Transcript. You may also watch my testimony here.
Lord Tom King
Dr Etzioni, welcome. Thank you for coming very much to this first hearing of The Iraq Commission, this morning. You know that what we’re looking at is the challenges faced by our countries and the present situation in Iraq, not looking backwards but looking forwards. If I could introduce my colleagues, with, with me today: Sir Patrick Walker, who’s a former Director General MI5, with which you may be familiar; Maeve Sherlock who is the former Director of the Refugee Council; Dr Rosemary Hollis who’s Research Director of Chatham House; Professor Brian Brivati, Professor of Contemporary History at Kingston University. I believe you’d like to make an opening statement. We’d be very pleased to hear it. Yes.
Dr Etzioni
Well thank you very, very much for this opportunity. Obviously it is a matter of grave concern to all of us, not just as citizens, but as human beings and it’s indeed a major tragedy in the making. I’ll be brief because I’d much rather answer questions than declare myself, but I should add that the White House I served in was the Jimmy Carter White House not the Bush White House. I also lived in the Middle East for 21 years and served for two and a half years as a commando fighter. The main option I’d like to call attention to – and there are no good options left, most of us long recognized – which the Baker-Hamilton Commission --dismissed in my judgement, deserves another look. We refer to it as plan Z, a kind of last resort. It calls for turning Iraq into a high devolution state. And the idea is a communitarian idea – to recognize that Iraq is not yet a nation but still largely a tribal society, composed of ethnic and confessional communities, which was artificially created in the 1920s by foreign powers. Now, it’s true that even the Kurds confess to some loyalty to Iraq, but when there’s a clash between national loyalty and tribal loyalty, the tribal loyalty prevails, practically in every single case. Now when you approach Iraq – and by the way other places like Afghanistan – with the notion that you want the local militias to transfer their loyalties and become national forces, it has the result you put Sunni units in Shia areas, and Shia areas in Sunni areas on the ground that you want them to become national forces. It’s a very sensible approach if you believe that it is possible. If you accept the fact that at this stage, sadly, when there is a clash between national and local loyalty to give priority to the communal loyalty, then the second best or least worse solution is to allow initially each militia to control its own area. To give just one statistic, there are 175,000 Kurdish soldiers and only 70 US soldiers in the north of Iraq. The number of American casualties in the north has been one and very few Iraqi ones. This of course is an extreme example because the north is particularly pacified. But if you look at Sadr City where two and a half million Shia live, who suffered particularly under Saddam, until the allied force started to put pressure on the militia to retreat, it was a relatively peaceful area right in the centre of Baghdad: the markets were open; people were working; children were going to school. But the allied force had this concept that because the Sunnis are made to become national the Shia also have to become national. The militia was made to retreat, Sunnis start bombing their mosque then they start sending death squads over to Sunni areas. I could imagine where you would turn over Sadr City back to the militia. 70% of Baghdad is already mono-ethnic. I don’t like it. I would much rather for them to all live like brothers and sisters. but given the present conditions like in Belfast, like in Jerusalem, like in Berlin temporary partition, with walls in effect buys you a cooling off, which then allows the parties to sit down and negotiate. I must admit – and I want to be very upfront about it – there are a lot of unpleasant consequences. For instance the British force in Basra intervened to keep the liquor stores open, and to keep the barber shops open, on the ground that it’s a national policy to allow the sale of liquor and to not force men to grow beards. Again, this is the concept that there’s a national government with a national policy. But in the United States we allow dry states, we have dress codes. I think for the time being we should recognize local codes and intervene only at the borders among the various communities. This in short is Plan Z. It is not under active consideration. Senator Biden is one who supports this approach. Sadly, the much more likely course is the one which is all too well known which is going to lead to the Vietnamisation of Iraq. I recommend any time somebody is asked to testify, a computer should pull up his last predictions to give commissions such as yours some perspective about their credibility. And I like to stand by that record. I was one of the sixty American intellectuals who wrote the Letter from Americans in support of the war against terrorism after 9/11, but I absolutely refused when the same group issued a letter to support the war in Iraq. And in a book I published early in 2004, called From Empire to Community, I wrote that it’s going to end up like Vietnam and I’ll stand by that statement. It’s worse