18 February 2007.
2. Gelb, Leslie H. “The Three-State Solution,” The New York Times, 25 November 2003.
3. Gelb, Leslie H. and Galbraith, Peter. “Why Jan. 30 Won’t Work,” The Los Angeles Times, 3 December 2004.
4. Biden Jr., Joseph R. “Breathing Room,” The National Interest, Fall 2006.
5. Galbraith, Peter W. “The Case for Dividing Iraq,” Time, 168;20, 13 November 2006, 28.
6. Downes, Alexander B. “More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars,” SAIS Review XXVI;1, Winter-Spring 2006, 49.
7. O’Hanlon, Michael E. “Voluntary Ethnic Relocation in Iraq?” Los Angeles Times, 27 August 2006.
8. Stansfield, Gareth. “Divide and Heal,” Prospect Magazine, 122, May 2006.
9. Romano, David. “From Dictatorship to Democracy—Uniting Diversity in the Tent of Federalism,” Policy Options, February-March 2004.
10. Ottaway, Marina. “Back from the Bring: A Strategy for Iraq,” Policy Brief 43, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2005, 3.
11. Ibid, 6.
12. Kaplan, Lawrence F. “Federal Reserve,” The New Republic, 17 March 2003, 17.
13. Baker, Pauline H. “From Failed State to Civil War: The Lebanization of Iraq 2003-2006” The Fund for Peace, April 2006, 4.
14. Eland, Ivan. “A Way Out of the Mesopotamian Morass?” Independent Institute Working Paper 55, 13 October 2004, 10.
15. Stansfield, Gareth. “Divide and Heal,” Prospect Magazine, 122, May 2006.
16. Galbraith, Peter W. “The Case for Dividing Iraq,” Time, 168;20, 13 November 2006, 28.
17. Greve, Michael S. “Germany’s Bad Example for Iraq,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October 2005.
18. Salamey, Imad and Pearson, Frederic. “The Crisis of Federalism and Electoral Strategies in Iraq,” International Studies Perspectives, 6, 2005, 197.

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Amitai Etzioni is University Professor at The George Washington University, and the author of Security First: For A Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 2007).

www.securityfirstbook.com