than Vietnam because this time there are going to be dominoes that fall. This time there is no question that if the United States would leave this would be followed by major bloodshed. And the the Sunni countries will not fight; they will appease the Shia ones, especially Iran. I don’t think it’s possible to decouple the discussion of Iraq from the discussion of Iran because the future of the Middle East will not be determined in Jerusalem not in Jaffa, not in Tel Aviv and not in Cairo, but in Tehran. the reason is that if the United States and its allied forces leave Iraq and do not deal with Iran, many nations in the area will be overrun by strong local Islamic forces, including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. I have little doubt that Tehran will develop a nuclear weapon. It will become the superpower of the area. And whatever relationship develops with it by nations of the area, will determine the relations between them and the West. Now, there are a variety of options. The one that I recommend – and I just published a book called Security First on the subject – is the following bargain. There’s no reason in the world I can imagine why Iran will want to help the United States retreat from Iraq and not be humiliated. Why possibly would they want to do that? But there is something they’re very keen on and I was the guest of the reformers, and I spent ten days in Iran. They are very keen on a non-aggression treaty. It may sound odd, but you see the Bush administration keeps talking about regime change. They keep saying to Iran and to North Korea that for beginners we want you to give up on your government and, and on everything you believe in. It’s really like asking Bush to turn the White House over to Gore and go and campaign for gay rights. I mean this is the way we approach Iran and that’s not a good conversation starter-- to say that you should give up your power and your regime, which means everything you believe in. What they are – and they quite openly stated so – keen to have, is an understanding that the United States will not use force to change their regime and will underwrite that commitment by thinning out of some of the bases by which we are surrounding Iran. Go back to the days the Soviet Union kept saying, that we surround them with bases and missiles, and you could read it both ways. A similar situation if you are in Iranian shoes, where you keep being told that you are next on the list of the axis of evil and that we are, the CIA is, spending 75 million in supporting your ethnic groups opposed to the Iran government. Then you are willing to give up some things in order to block that possibility. So let me close by saying what I’m really talking about is the combination of soft and hard power. I want to make this clear. It’s not just a question of being open to negotiations. If there is no sense in Iran that they face forced regime change if they will not come to a peaceful settlement in which they will give up the military nuclear ambitions in exchange for a non-aggression treaty, there is no reason for them to come to the bargaining table. The latest fashion is to talk about smart power – this kind of a cocktail of soft power with hard power – never mind those labels – but the main point is that if Iran will not sit down and negotiate in good faith that there will be bad consequences is essential, in my judgement, as part of the scenario which would lead it to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. And the continued presence of the West in the Middle East. Thank you for your patience.
Lord Tom King
Thank you very much. Um… there was one group you didn’t actually mention in looking at um, the situation in Iraq and whether it’s tribal, um, or the degree it might be national, are the foreigners. Which obviously Al Qaeda would be seen as one of the key elements in that. Would you like to comment about their position in a, in a future, any future developments?
Dr Etzioni
Reliable statistics on this point are not easy to come by. But I, from the little I know – most of the fighting is sectarian. And also the cooperation between the local population and the foreigners is again affected by the relationship between the local groups and the occupying forces. So if for instance just to say that the example of Sadr City, if Sadr City would be controlled by its own militia and there would be no American or British presence in Sadr City, I don’t see what Al Qaeda could do in Sadr City, or that they would be particularly welcome or tolerated. The famous Mao line that “the fish need an ocean to swim in” the ocean. And so the longer this continues the more we face this mixture of foreigners and, and locals. In short I think Al Qaeda is a relatively small problem numerically and otherwise politically compared to the local groups.
Lord Tom King
Sir Patrick?
Sir Patrick Walker
The, this concept of militia government I can see, it, it’s a sort of a practical exception acceptance of a, the current situation. When you talk about, um, militia government I can see that that is a, a practical solution to the current situation. But we’ve just, we heard earlier that 95% of the revenue of Iraq comes from oil industry. How would you separate or distribute that funding which is absolutely crucial to the successful running of Iraq?
Dr Etzioni
It’s a very fair question. It does involve a political deal between the Sunnis and the Shia and the Kurds. But I see no reason that it will be more difficult if there would be less killing than at the current level of hostility. So if you for a moment think about separating them into their corners, and then negotiating, I don’t see why this would become more difficult in negotiating under the current circumstances. Second, I would lean on Saudi Arabia to make up for some of the Sunni shortfall. Increasing the pie so to speak.
Sir Patrick Walker
Mh
Dr Etzioni
The only way out of this corner as we know from other political situations is to increase the pie. And the only major source I can see if for compensating the Sunni for some of their losses would be the Saudi money.
Sir Patrick Walker
Yes but you see it’s in the Shia area in the south there are a series of militia.
Dr Etzioni
Mm
Sir Patrick Walker
So this negotiation would have to take place and would be extremely complicated with not just Shia, Sunni, Kurds, but with various blocks.
Dr Etzioni
That’s true, but it, I don’t see that the tribal separation makes thing worse or more difficult than it is now. You are absolutely right that there are Shia groups fighting each other. But again I cannot imagine why it’s our duty, or why we’re called for even can send our boys and girls to have the Shia make peace with each other. I agree with your, you that it’s not a very attractive option,
Sir Patrick Walker
Mm.
Dr Etzioni
but the question is compared to what? Compared to continuing the present one or just walking away on Monday?
Sir Patrick Walker
Mm.
Lord Tom King
er, as preparation to the ne, those negotiations, I think is an option which is somewhat less worse than the others. That’s all I can for it.
Sir Patrick Walker
Mm.
Lord Tom King
Rosemary Hollis.
Rosemary Hollis
Er, you mentioned earlier, professor, that you thought it was fair enough that the liquor stores be closed in Basra and that there be stricter rules for women’s dress as a local decision. Can I put to you that if the British were trying to keep those stores open initially they could well have been approached locally by minorities within the Iraqi population who actually relied on the previous regime of Saddam Hussein to protect them from the kind of sectarian authoritarianism that they perceived motivated the Iraqi parties that are not predominant in government.
Dr Etzioni
I appreciate this very much and it gives me a chance to correct what I might have mis-stated, though I hope I didn’t. I don’t think that it’s an attractive option at all. I, I believe that human rights are sacred, including women rights. And so if it would be up to me every human being in the world would have full access to the full list of human rights, including socio-economic rights, which in the United States we haven’t come yet to respect. So it’s not a question of what is right, it’s a question at what point we intervene by the use of force.
Rosemary Hollis
No, no, no. Please forgive.
Dr Etzioni
Mm, mm, mm.
Rosemary Hollis
To clarify…
Dr Etzioni
Yeah.
Rosemary Hollis
I, you suggested that what was motivating the British was an inappropriate notion of the national
Dr Etzioni
Right. Right.
Rosemary Hollis
project, and I was saying it could well have been the British caught between two lobbying positions at the local level, nothing to do with the national.
Dr Etzioni
Well in this case I’ll amend my statement saying they shouldn’t be, become party to minority/majority fight within any particular town.
Rosemary Hollis
Er, they could well have been trying to maintain a, a pre-existing situation in Basra. From what I hear from the population, people who, who have lived and worked in Basra all their life
Dr Etzioni
Mm, mm.
Rosemary Hollis
including medics, and university professors
Dr Etzioni
Mm.
Rosemary Hollis
there has been a massive transformation
Dr Etzioni
Mm hmm.
Rosemary Hollis
of the social norms in Basra. This was a power struggle. Now you are basically saying that an occupying force cannot take sides in a local power structure. But basically you’re saying therefore there is nothing that they can do.
Dr Etzioni
If the consequence of this intervention would be something that vaguely resembles elementary security which is essential for everything, I think the most sacred right, on which all the other ones are based from my viewpoint, is the right to be secure in your person. And if the result of all this process is that peoples’ kids cannot go to school, that people sleep in their bathtubs because of stray bullets, if people feel imprisoned in their homes, then none of their rights has been secured. And so if that is the consequence, yes, I, I will come to the tragic conclusion that we must protect life first. So if the alternative is – and again my whole discussion assumed that the alternative to my plan is just leaving-- they surely are not going to have barber shops and the liquor stores or women rights. So the question is…
Rosemary Hollis
So don’t leave…
Dr Etzioni
… so at least the killing stopped. This is really like stopping genocide in Darfur. Does it mean we also must provide for, for everything else? I wish we could but we cannot. We can barely hope one day to stop all genocide. So I think our first duty is to protect life. That’s the first duty of the state was always to protect life. Sir Lewis just came back to Washington to talk one more time about the clash of civilisation , which raises the question whom are we vying with, whom are we fighting. My answer to this is it’s only those who support violence. So I have no problem with moderate Islam. I would support a moderate Muslim party the AK in Turkey. I think we should have long ago supported Sistani. And so this notion that we have a struggle with Islam and that the only people on our side are those who support liberal democracy including human rights, is not a position we can sustain. So for the first round I would argue we need to ally ourself with everybody who is willing to commit themselves to stop the killing. Then we come to stage two.
Lord Tom King
Er, Professor Brivati.
Professor Brivati
Er, let, let me pick up on that because that, that, that loops back to part of your answer about Al Qaeda because… um it seems to me that – and I absolutely take the point that you’re saying there are no good options and that you’re not, you know, that universal human rights would be the ideal – um… but you laid out three options. One is the current attempt at a national federal solution of some kind. The second is withdrawal now and the blood bath that follows and the third is the communitarian one. So everybody goes to their bases, right? What’s the next stage? What are the next ten words in that policy? Because my problem is they go to those bases and then civil war within Islam is then carried out within those situations. But I don’t agree that your characterisation of Al Qaeda. I, I think you un, you understate it, I think, there is potential significance in any of these scenarios of the continuing foreign presence. It seems to me that in order to fight that foreign presence you’re not creating benevolent militia centres, you’re actually possibly creating bases where there is even further polarisation in those communities and I think that’s a real danger. But let’s say you don’t do that. Let’s say the militia centres are a moderating force; that they do establish some civil society that we would recognise. How do you get them back then? Do you break up Iraq? I mean isn’t the logical consequence of what you’re saying we, we, we have three states?
Dr Etzioni
For me it is very critical point. You referred to creating a civil society. I would never make that claim.
Professor Brivati
OK
Dr Etzioni
Because that again, that for me is the next stage. Lets first help create a society in which people don’t kill each other.
Professor Brivati
Mm.
Dr Etzioni
The notion that the test is if you do or cannot create a civil society, from my viewpoint is much too high a standard. That is the regime change
Professor Brivati
OK
Dr Etzioni
idea. So my standard is much more elementary. Now I think it’s best to take the region by region. North – we basically already have the situation, though there are areas, like Kirkuk and such, that are contested and there is a danger of Turkey interventions. The Kurds surely would like their independence but
they realise they are unrealistic and if they’re going to go for independence. So they are accepting to become a highly autonomous part of Iraq. Is it a civil society? Oh God, no. Do they respect women rights? No, they don’t. Should they? Of course they should. But for now at, at least people live so tomorrow they can work out…
Professor Brivati
Yeah.
Dr Etzioni
the rights issue.
Professor Brivati
But, but of course they, as you say they’ve had 12 years… or so longer
Dr Etzioni
Er, er…
Professor Brivati
in order to get to that point.
Dr Etzioni
Fair enough. Sadr City, two and a half million people, 70% of Baghdad is now ethnically segregated. Do I like it? No, of course not. I like them all to be brothers and sisters. You tell me how to do that, I, I’ll give my right arm. The fact there’s no way on earth we can… so what we can do now is to allow each neighbourhood to regulate itself. Now I cannot see the reason why if you have – let, let’s take this example of Sadr City – control by militia which occasionally will have infighting the way there were among the Irish or the Palestinians, that it is our duty to force them to settle their differences.
Professor Brivati
Mm.
Dr Etzioni
So the Shia will have to sort out things with each other. But why they would want foreign terrorists to come and blow up their quarters when there are no Americans or other foreign forces, I don’t see the reason. I see Al Qaeda wanting to use that for as a base. They may ask say Sadr City to be the base so they could attack other places. I can see that.
Professor Brivati
But the, but the reason surely is that Al Qaeda is not, um, primarily in my view
Dr Etzioni
Mm.
Professor Brivati
fighting the west, it’s fighting moderate Islam.
Dr Etzioni
Mm.
Professor Brivati
It doesn’t want to win a war against the west as much as it wants to win a war within Islam. So the motivation for Al Qaeda to con, to attack and try and take over
Dr Etzioni
Mm hmm.
Professor Brivati
those pockets
Dr Etzioni
Mm hmm.
Professor Brivati
would be extremely high. That would be major triumph wouldn’t it?
Dr Etzioni
Well this is a pressing question, is if the Taliban and Al Qaeda are one and the same thing. Er I’m, I’m not completely
Professor Brivati
OK.
Dr Etzioni
er sure about that. But, again let’s say that there are 3,000 Al Qaeda in, in Sadr City, and 60,000 Shia militia. I don’t see that contest.
Professor Brivati
Yeah.
Dr Etzioni
They may be going Taliban anyhow, in the sense of becoming very strict Muslims. But I see no way to stop such a development.
Professor Brivati
Right.
Dr Etzioni
So I don’t see Al Qaeda being THE problem.
Professor Brivati
OK. Sorry, I’m…
Lord Tom King
Maeve Sherlock.
Maeve Sherlock
Just one follow up there if I may, professor. You mention that, um, you would like to look at bringing Saudi money in to shore up the, um to, to make good the shortfall. Um, do you think money would come without influence and are we not simply going to see a range of players moving in? Um, if we, if we create the kind of segregation describe with communities that are fundamentally unstable and borders that are going to see a lot of incursions going on? And will that not simply suck in other players in the region to fight out a proxy war and look for bases?
Dr Etzioni
It’s, it’s a very fair question so let me quickly go through it again. I think it’s helpful to be specific. Turkey may send forces into Kurdistan: they already tried. I think they are a lot better if Kurdistan stays part of Iraq. But I do not know how they will conduct themselves once they find out that they’re not going to become members of the EU and how much influence the US and EU will have over them at that point. But basically I believe there is sufficient leverage for NATO, the United States and other countries to prevent an outright invasion of Turkey into Kurdistan, if the Kurd do not declare independence. Now as to the Shia in the south, Iran may march in there though there are actually considerable tensions already between the local Shia and the Iranian Shia. True there is no question that Iran is going to win there. We create a horrible situation and one of the many prices we’re going to pay, the most from my viewpoint other than the human costs, the most severe costs will be that we crown Iran as a superpower of the whole area, supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, supporting Islamic group in Jordan, supporting even more extreme group in Saudi and in Egypt. So I think you’re right, Iran will interfere in the south. I don’t see any way we can stop that. So now we come to the integrated cities and that’s where – the mixed cities – and that’s where it’s most difficult. And I think as we retreat from patrolling all the cities, we basically will remain on the borders helping enforce the borders among the various cantons. Again not for ever, but for the transition period. So I see in bar…
Professor Brivati
Just to push you… so the transition to what. What are the next ten… stay… what are the next [INAUDIBLE]
Dr Etzioni
But what happened in Belfast? What happened in other areas where you have two sides who are each other’s throats and killing each other like crazy? You get a cooling off period. And, you basically send them to their quarters and you put a wall in between and you have British forces patrolling the border until there is first of all less killing and less revenge. And then you, you start working – it’s a ten year process, a 20 year process.
Professor Brivati
Yeah.
Dr Etzioni
By providing incentives for them to come to a table and negotiate and you provide external rewards like the Saudis want to have the Sunni accept and get to accept a new status so it’s a process of cooling down and negotiating the differences, under a somewhat less inflamed condition.
Lord Tom King
Dr Etzioni, we could go on a long time, but thank you very much indeed for coming and talking to us. We’re most grateful.
Dr Etzioni
I appreciate your patience with me.
Lord Tom King
Thank you so much.
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